[originally posted to Machiavelli and Political Philosophy Yahoo!Group (May-Sep 2002]

Machiavelli’s The Prince

Commentary by

Joseph Martin

[Joe's commentary on Machiavelli's "The Prince" has been visited 2136 times since 14 March 2007]

Dedication

To the Magnificent

Lorenzo Di Piero De' Medici:

(I found this translation at

ftp://ftp.ibiblio.org/pub/docs/books/gutenberg/etext98/tprnc10.txt )

Translated by W. K. Marriott

Those who strive to obtain the good graces of a prince are accustomed to come before him with such things as they hold most precious, or in which they see him take most delight; whence one often sees horses, arms, cloth of gold, precious stones, and similar ornaments presented to princes, worthy of their greatness. Desiring therefore to present myself to your Magnificence with some testimony of my devotion towards you, I have not found among my possessions anything which I hold more dear than, or value so much as, the knowledge of the actions of great men, acquired by long experience in contemporary affairs, and a continual study of antiquity; which, having reflected upon it with great and prolonged diligence, I now send, digested into a little volume, to your Magnificence.

And although I may consider this work unworthy of your countenance, nevertheless I trust much to your benignity that it may be acceptable, seeing that it is not possible for me to make a better gift than to offer you the opportunity of understanding in the shortest time all that I have learnt in so many years, and with so many troubles and dangers; which work I have not embellished with swelling or magnificent words, nor stuffed with rounded periods, nor with any extrinsic allurements or adornments whatever, with which so many are accustomed to embellish their works; for I have wished either that no honour should be given it, or else that the truth of the matter and the weightiness of the theme shall make it acceptable. Nor do I hold with those who regard it as a presumption if a man of low and humble condition dare to discuss and settle the concerns of princes; because, just as those who draw landscapes place themselves below in the plain to contemplate the nature of the mountains and of lofty places, and in order to contemplate the plains place themselves upon high mountains, even so to understand the nature of the people it needs to be a prince, and to understand that if princes it needs to be of the people.

Take then, your Magnificence, this little gift in the spirit in which I send it; wherein, if it be diligently read and considered by you, you will learn my extreme desire that you should attain that greatness which fortune and your other attributes promise. And if your Magnificence from the summit of your greatness will sometimes turn your eyes to these lower regions, you will see how unmeritedly I suffer a great and continued malignity of fortune.

Commentary

Who was this book written for? It would seem that Machiavelli has answered us. He dedicates this book to Lorenzo De’ Medici. Machiavelli begins his dedication by contrasting what he brings (a prince) to what others typically bring. These things he mentions (horses, arms, cloth of gold, precious stones) are said to be esteemed by either the giver or the recipient of these items. We hesitate, and perhaps Machiavelli hesitates, to call them gifts because the giver expects from the Prince something in return – his good graces. Does Machiavelli esteem the things just mentioned? Does our Prince, Lorenzo De’ Medici esteem them? In any case, he says these things are worthy of the greatness of a Prince. If Machiavelli doesn’t esteem the above items, hold them most precious, and Lorenzo does – What?

Machiavelli sends the thing he holds most precious – knowledge. Note that this is not mentioned in the list of items in the first sentence. Machiavelli is being unconventional. Knowledge would seem to be something one does not bring a prince. Why? Do they not want it? Perhaps they do not need it. One wonders if the Princes of the world already suspect, or perhaps they believe they know, that knowledge is power. After all, who is stronger, or has more power, than the Prince? Power is knowledge. Is the Prince already enlightened?

In any case, this knowledge that Machiavelli holds most dear is the knowledge of the actions of great men. This would seem to square nicely with our suggestion that the Prince already knows (or believes) that power is knowledge. After all, why would Machiavelli hold so dear knowledge of the actions of fools? At this point one is tempted to say that if he wanted to know fools he would study the people!

But is our Prince, Lorenzo, a great man? He is certainly a powerful man, but is he a knowledgeable man? Machiavelli says he has gained this knowledge (of the actions of great men) through experience in contemporary affairs and the study of antiquity, both of which he has reflected upon. He now sends a digested (condensed) form of this to our prince. Why send a condensed volume? Obviously, a Prince is a busy man. But still, a condensed (or digested) form should make us wonder if Machiavelli left anything out. Perhaps our 'enlightened' prince doesn't need to have Machiavelli spell out what he means? Perhaps!

Machiavelli continues by saying that this work is unworthy of his (Lorenzo) countenance, or consideration, but adds that his kindness will convince him to accept it. Does Machiavelli consider kindness a Princely virtue? He adds that the reason to do this is that the Prince will gain in a short time what it took Machiavelli a long time (many years) to learn. Will the Prince be able to learn this in such a short time because, as a man of power, he is already a man of knowledge? But if our prince, or any Prince, is not a man of knowledge – could he learn what Machiavelli teaches in a short while? Does Machiavelli think that this little miracle of enlightenment is possible? Do you?

After hinting how much smarter he is Machiavelli goes on to say that he has not embellished the work with the usual adornments and allurements. Machiavelli is quietly saying don’t expect to be flattered as usually happens with other writers. Why doesn’t Machiavelli do the usual or customary in this? He tells us that he wants his book to be known for what it says, not how it is said. If that were true, then presumably one would write in a straightforward manner. Is this how he writes? He is also, perhaps, reminding Lorenzo, and us, that this book isn’t only intended for whom it was dedicated.

He then defends how he, Machiavelli, a mere private citizen, can dare discuss and settle the concerns of Princes. He compares himself to those that paint landscapes. If you want to paint a mountain you go down to the plain, and in order to paint the plains one goes to the mountain. One needs perspective. Thus it is a Prince that understands the nature of the people and the people that understand the nature of the Prince. Has Machiavelli just denied that either the Prince or his people can achieve self-knowledge? Is he denying that the Prince is a man of knowledge or self-knowledge? After all, doesn’t philosophy begin with the Delphic injunction to know oneself? One also finds oneself wondering if he is also denying that knowledge of the whole is possible. Be that as it may, is there anyone that knows both Prince and people? We will better able to answer that if we find Machiavelli discussing the people in this book.

At the beginning of the penultimate sentence of the dedication Machiavelli tells our prince to accept this gift in the spirit in which it was sent. What a thing to say! He ends the sentence by speaking of his desire that Lorenzo achieves what fortune and his attributes or capacities predict for him. In between he says if you read (this work) and consider it with care you will find this desire. One would think that if Lorenzo read this book with care he would find knowledge. Machiavelli says only that this prince will find what Machiavelli thinks of him. And that he will achieve what fortune (luck) and certain unnamed qualities predict for him. Do we not already know what Machiavelli thinks of this prince?

Finally, Machiavelli, returning to the painter analogy, will tell Lorenzo that if he looks down from his heights he will see how Machiavelli has suffered unjustly a great and continued malignity (or malfeasance) of fortune. One is tempted to think of this as a ratio. Machiavelli has no luck. Lorenzo has it, thus far, in abundance. Machiavelli has great intelligence. Lorenzo has, thus far, little or no intelligence. At least Machiavelli has given no unequivocal indication that Lorenzo possesses it.

It would seem that the ball, as they say, is entirely in Lorenzo’s court. He can change both Machiavelli’s luck, by giving our author a job, and his own intelligence, by understanding Machiavelli’s book. Or he could rely on fortune and do nothing at all. From all this one could, perhaps, conclude that knowledge is never power. But Lorenzo, of course, does nothing and Machiavelli is read throughout the world. Perhaps we could say that Machiavelli was, in some sense, lucky, favored by fortune, after all? If, on the other hand, he succeeded thanks to his own virtu' - well, wouldn't knowledge, eventually, be power?

But again we find ourselves asking, who is the one (or ones) that knows both Princes and peoples? Perhaps we can get a better handle on that question by asking another question – how is it that painters know both mountains and plains? Well, they do so through their knowledge of perspective and their willingness to change perspective. Perhaps there is, after all, knowledge of the whole. But, since one can only know the whole by continually changing perspective, then one can only know the whole as a series of parts. Who is prepared, or fortunate enough, to have the (virtu’) ability to do this with Princes and peoples? We began by wondering whom this book was written for. We end by wondering if we are capable of understanding this book?

Joe

PS The text of the Prince is supplied for convenience only. I am consulting a bilingual edition translated and edited by Mark Musa.

Chapter 1

How Many Kinds Of Principalities There Are, And By What Means They Are Acquired

Translated by W. K. Marriott at http://www.constitution.org/mac/prince00.htm

ALL STATES, all powers, that have held and hold rule over men have been and are either republics or principalities. Principalities are either hereditary, in which the family has been long established; or they are new. The new are either entirely new, as was Milan to Francesco Sforza, or they are, as it were, members annexed to the hereditary state of the prince who has acquired them, as was the kingdom of Naples to that of the King of Spain. Such dominions thus acquired are either accustomed to live under a prince, or to live in freedom; and are acquired either by the arms of the prince himself, or of others, or else by fortune or by ability.

Commentary

The shortest chapter.  – The shortest commentary? At the outset I would like to note that Machiavelli doesn't mention aristocracies. Do aristocracies even exist for Machiavelli? By this he immediately establishes his difference from Aristotle. Are aristocracies irrelevant? Is Aristotle irrelevant? He mentions Republics only once and then goes on to discuss Principalities. Perhaps an aristocracy, for the Prince (or is it Machiavelli?) is only another type of Republic? Another group of people he needs to master, albeit a smaller (more powerful, more talented) group. The last sentence above seems to imply ("dominions {…} are either accustomed to live under a prince, or to live in freedom") that those that live under these (republican-like?) aristocracies consider themselves to be free. Do the people in aristocracies consider themselves free, or is it just the Aristocrats that consider themselves free? Oh, and lastly, all this should make us wonder whether the Prince, or Machiavelli, or the Prince as Machiavelli imagines him, is oblivious to the (Nietzschean) difference between the exception and the herd? And assuming, for the sake of argument, that there is a difference – which (exception or herd, aristocracy or republic) is easier for the Prince to control?

Be that as it may, he mentions hereditary Principalities just once, and then goes on to discuss the other type of Principality – the new. Why? Isn't Machiavelli interested in the hereditary Prince? Remember, the Prince (Lorenzo) that this book is dedicated to is a Medici. They had power, were established, in Florence before their recent return. And the Medici present themselves as restorers of order. Lorenzo is a hereditary Prince. Then why mention hereditary Princes only once? Is it that hereditary princes are similar to aristocracies? After all, the hereditary prince has a whole family around him whose opinions and needs (prerogatives) he must take into account. The new Prince does not. It would seem the new Prince rules alone. Is this the difference between hereditary princes and new Princes?

And what of religious Princes? Why doesn't Machiavelli mention them? The Papacy was, after all, a temporal power at this time. Will Machiavelli ignore that? Or are we meant to consider the pope another type of hereditary prince? And finally, what of tyrants? By failing to mention tyranny is he implying that there are no tyrants? Tyrants, by definition, rule alone, so they certainly can't be subsumed under the category of hereditary prince! No tyrants? Are there then only successful and unsuccessful Princes? Perhaps Machiavelli is only being polite to the recipient of this book? Perhaps...

In any case, Machiavelli goes on to describe the two types of new Prince. One is either entirely new – he never ruled (as Prince) before, or the new Prince is an already existing Prince that annexes new territory. Sforza did not rule before he won (betrayed) Milan. He is a new Prince. But what of Ferdinand of Spain? He was a hereditary prince of Aragon who then married Isabella of Castille. He successfully added appendages, as Machiavelli said, not only with Naples but also with Granada and Navarre. Can we not say that an energetic and successful hereditary Prince is also a `new' Prince? Indeed. Is this what Machiavelli is showing our Lorenzo?

Machiavelli concludes by saying the dominions thus acquired were either free or under some prince. Is he referring to dominions gained as Sforza gained them or as the Spanish King gained them? Or is he referring to both? Does it make a difference how one acquires people and territory so long as one is successful? Or, perhaps the important difference between the two conquests is which (oh which!) of the two dominions acquired (free or not free) is easier to control. Remember that Milan was a Republic when Sforza took her and the Kingdom of Naples was – a kingdom, and by definition not free.

The contrast between virtue and fortune is something else we will need to watch. Machiavelli says that one acquires states either through the arms of others or ones own. Which are we to think is fortune and which is (virtu') ability? More importantly, what is virtu' and what is fortune? A Prince conquers a territory either by ability or by luck. How do we tell these two conquests (virtuous or fortunate) apart? By the way, the final sentence above ends "o per fortuna o per virtu." The `or else' above is, I think, misleading. There are only two ways to conquer, not four: either through the arms of others or one's own,  - one of these two is virtu, the other is fortune.

It would seem that our author is more interested in the new Prince, perhaps the `new' per se, than he is interested in the Medici (hereditary) Prince he dedicates this book to. Why? Is Machiavelli an introducer of new forms (ideas) of ruling, a revolutionary pretending to be a policy advisor or technician? Note how modern this ignoring of the aristocratic, the downplaying of the hereditary, and this admiration of the active Prince all seems to us.

> Joe

PS You can find a very brief note on Ferdinand of Spain at

http://www.sonhex.dk/fandi.htm

Any good encyclopedia will give you more.

PPS The text of the Prince is supplied for convenience only. I am consulting a bilingual edition translated and edited by Mark Musa.

CHAPTER II

                    Concerning Hereditary Principalities

Translated by W. K. Marriott

I WILL leave out all discussion on republics, inasmuch as in another place I have written of them at length, and will address myself only to principalities. In doing so I will keep to the order indicated above, and discuss how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved. I say at once there are fewer difficulties in holding hereditary states, and those long accustomed to the family of their prince, than new ones; for it is sufficient only not to transgress the customs of his ancestors, and to deal prudently with circumstances as they arise, for a prince of average powers to maintain himself in his state, unless he be deprived of it by some extraordinary and excessive force; and if he should be so deprived of it, whenever anything sinister happens to the usurper, he will regain it. We have in Italy, for example, the Duke of Ferrara, who could not have withstood the attacks of the Venetians in '84, nor those of Pope Julius in '10, unless he had been long established in his dominions. For the hereditary prince has less cause and less necessity to offend; hence it happens that he will be more loved; and unless extraordinary vices cause him to be hated, it is reasonable to expect that his subjects will be naturally well disposed towards him; and in the antiquity and duration of his rule the memories and motives that make for change are lost, for one change always leaves the toothing for another.

Commentary

The 2nd shortest chapter. The elsewhere (another place) Machiavelli alludes to is the Discourses on the first Ten books of Titus Livy. Why does he mention this? Does Machiavelli want his readers, and Lorenzo, the Medici Prince, to read this as well? Well, perhaps not the Medici Prince – but other Princes? Should the new Prince read the Discourses? We also note that not only will Machiavelli speak of acquiring states but how to govern and maintain them too. Good. Old Nick will not leave his Prince, his students, and his followers – should he have any, in the position of Alexander the Great – a student of Aristotle – of whom Augustus rightly wondered how Alexander could consider conquering his empire everything but maintaining his empire nothing.

When we again check the `order indicated above' (in chapter 1) we think that Machiavelli will be mostly interested in the new Prince and his acquiring principalities through either virtu' or fortune. But here we are speaking of hereditary Princes, and to Lorenzo, a hereditary prince. Perhaps this is why he adds that he will discuss "how such principalities are to be ruled and preserved." After all, ruling and preservation are the only certain concerns of a hereditary Prince. Well, what will Machiavelli say to his Medici Prince on the ruling and preserving of hereditary Principalities? And what of other Princes, and readers that are not princes – are they addressed in this chapter as well? But again notice that he says he adds ruling and preserving – both of which were not mentioned previously – to the order indicated earlier. The order indicated earlier seemed to us most concerned with the new Prince. Perhaps Machiavelli intends that this new Prince of his not only conquer, but survive.

Machiavelli starts off by saying that the hereditary prince will have fewer difficulties than the new Prince will. Note that fewer difficulties doesn't at all mean no difficulties. We wonder how long the family of the hereditary prince must have ruled – so that people are "long accustomed" to this rule – in order to reap this immense benefit of fewer difficulties. He admonishes the hereditary prince not to transgress ancient customs. Why? Is even the hereditary prince of a long-standing noble family unsafe in his realm? Are these ancient customs a cage to hold the ruled – or the ruler? And certainly it is prudent to always rule prudently! We are told that if our hereditary prince does all this then even if he is of average ability he will be able to maintain himself in his states.

A prince of even `average ability' will be able to maintain his rule, eh? One wonders how Lorenzo, the recipient of this book, took this. Does he think '`hey, I'm a hereditary Prince, I certainly have more than average ability, why don't I go play with a mistress?' Or does he think "what a presumptuous twit this Machiavelli is!?!" Be that as it may Machiavelli adds that the hereditary Prince will rule unless some unusual force deprives him of his rule. Hmmm... Perhaps the intelligent Prince will keep reading. What should one do in case of these `unforeseen events?' Adjust, Machiavelli will say. This insane history of ours, I fear, is nothing but adjustments to ever changing (extraordinary and excessive) circumstances. The evidence of history (on good days) makes us wonder if a person of average intellect is capable of managing that. On bad days we wonder ...well what does it matter what we wonder?

What does Machiavelli mean by excessive and extraordinary force? A force that ones ancestors never encountered and therefore no (hereditary) prince that watches customs and prerogatives is likely to notice? This would mean that, by definition, any force that the (hereditary) Prince fails to foresee is excessive and extraordinary. To an especially average or mediocre (unintelligent) prince, whether hereditary or new, perhaps everything will seem extraordinary! Again I want to draw attention to the phrase "deal prudently with circumstances as they arise" which should have made us stop a moment. How does a person of average ability know how to deal `prudently' with anything? And should the hereditary prince of average ability lose his states and then something bad happen to the usurper, the new Prince – well, will a dispossessed hereditary Prince of average ability be able to capitalize on this opportunity? Indeed, will he even be able to see an opportunity? Lastly, do the adjustments made by the hereditary prince, when confronted by these extraordinary and excessive forces, change the ancient customs and practices? Which is what we are told the hereditary prince must not do. Is the hereditary prince playing a losing hand?

It would seem that perhaps only rarely or in the beginning of his reign is the rule of the hereditary Prince customary. It would seem that all we can say is that as time goes on his rule tends towards the perpetual crisis that every new Prince must face, and conquer. Is Machiavelli telling the new Prince that the position, and advantages, the hereditary Prince holds are not quite as insurmountable as one might at first think? After all, who is the new Prince conquering when he is not conquering republics?

The example Machiavelli gives here is not trivial. There are 2 Dukes of Ferrara. The first, Ercole d'Este, successfully resisted Pope Sixtus IV in 1482. Alfonso d'Este lost to Pope Julius II in 1510. Our author presents two Popes as usurpers of legitimate and hereditary power! Two Popes acting as any Prince would!! And between these two Popes, the worst Pope, Alexander VI, not even mentioned - yet!!! If one were the suspicious type one would suspect Machiavelli was trying to make a point. Perhaps this is only an unfortunate example on the part of our author. We need to see if he will continue to choose examples so poorly.

Also, why does Machiavelli say that the 2 Dukes of Ferrara ("withstood the attacks") succeeded in defending themselves when only one did? Does he want us to draw our attention to this fact and then have us draw the conclusion that the Pope (Julius II) overthrew the hereditary Prince and therefore the Papacy is also, in a sense, a new Prince? Can we say that after a conquest every prince is a `new' Prince? As an aside we should wonder if any active Prince is a new Prince while any passive prince is, in principle, a `hereditary' prince. In any case, will this new Prince, the Papacy, be subject to the dangers faced by any new Prince? Who is to take advantage of the opportunity this danger presents?

Note that he says that the hereditary Prince must only avoid extraordinary vices. An ordinary Prince of ordinary ability must take care to have only ordinary vices! Are all hereditary Princes ordinary? In any case the people will be naturally well disposed towards him. And why not? The hereditary Prince in the ordinariness of his person and rule is a mirror image of the people! Do you think our Prince, Lorenzo, notices any of this? That the people are naturally well disposed towards this prince makes us wonder if the hereditary, which is the natural, is also the conventional. As an aside we should ask if Machiavelli is saying that in politics habit can be treated as natural? Which would mean that the people, at least, have a nature. In any case, can we say that the new Prince, insofar as no one is naturally well disposed to him, is both unconventional and unnatural? But even wolves are natural! The new Prince, if unconventional and unnatural, would be a monster. Who is the new Prince?

The translation (Mark Musa) I have with me ends with the words `for one change always leaves a denticulation for the construction of another.' The word in Italian is addentellato, which is an architectural term. It is a toothed wall left on a building so another building can be added to it. A building that one continually adds to… Hmmm. Does all ruling include the need to `build new additions?' [Perhaps we can take this to mean that one must always plan for change. A wall is either prepared for change, toothed, or it will be destroyed. Does Machiavelli prepare for change? How does a philosopher prepare for, or manage, change?] The rule of the hereditary Prince is beginning to sound a little like the innovation (or change) of the new Prince. Pope Julius II conquered a hereditary prince. Perhaps the safest thing any hereditary Prince can do is transform himself into a new Prince. Is the Papacy also a hereditary Princedom? Is this why Machiavelli will spend most of the rest of his book discussing the new Prince? Like the new Prince, all Princes (potentially) face the same dangers – perhaps Machiavelli means to say that if they are prudent they will also reap the same rewards. Lorenzo! – are you still with us? Perhaps our Medici Prince should read on. I know we should.

So, the hereditary prince is (potentially) exposed to the same dangers, and innovations, as the new Prince. Perhaps the difference between the hereditary prince and the new Prince is that the former faces the dangers the latter faces less frequently, a little less necessarily. Or is it that the new Prince, perhaps I should say the virtuous new Prince, rules alone? I can think of no better way to close than by wondering how it is possible to rule alone. Who, besides the new Prince, rules alone?

Joe

PS The text of the Prince is supplied for convenience only. I am consulting a bilingual edition translated and edited by Mark Musa.

CHAPTER III

Concerning Mixed Principalities

       Translated by W. K. Marriott

I found this translation at

 ftp://ftp.ibiblio.org/pub/docs/books/gutenberg/etext98/tprnc10.txt  or at

http://www.constitution.org/mac/prince00.htm

BUT the difficulties occur in a new principality. And firstly, if it be not entirely new, but is, as it were, a member of a state which, taken collectively, may be called composite, the changes arise chiefly from an inherent difficulty which there is in all new principalities; for men change their rulers willingly, hoping to better themselves, and this hope induces them to take up arms against him who rules: wherein they are deceived, because they afterwards find by experience they have gone from bad to worse. This follows also on another natural and common necessity, which always causes a new prince to burden those who have submitted to him with his soldiery and with infinite other hardships which he must put upon his new acquisition.

In this way you have enemies in all those whom you have injured in seizing that principality, and you are not able to keep those friends who put you there because of your not being able to satisfy them in the way they expected, and you cannot take strong measures against them, feeling bound to them. For, although one may be very strong in armed forces, yet in entering a province one has always need of the  goodwill of the natives.

For these reasons Louis XII, King of France, quickly occupied Milan, and as quickly lost it; and to turn him out the first time it only needed Lodovico's own forces; because those who had opened the gates to him, finding themselves deceived in their hopes of future benefit, would not endure the ill-treatment of the new prince. It is very true that, after acquiring rebellious provinces a second time, they are not so lightly lost afterwards, because the prince, with little reluctance, takes the opportunity of the rebellion to punish the delinquents, to clear out the suspects, and to strengthen himself in the weakest places. Thus to cause France to lose Milan the first time it was enough for the Duke Lodovico to raise insurrections on the borders; but to cause him to lose it a second time it was necessary to bring the whole world against him, and that his armies should be defeated and driven out of Italy; which followed from the causes above mentioned.

Nevertheless Milan was taken from France both the first and the second time. The general reasons for the first have been discussed; it remains to name those for the second, and to see what resources he had, and what any one in his situation would have had for maintaining himself more securely in his acquisition than did the King of France.

Now I say that those dominions which, when acquired, are added to an ancient state by him who acquires them, are either of the same country and language, or they are not. When they are, it is easier to hold them, especially when they have not been accustomed to self-government; and to hold them securely it is enough to have destroyed the family of the prince who was ruling them; because the two peoples, preserving in other things the old conditions, and not being unlike in customs, will live quietly together, as one has seen in Brittany, Burgundy, Gascony, and Normandy, which have been bound to France for so long a time: and, although there may be some difference in language, nevertheless the customs are alike, and the people will easily be able to get on amongst themselves. He who has annexed them, if he wishes to hold them, has only to bear in mind two considerations: the one, that the family of their former lord is extinguished; the other, that neither their laws nor their taxes are altered, so that in a very short time they will become entirely one body with the old principality.

But when states are acquired in a country differing in language, customs, or laws, there are difficulties, and good fortune and great energy are needed to hold them, and one of the greatest and most real helps would be that he who has acquired them should go and reside there. This would make his position more secure and durable, as it has made that of the Turk in Greece, who, notwithstanding all the other measures taken by him for holding that state, if he had not settled there, would not have been able to keep it. Because, if one is on the spot, disorders are seen as they spring up, and one can quickly remedy them; but if one is not at hand, they heard of only when they are one can no longer remedy them. Besides this, the country is not pillaged by your officials; the subjects are satisfied by prompt recourse to the prince; thus, wishing to be good, they have more cause to love him, and wishing to be otherwise, to fear him. He who would attack that state from the outside must have the utmost caution; as long as the prince resides there it can only be wrested from him with the greatest difficulty.

The other and better course is to send colonies to one or two places, which may be as keys to that state, for it necessary either to do this or else to keep there a great number of cavalry and infantry. A prince does not spend much on colonies, for with little or no expense he can send them out and keep them there, and he offends a minority only of the citizens from whom he takes lands and houses to give them to the new inhabitants; and those whom he offends, remaining poor and scattered, are never able to injure him; whilst the rest being uninjured are easily kept quiet, and at the same time are anxious not to err for fear it should happen to them as it has to those who have been despoiled. In conclusion, I say that these colonies are not costly, they are more faithful, they injure less, and the injured, as has been said, being poor and scattered, cannot hurt. Upon this, one has to remark that men ought either to be well treated or crushed, because they can avenge themselves of lighter injuries, of more serious ones they cannot; therefore the injury that is to be done to a man ought to be of such a kind that one does not stand in fear of revenge.

But in maintaining armed men there in place of colonies one spends much more, having to consume on the garrison all income from the state, so that the acquisition turns into a loss, and many more are exasperated, because the whole state is injured; through the shifting of the garrison up and down all become acquainted with hardship, and all become hostile, and they are enemies who, whilst beaten on their own ground, are yet able to do hurt. For every reason, therefore, such guards are as useless as a colony is useful.

Again, the prince who holds a country differing in the above respects ought to make himself the head and defender of his powerful neighbours, and to weaken the more powerful amongst them, taking care that no foreigner as powerful as himself shall, by any accident, get a footing there; for it will always happen that such a one will be introduced by those who are discontented, either through excess of ambition or through fear, as one has seen already. The Romans were brought into Greece by the Aetolians; and in every other country where they obtained a footing they were brought in by the inhabitants. And the usual course of affairs is that, as soon as a powerful foreigner enters a country, all the subject states are drawn to him, moved by the hatred which they feel against the ruling power. So that in respect to these subject states he has not to take any trouble to gain them over to himself, for the whole of them quickly rally to the state which he has acquired there. He has only to take care that they do not get hold of too much power and too much authority, and then with his own forces, and with their goodwill, he can easily keep down the more powerful of them, so as to remain entirely master in the country. And he who does not properly manage this business will soon lose what he has acquired, and whilst he does hold it he will have endless difficulties and troubles.

The Romans, in the countries which they annexed, observed closely these measures; they sent colonies and maintained friendly relations with the minor powers, without increasing their strength; they kept down the greater, and did not allow any strong foreign powers to gain authority. Greece appears to me sufficient for an example. The Achaeans and Aetolians were kept friendly by them, the kingdom of Macedonia was humbled, Antiochus was driven out; yet the merits of the Achaeans and Aetolians never secured for them permission to increase their power, nor did the persuasions of Philip ever induce the Romans to be his friends without first humbling him, nor did the influence of Antiochus make them agree that he should retain any lordship over the country. Because the Romans did in these instances what all prudent princes ought to do, who have to regard not only present troubles, but also future ones, for which they must prepare with every energy, because, when foreseen, it is easy to remedy them; but if you wait until they approach, the medicine is no longer in time because the malady has become incurable; for it happens in this, as the physicians say it happens in hectic fever, that in the beginning of the malady it is easy to cure but difficult to detect, but in the course of time, not having been either detected or treated in the beginning, it becomes easy to detect but difficult to cure. Thus it happens in affairs of state, for when the evils that arise have been foreseen (which it is only given to a wise man to see), they can be quickly redressed, but when, through not having been foreseen, they have been permitted to grow in a way that every one can see them. there is no longer a remedy. Therefore, the Romans, foreseeing troubles, dealt with them at once, and, even to avoid a  war, would not let them come to a head, for they knew that war is not to be avoided, but is only put off to the advantage of others; moreover they wished to fight with Philip and Antiochus in Greece so as not to have to do it in Italy; they could have avoided both, but this they did not wish; nor did that ever please them which is for ever in the mouths of the wise ones of our time:— Let us enjoy the benefits of the time — but rather the benefits of their own valour and prudence, for time drives everything before it, and is able to bring with it good as well as evil, and evil as well as good.

But let us turn to France and inquire whether she has done any of the things mentioned. I will speak of Louis [XII] (and not of Charles [VIII]) as the one whose conduct is the better to be observed, he having held possession of Italy for the longest period; and you will see that he has done the opposite to those things which ought to be done to retain a state composed of divers elements.

King Louis was brought into Italy by the ambition of the Venetians, who desired to obtain half the state of Lombardy by his intervention. I will not blame the course taken by the king, because, wishing to get a foothold in Italy, and having no friends there — seeing rather that every door was shut to him owing to the conduct of Charles — he was forced to accept those friendships which he could get, and he would have succeeded very quickly in his design if in other matters he had not made some mistakes. The king, however, having acquired Lombardy, regained at once the authority which Charles had lost: Genoa yielded; the Florentines became his friends; the Marquess of Mantua, the Duke of Ferrara, the Bentivoglio, my lady of Forli, the Lords of Faenza, of Pesaro, of Rimini, of Camerino, of Piombino, the Lucchesi, the Pisans, the Sienese — everybody made advances to him to become his friend. Then could the Venetians realize the rashness of the course taken by them, which, in order that they might secure two towns in Lombardy, had made the king master of two-thirds of Italy.

Let any one now consider with what little difficulty the king could have maintained his position in Italy had he observed the rules above laid down, and kept all his friends secure and protected; for although they were numerous they were both weak and timid, some afraid of the Church, some of the Venetians, and thus they would always have been forced to stand in with him, and by their means he could easily have made himself secure against those who remained powerful. But he was no sooner in Milan than he did the contrary by assisting Pope Alexander to occupy the Romagna. It never occurred to him that by this action he was weakening himself, depriving himself of friends and those who had thrown themselves into his lap, whilst he aggrandized the Church by adding much temporal power to the spiritual, thus giving it great authority. And having committed this prime error, he was obliged to follow it up, so much so that, to put an end to the ambition of Alexander, and to prevent his becoming the master of Tuscany, he was himself forced to come into Italy.

And as if it were not enough to have aggrandized the Church, and deprived himself friends, he, wishing to have the kingdom of Naples, divides it with the King of Spain, and where he was the prime arbiter of Italy he takes an associate, so that the ambitious of that country and the malcontents of his own should have where to shelter; and whereas he could have left in the kingdom his own pensioner as king, he drove him out, to put one there who was able to drive him, Louis, out in turn.

The wish to acquire is in truth very natural and common, and men always do so when they can, and for this they will be praised not blamed; but when they cannot do so, yet wish to do so by any means, then there is folly and blame. Therefore, if France could have attacked Naples with her own forces she ought to have done so; if she could not, then she ought not to have divided it. And if the partition which she made with the Venetians in Lombardy was justified by the excuse that by it she got a foothold in Italy, this other partition merited blame, for it had not the excuse of that necessity.

Therefore Louis made these five errors: he destroyed the minor powers, he increased the strength of one of the greater powers in Italy, he brought in a foreign power, he did not settle in the country, he did not send colonies. Which errors, if he had lived, were not enough to injure him had he not made a sixth by taking away their dominions from the Venetians; because, had he not aggrandized the Church, nor brought Spain into Italy, it would have been very reasonable and necessary to humble them; but having first taken these steps, he ought never to have consented to their ruin, for they, being powerful, would always have kept off others from designs on Lombardy, to which the Venetians would never have consented except to become masters themselves there; also because the others would not wish to take Lombardy from France in order to give it to the Venetians, and to run counter to both they would not have had the courage.

And if any one should say: King Louis yielded the Romagna to Alexander and the kingdom to Spain to avoid war, I answer for the reasons given above that a blunder ought never be perpetrated to avoid war, because it is not to be avoided, but is only deferred to your disadvantage. And if another should allege the pledge which the king had given to the Pope that he would assist him in the enterprise, in exchange for the dissolution of his marriage and for the hat to Rouen, to that I reply what I shall write later on concerning the faith of princes, and how it ought to be kept.

Thus King Louis lost Lombardy by not having followed any of the conditions observed by those who have taken possession of countries and wished to retain them. Nor is there any miracle in this, but much that is reasonable and quite natural. And on these matters I spoke at Nantes with Rouen, when Valentino, as Cesare Borgia, the son of Pope Alexander, was usually called, occupied the Romagna, and on Cardinal Rouen observing to me that the Italians did not understand war, I replied to him that the French did not understand statecraft, meaning that otherwise they would not have allowed the Church to reach such greatness. And in fact it has been seen that the greatness of the Church and of Spain in Italy has been caused by France, and her ruin may be attributed to them. From this a general rule is drawn which never or rarely fails: that he who is the cause of another becoming powerful is ruined; because that predominancy has been brought about either by astuteness or else by force, and both are distrusted by him who has been raised to power.

Commentary

Difficulties arise our philosopher says. Oy vey! Do they ever cease? We should note at the outset how interesting the beginning of this chapter is. It opens with our philosopher saying difficulties arise. Then Machiavelli says, "men willingly change masters ...but in this they deceive themselves." If we were Marxists or Hegelians (and we are not!) we would wonder if he is indicating that the motor of history, the cause of all these difficulties, was the fickleness of the ruled. Of course, the new Prince needs people willing to change masters, but then why mention that they (the people) deceive themselves? To warn the new Prince that eventually he, or one of his heirs, will be an old (hereditary) Prince? After all, the lineage of even the most ancient hereditary prince had an origin; it was made way back when by a new Prince. How does the Prince, or his heirs, maintain power and dominions in the shadow of this fickleness of the people? An example he later gives is of France losing Milan after conquering it the first time. What happened after they conquered it the second time? Read on…

But before we get to that there are some other points we need to consider. This chapter is called Mixed Principalities. This is the first time Machiavelli has used this formulation. Earlier, in chapter 1, he spoke of members joined to the hereditary state of the prince who acquires them. In this chapter we are apparently considering the active hereditary Prince. This would seem to confirm our suspicion that what Machiavelli means by hereditary prince is a passive prince. The second sentence of the first paragraph needs to be lingered over a bit. It says the chief difficulty of this 'composite' prince, part hereditary and part new, which is also a difficulty of all Princes, is that men willingly change masters. This is the chief difficulty - again I emphasize, of all Princes - because this people's willingness to change masters is proven to be wrong; things are seen to go from bad to worse. This could be considered a warning to the Prince, the people, or both. Is this a warning to anyone else?

As we said above one could take all this to mean that the new Prince is doomed to become like an old (passive or hereditary-like) prince thanks to the fickleness of the people. In this case every Prince (perhaps we should add, or his heirs) would eventually find himself easy pickings for the next new Prince. In which case the solution would be - what? Never stop conquering, perhaps? On the other hand this fickleness may indicate that the old deposed prince only needs to wait. The people will see the error of their ways and the prudent deposed Prince will find the opportunity to regain his possessions. Our author would then be indicating that no victory of the new Prince is safe. Or all this could be taken as a warning to the people. Don't bother to change, he warns, after all the effort and pain that changing requires, you will find yourselves disappointed yet again.

But then again he could be hinting that the people never change their fickle ways, they are inevitably disappointed, they inevitably demand change - and they are inevitably disappointed again. The people would then indeed have an unchanging nature. It would be their nature to change masters. Is Machiavelli saying to the Prince plan on this (eternally recurring) fickleness? The prudent or virtuous Prince will exploit it while the other princes are destroyed by it. If this were true then Machiavelli is certainly no Hegelian, for while with Hegel (or Marx) change always has a destination, a telos, it would seem that for Machiavelli change has no teleology at all. For him, it would seem, history is this ever-recurring change of Masters – and human nature is the cause of this change. Political change would then be like any other consequence of a force of nature  - a fact that one either manages or suffers.

Machiavelli then says all this - popular disappointment - follows because one must always harm the conquered.  He says that this is a natural and common (ordinaria) necessity. Do Princes have a nature too? The new (or composite) Prince must harm the conquered through his soldiers and infinite other hardships (infinite altre iniurie) which he must put on his new acquisition. Again, he seems to be pretty insistent on this point - none of this can be avoided, thus the people's disappointment can't be avoided. He adds that not only have you harmed your enemies but also the friends (traitors to the old dispensation) you have in the newly conquered province cannot be rewarded in the manner they expected. But one may object - they are traitors; no one will shed a tear if you kill them. But Machiavelli prudently warns against using this strong medicine (medicine forti) against them. He gives two reasons, the Prince is obligated to them and one will always need the backing of the inhabitants to takeover a province. The first reason doesn't seem very `Machiavellian' now does it? You can't simply slay them because people will say you are an ungrateful fibber - oh my! Or perhaps he is indicating that a conquering Prince is always in need of such people and thus he can't be seen to be eliminating them whenever he pleases. The other reason (needing the backing of the inhabitants) is interesting too. It seems to indicate that even the new Prince faces limits that he can't transgress. Those limits would seem only to be whatever the people are prepared to bear.

By way of an explication of the above discussion Machiavelli gives as an example the conquest and loss, and reconquest and loss yet again, of Milan by the French King. We are told that the first time Louis XII conquered Milan he quickly occupied it and then quickly lost it. This all seems straight forward enough; the people changed masters, and then, seeing things have gotten worse, changed masters yet again. The French King later retakes Milan. Here things are no longer so obvious. Machiavelli says that with a second conquest the conquered province is lost with more difficulty. He seems to treat the loss and reconquest of a province as a grand opportunity to get rid of enemies and shore up weak spots that were exposed by the first loss of the conquered province. In other words, with the second conquest one prudently ignores what prudence counseled (avoid strong medicines) during the first conquest. Now, after the second conquest, one can round up the usual suspects and do what's usually done with them. Machiavelli then says that while the first conquest was lost to a Duke, it took the whole world to expel the French the second time. He then pointedly adds that nevertheless, both times France lost Milan.

So, why did the French lose Milan a second time? They annexed a territory that was not of the same language or province. Machiavelli now says that if the conquered territories are of the same language and province and are also not accustomed to freedom it is especially easy to hold them. Hmmm... How often does a Prince find himself conquering people of the same province, language, customs, etc, and that are not used to being free? What?!? You would think he was here speaking of a hereditary prince trying to recover (re-conquer) territory that he had lost to some audacious new Prince! Be that as it may our philosopher advises quite intelligently (and humanely) that you exterminate the royal family of the conquered territory but leave laws, customs and taxes intact. Lenin and his followers would take our boys advice as to the first point but ignore the second point - with results that are now taught in every civics class throughout the land. By the way, it is the insistence on the extinguishing (spenta, spenga) of the line of the established prince that convinces us that this discussion cannot be aimed mainly at a passive hereditary prince. But would this point, extermination of an existing royal line, even be entirely pleasing to an active, conquering, hereditary Prince?

But what if you conquer a province of different laws, customs and language? Now, things get a little bit tricky - difficulta`. This chapter opens with difficulties and thus far we have only seen them grow worse. You need, in this present case, a great deal of fortune and industry to hold them. What - no virtue!? Almost certainly another oversight. As always Niccolo has the solution. Go to the newly acquired province to live. The new Prince, by living in the new province, will be able to better see and hear problems as they arise in this new province, and the officials of this new prince won't be able to do any plundering. He adds that his new subjects will have direct recourse to him and that this will satisfy them while troublemakers will have all the more reason to fear him. This Prince is certainly fortunate that he doesn't need to see and hear what is going on in his old established province or need to worry about subjects and officials there! Lastly, he adds that any outside force (former prince perhaps?) wanting to invade this new province would be more hesitant to do so. But what of his established territories? Are they safe? Interesting, all the benefits this Prince gains from moving to the new province he loses in his old established province.

Perhaps this is why Machiavelli next suggests to this Prince the sending of colonies to the new provinces instead of his royal personage. He calls these colonies connecting links to his state and this solution even better than the previous one. He says colonies do not cost much and only hurt those few whose lands are taken. He says those dispossessed in this manner are too few and poor to avenge themselves. This dispossession also serves as a warning to the other locals.

It is interesting that it is exactly here that Machiavelli makes the (in)famous statement that men must either be pampered or done away with for they can avenge themselves for slight hurts but not for serious ones. The dispossessed locals are too poor and scattered to avenge themselves. Of course, Machiavelli ends this magnificently frightening sentence in a magnificently frightening manner; he says that any hurt done to a man must leave no fear of revenge. Now, the only way to have no fear of the revenge of ones enemies would be to exterminate them.

Are colonies an example of pampering or doing away with the ones enemies? Who do colonies hurt less - the new Prince, or the conquered Province? - The new Prince, obviously, if we believe Machiavelli when he tells us that these colonies cost less because they cause less resistance from the native population. But we could also say that the conquered territory is pampered because it feels less pain with colonies than it would with a military occupation. On the other hand this could all be construed as a `doing away' of the conquered people. By sending colonies into provinces of different languages, customs and laws one has begun the process of destroying those languages, customs and laws. You would be extinguishing them (as a separate people) in a relatively painless manner. Talk about doing away with ones enemies! In any case he says that the founding of colonies is useful. Note that the consequences of sending colonies, changing the language, laws and customs of the conquered territory directly contradict what was said earlier about avoiding such means. But there Machiavelli was talking about a conquered province of the same language and customs that wasn't used to freedom. In such a situation why would the conquering Prince want to change anything? One finds oneself wondering if the humanity, or lack thereof, of the Prince is to be entirely dictated by circumstances?

Clearly, one can certainly always hope not. Next, we are told that the new Prince in this newly conquered Province (of different language, laws and customs - our new Prince is a foreigner here) should ally with weak neighbors against any and all strong neighbors. And never, never, never, allow (how, oh how, could such a thing happen?) a strong foreigner into the area. It would seem that now our new Prince is in the position of an old prince, looking warily over the walls of his castle, anticipating the inevitable appearance of some new Prince. After all, it is always in the interest of the new prince to prevent the advent of the next new Prince. Ahh, but now an example from the ancient Romans.

But before we get to that he says that the foreigner is always brought in by those dissatisfied because of either excessive ambition or fear. This is an interesting remark in itself. It would seem that Machiavelli also considers ambition and fear normal or natural. It is only when it is excessive that it causes difficulties. How does one know that a given ambition or fear is excessive? Apparently an excessive ambition or fear leads to the changing of masters, the bringing of the (foreign) Prince. Yes, but how does one know a given fear or ambition is excessive before rebellion breaks out?

These Romans, we are told, were always brought in by the inhabitants. Are we to assume these inhabitants were also excessively fearful and/or ambitious? Machiavelli tells us that whenever a powerful foreigner enters a province the weaker powers cling to him and that he has no problem winning them over. All the Prince must do is keep them from getting too much power and authority, and he tells us this is easy to do. He ends this point by saying that those (Princes) that do not do this will lose what they have acquired, and that they will experience infinite difficulties until they lose it. One wonders how this could ever happen - since it is so `easy' to keep others from power.

These Romans Machiavelli goes on to contrast with the French of his times. The Romans he speaks of are the Romans that conquered and controlled Macedonia and Greece through colonies and the methods outlined above. It is while discussing these long dead Romans that Machiavelli will first mention foresight. He says of them "they not only have to watch out for troubles at hand, but also for those ahead, and endeavor diligently to avoid them." These Romans seem to know the answer to the question we asked previously. How does a Prince know when the subjects in a conquered territory, or any foreign territory, are excessively fearful or ambitious? Perhaps Machiavelli will eventually tell us how these Romans came to know the answer to this question - how they came to know the future. He continues by saying that trouble foreseen is easily remedied. No doubt!

He then says that if you wait for the trouble to become evident the medicine will be too late for the disease will be incurable. In the beginning, he says, a disease is hard to recognize but easy to cure, later it is easy to see but difficult to cure. Note also that the medicine he is speaking of is most likely the strong medicine he spoke of earlier in the chapter. In other words, if the Prince waits too long, he will no longer be in a position to eliminate those that he needs to eliminate. It would seem that Machiavelli expects that the natural tendencies of people to change masters, to have excessive fears and ambitions, will be treated by the Prince as a disease. Diseases are natural too. Are (all) cures natural? No, they are (mostly) interventions that change nature's course.  Can we consider the political interventions of the Prince an example of preventive medicine, of foresight?

Machiavelli continues by saying that the Romans we are here discussing did all this. They foresaw and applied remedies in a timely manner. But if one foresees troubles this could very well mean that one is not currently in trouble. Why not enjoy life a little and let the trouble get a little closer before one decides to deal with it? Because, as our philosopher says, these Romans knew that war cannot be avoided but only postponed to the advantage of others. These Romans were not like the sages of his times, and ours, who wanted to enjoy the present, those Romans enjoyed the benefits of their virtu' and prudence.  This is only the second time (thus far) that virtu` has been mentioned. The first time it was used he had just said that dominions are acquired through either the arms of others or ones own. Did the Romans of the Republic rely on the arms of others?

It is a bit peculiar that Machiavelli chooses these Romans to discuss in a book dedicated to a Prince. These Romans that we are discussing, as mentioned before, are the Romans of a Republic, not an empire. And Republics are what our Nick said (in chapter II) he puts aside because he discusses them elsewhere. Sloppy. Or perhaps he means to contrast Republics favorably with Principalities? How were the Romans prescient enough to foresee problems before they became unmanageable? Perhaps the answers are in the Discourses? For the numerologists among us - you know who you are - I will mention that these Romans appear in the central paragraphs of this chapter. This is the first time Machiavelli mentions an ancient example - it will not be the last. Oh dear, I almost forgot, these Romans, unlike contemporary Romans, were not Christians. Again; Machiavelli stresses the success of these ancient Romans. And by the way, the Republic always relied on its own arms. It was the Roman Empire that came to rely on the arms of barbarians. Can we say that a prince, any Prince, always (in some sense) relies on the arms of others?

It is at this point that Machiavelli returns our attention to the French king. He tells us that the King did the opposite of what must be done to maintain rule in a foreign country. Does the French King do the opposite of the Romans because a Kingdom is the opposite of a Republic? Is the greatness (grandezza) of contemporary Christian Rome to be contrasted with the power (potenzia) of ancient republican Rome? Anyway after telling us what the French did he tells us that the desire to acquire is natural and common. (See the translation for what Machiavelli says The French did and failed to do.) If this is true then no power is safe; neither new Princes, nor hereditary princes, nor Republics. This should also make us wonder if we were correct to assert that it is the fickleness of the people that would be the 'motor' of history. Perhaps we should have wondered who drives or aims this (motored) history?

In any case let us hope that the hereditary Prince this book is addressed to is still with us. Machiavelli describes two possible ways to defend the actions of the French King. He was trying to keep the peace and he was trying to keep his word. He says what he said above about permitting disorder to develop in order to avoid going to war. And on lying he says he will speak later on Princes keeping their word. Hopefully to lecture them on its importance! Note that keeping the peace and keeping ones word can be considered good, Christian defenses of the actions of the French King. In any case they certainly led to the increase of the power of the most Christian (joke here) Pope Alexander VI - not the French king!

His mentioning of the Cardinal of Rouen (France) in the last paragraph is also interesting; does the Catholic Church, the temporal church, have traitors, spies, or at least agents of influence, in the Royal Court and at the ear of every monarch in Europe? This amazing chapter ends with our Virgil telling us that whoever is the cause of another's coming into power ruins himself. France was responsible for the Church becoming powerful in Italy. However, the Church legitimizes the rule of Princes in the eyes of ordinary people. Who is bringing whom into power? And, lest we forget, it is the always-dissatisfied people that bring Princes (and Churches) to power. Has this ruined the people? This chapter is a chapter on Mixed Principalities. Is the church a mixed principality? - made up of God and men.

At the beginning of this chapter Machiavelli says, ``men willingly change masters, believing to better themselves; and this belief makes them take up arms against their masters, but in this they deceive themselves, because eventually with experience they see that things have gotten worse." As an aside I would like to point out that Spinoza makes a similar observation, in somewhat different circumstances, when he says, "for the mass of mankind remains always at about the same pitch of misery, it never assents long to any one remedy, but is always best pleased by a novelty which has not yet proved illusive." In either case, the process of changing masters starts all over again. Perhaps this is why in the realm of politics (and, god help us, not only politics) one has the uncanny feeling that one is forever starting all over again. Is this a warning to Philosophy, to the Church, to Princes, or to the people?

Joe

PS The text of the Prince is supplied for convenience only. I am consulting a bilingual edition translated and edited by Mark Musa.

Chapter 4

Why the Kingdom of Darius, Which was occupied by Alexander, Did Not, After the Death of Alexander, Rebel Against his Successors

 

Translated by W. K. Marriott

 

     ftp://ftp.ibiblio.org/pub/docs/books/gutenberg/etext98/tprnc10.txt

 

Considering the difficulties which men have had to hold to a newly acquired state, some might wonder how, seeing that Alexander the Great became the master of Asia in a few years, and died whilst it was scarcely settled (whence it might appear reasonable that the whole empire would have rebelled), nevertheless his successors maintained themselves, and had to meet no other difficulty than that which arose among themselves from their own ambitions.

I answer that the principalities of which one has record are found to be governed in two different ways; either by a prince, with a body of servants, who assist him to govern the kingdom as ministers by his favour and permission; or by a prince and barons, who hold that dignity by antiquity of blood and not by the grace of the prince. Such barons have states and their own subjects, who recognize them as lords and hold them in natural affection. Those states that are governed by a prince and his servants hold their prince in more consideration, because in all the country there is no one who is recognized as superior to him, and if they yield obedience to another they do it as to a minister and official, and they do not bear him any particular affection.

The examples of these two governments in our time are the Turk and the King of France. The entire monarchy of the Turk is governed by one lord, the others are his servants; and, dividing his kingdom into sanjaks, he sends there different administrators, and shifts and changes them as he chooses. But the King of France is placed in the midst of an ancient body of lords, acknowledged by their own subjects, and beloved by them; they have their own prerogatives, nor can the king take these away except at his peril. Therefore, he who considers both of these states will recognize great difficulties in seizing the state of the Turk, but, once it is conquered, great ease in holding it. The causes of the difficulties in seizing the kingdom of the Turk are that the usurper cannot be called in by the princes of the kingdom, nor can he hope to be assisted in his designs by the revolt of those whom the lord has around him. This arises from the reasons given above; for his ministers, being all slaves and bondmen, can only be corrupted with great difficulty, and one can expect little advantage from them when they have been corrupted, as they cannot carry the people with them, for the reasons assigned. Hence, he who attacks the Turk must bear in mind that he will find him united, and he will have to rely more on his own strength than on the revolt of others; but, if once the Turk has been conquered, and routed in the field in such a way that he cannot replace his armies, there is nothing to fear but the family of this prince, and, this being exterminated, there remains no one to fear, the others having no credit with the people; and as the conqueror did not rely on them before his victory, so he ought not to fear them after it.

The contrary happens in kingdoms governed like that of France, because one can easily enter there by gaining over some baron of the kingdom, for one always finds malcontents and such as desire a change. Such men, for the reasons given, can open the way into the state and render the victory easy; but if you wish to hold it afterwards, you meet with infinite difficulties, both from those who have assisted you and from those you have crushed. Nor is it enough for you to have exterminated the family of the prince, because the lords that remain make themselves the heads of fresh movements against you, and as you are unable either to satisfy or exterminate them, that state is lost whenever time brings the opportunity.

Now if you will consider what was the nature of the government of Darius, you will find it similar to the kingdom of the Turk, and therefore it was only necessary for Alexander, first to overthrow him in the field, and then to take the country from him. After which victory, Darius being killed, the state remained secure to Alexander, for the above reasons. And if his successors had been united they would have enjoyed it securely and at their ease, for there were no tumults raised in the kingdom except those they provoked themselves.

But it is impossible to hold with such tranquillity states constituted like that of France. Hence arose those frequent rebellions against the Romans in Spain, France, and Greece, owing to the many principalities there were in these states, of which, as long as the memory of them endured, the Romans always held an insecure possession; but with the power and long continuance of the empire the memory of them passed away, and the Romans then became secure possessors. And when fighting afterwards amongst themselves, each one was able to attach to himself his own parts of the country, according to the authority he had assumed there; and the family of the former lord being exterminated, none other than the Romans were acknowledged.

When these things are remembered no one will marvel at the ease with which Alexander held the Empire of Asia, or at the difficulties which others have had to keep an acquisition, such as Pyrrhus and many more; this is not occasioned by the little or abundance of ability in the conqueror, but by the want of uniformity in the subject state.

Commentary

A relatively straightforward chapter? Don't you believe it! Once again, our philosopher begins with difficulties. We are beginning to be fairly certain they will never cease. We will now discuss the difference between conquering and maintaining an empire. Which does make sense – as indicated earlier, every (successful) new Prince, or his successors, will one day find themselves in the position of an old prince, worried about squabbling heirs and barbarians (or some new Prince) at the gate. Apparently, at least in politics, one always finds oneself today destroying what tomorrow one will strive to preserve. And who knows, perhaps not only in politics…

Machiavelli mentions Alexander the Great to indicate these points. Is it a matter of indifference to us that he uses this point (the difference between conquering and maintaining an empire) to compare two types of principalities – Prince alone and prince with Barons? In any case, he says that when Alexander died his successors had no trouble from the conquered peoples. But there was trouble among Alexander's successors – his generals. These problems seemed to have originated in the ambitions of his successors. If this is so we could say that these difficulties were in some sense natural. (Why didn't, excuse the digression, Alexander, the student of Aristotle, notice these `natural' difficulties and plan for them? Is our philosopher taking a swipe at Aristotle? Well perhaps all this is a bit of a stretch. After all, where in the Prince is Aristotle mentioned?) One then finds oneself wondering if success is to be as much of a problem as failure? In any case both success and failure, it seems, need to be managed. But why didn't the various conquered peoples rebel?

Here Machiavelli makes a distinction between two different types or modes of governing principalities. The first one mentioned is a Principality in which all are the servants of the Prince. His ministers serve Him through His kindness and permission. The other type of principality is where there are barons. These Barons have their own power, position and prerogatives through their noble lineage – not from the grace of the Prince. These Barons, we are told, have their own states and subjects that are naturally fond of them. These barons are, in a sense, hereditary Princes. Hereditary princes can be active or passive. Those states of the first type hold their Prince in greater esteem then those of the second type. In this first type, in which there is no aristocracy, all power comes from the Prince. Here, it would seem, our Prince is something of a god. Are we to understand that the Prince in an aristocracy is never a god?

Note that these different Principalities, Prince alone or Prince with Barons, existed in antiquity and also existed in Machiavelli's time. Thus the problems he indicates are permanent. But Princes and aristocracies don't exist in out times – unless one wishes to maintain that the people en masse in democratic times are the Prince and the various factions (race, class, culture, religion, gender) of the modern state are the Barons. But that would certainly be an unusual way of speaking! In any case, one could perhaps say that the Prince alone is a monotheistic politics while the Prince ruling in concert with powerful Barons is a polytheistic politics. Does Machiavelli prefer one or the other? A silly question –  and I withdraw it. It is tantamount to asking whether our Virgil is a modern or a postmodern philosopher! It is strange, perhaps, that we here recall a remark of Kierkegaard, to the effect that modern philosophy is paganism through and through.

He continues by giving examples of both types of governments in his own time. The examples he gives are the French and the Turk. Now the French of his time were most certainly an Aristocracy while the Turks were (at least in European eyes) an absolute monarchy. Machiavelli says that the Turkish state is difficult to conquer but easy to hold on to after it is conquered. He adds that it is easier to occupy the French state but it is very difficult to hold on to it. These two examples, French and Turk, are both monotheistic Kingdoms – no polytheism or people (democracy) in sight. We should note (perhaps pedantically) that in the few free discussions that occurred between Christian, Muslim and Jew in Medieval times the one critique consistently made of Christianity was that it was not fully monotheistic. The three gods in one theory, the trinity, seemed to Muslims and Jews to be something of a lukewarm paganism.

Machiavelli says of the Turk that some hopeful conqueror has no hope of either being called there by dissatisfied subjects, or any hope of some timely rebellion to aid his conquest. Properly speaking the people of this Turkish Empire have no politics at all. They are all slaves, and will obey the current master, whomever that might be. Thus when you attack such a Kingdom you must be strong enough on your own to overwhelm it. There will be no factions to aid you. He immediately adds that if you do conquer this Kingdom then all you need fear is the family of the Prince. And once the royal family is exterminated there is nothing to fear. Machiavelli has spoken of exterminating royal families before. There he said that if a newly conquered territory were of the same province and language as the previously established states of the new Prince and that the new territories were unaccustomed to freedom all our new Prince had to do would be to extinguish the old royal line. Perhaps the point is that slaves belong to any province that holds them and that slavery is a universal language that all conquerors speak and understand? In any case, people unused to freedom are the easiest to hold after a conquest.

Machiavelli then says that the opposite happens in Kingdoms governed like France. You can always find some malcontented Baron to invite you in. Ahh, but once you have `conquered' the French Kingdom then you are faced with endless difficulties. You can neither please the Baron(s) that helped you nor please the ones that opposed you. Extinguishing the royal family is not enough; another royal line will spring up to take its place. He seems to indicate that you cannot extinguish everyone. To recapitulate, the subjects of the Turk can neither help you conquer the Turkish Kingdom, nor hurt you after you have conquered it. And the French Barons can indeed help you conquer France but they can also steal your conquest away from you. As a general rule one can perhaps say that on the one hand anyone strong enough to help you is strong enough to hurt you and that on the other hand anyone too weak to help you is too weak to hurt you. And people wonder why there are no friends in politics!

Machiavelli concludes this chapter by going back to Alexander. He says that the kind of government Darius had is similar to the government the Turk has. Conquering it is difficult but holding it is easy. So, again we ask, why did Alexander's Empire fall to pieces? When Alexander died his commanders had wars between each other to increase their own personal power. In this they behaved as any active hereditary Prince (or Baron) would. Plutarch, if memory serves, told an unforgettable story of Alexander's death. His generals, gathered at his deathbed, asked him who do you leave this empire to? Alexander said, with terrible and astonishing brevity, to the strongest. Alexander's infant son and wife did not survive the night. We are, of course, all free to hope that there are more intelligent ways to plan for the death of empires.

It is interesting that Machiavelli says that his Barons, had they been united, could have enjoyed the fruits of Alexander's labors with ease. Remember that he had earlier said that they were prevented from doing this by their ambitions. Are these ambitions natural? If they are, then is it natural to assume that there cannot be anything like a secure Kingdom as long as there are Aristocracies? Does Machiavelli, in this dangerous little book, ever speak well of aristocracies? How should princes deal with aristocracies? (As an aside I should add that I cannot help wondering if this is a mask, or an avatar, of a different (Platonic/Nietzschean) question – how do philosophers manage exceptions? Sorry.)

Machiavelli now mentions (states like) France for the final time in the chapter. He says it is impossible to conquer and keep them with ease. We have also seen that safely conquered states, like the ones Alexander held at his death, are also put in jeopardy by ones own Barons. These `Barons' or Generals helped Alexander conquer, but the moment he was gone they ruined his legacy. Anyone strong enough to help you is strong enough to hurt you. This reminds us of how the first chapter ended with Machiavelli saying that one conquers with either ones own arms or the arms of others, either through virtue or fortune. But even an Alexander needs strong competent generals. How does one conquer without anyone at all strong on ones side? Who can be said to truly conquer alone? – Philosophers? …But do even philosophers conquer alone?

Now Machiavelli chooses to mention the (polytheistic, republican) Romans. We are at the end of this chapter on the uses and abuses of powerful allies and enemies. He says that the Romans had continual trouble with Spain, France and Greece due to the memory of former principalities that once were there. He says that when these memories were extinguished they became sure possessions. Later, he says, when the Romans began fighting among themselves, each one, each Roman dynast or faction, was able to attract a following in these provinces, due to the fact that the old line had been extinguished.

The Romans Machiavelli is speaking of are of both the Republic and (I think) its most famous result, the Empire. It was the Republic that initially conquered France, Spain, and Greece. How did they conquer them? Earlier Machiavelli had mentioned that they sent colonies. Perhaps we were correct to conclude in the previous chapter that, "by sending colonies into provinces of different languages, customs and laws one has begun the process of destroying those languages, customs and laws. You would be extinguishing them (as a separate people) in a relatively painless manner." Is colonization a (relatively) bloodless holocaust?

Machiavelli then ambiguously adds `that afterwards, when the Romans were fighting among themselves.' Is he speaking here of the Romans of the late republic or the Romans of the late empire? The conflicts of the Romans of the late republic created the Empire while the squabbling of the Romans of the late empire created Christianity and, here in the West at least, the Dark Ages. Which is Machiavelli indicating? (We should note that ambiguity, when found in genuinely great philosophers – such as Plato, Machiavelli, and Nietzsche – always represents a choice.) Does he mean to ambiguously indicate both? By comparison, ambiguity in the rest of us is usually indicative of mere confusion or, more rarely, some sordid and obvious subterfuge.

So, is it good or bad to have barons? Is it good or bad to have (only) slaves? Sometimes the strong can help you, and sometimes they can hurt you, but the weak are always helpless and useless when it comes to conquering or maintaining Kingdoms. All the slaves of Darius can't help him save his empire while Alexander's generals help Alexander make his Empire and then help destroy it. Our philosopher then notes that we should not marvel at the fact of Alexander's ease of conquest or the fact that others, many others, lost their conquests. We should also note that (in some sense) one could say that Alexander too lost his conquest, albeit after he died. Apparently it is easier to conquer an empire than it is to maintain one. Note that Machiavelli doesn't exactly say here that Alexander lost his Kingdom. And yet this chapter is about how and whether it is possible for a creation to survive the death of the one that made it. One is tempted to say that it is easier to make (or create a kingdom) than it is to know (how to maintain one.) But one should always resist temptation! How can a creator, or a conqueror, create or conquer, using only ones own means and arms, and then see to it that the artifact will survive the creators or conquerors death?

The final sentence reads "This does not come about from greater or lesser virtue on the part of the victor, but rather from the disparity of the situations." It amuses us to imagine that we have chosen to conclude our confusing commentary with that ambiguous remark.

Joe

PS The text of the Prince is supplied for convenience only. I am consulting a bilingual edition translated and edited by Mark Musa.

CHAPTER V

CONCERNING THE WAY TO GOVERN CITIES OR PRINCIPALITIES WHICH LIVED UNDER THEIR OWN LAWS BEFORE THEY WERE ANNEXED

Translated by W. K. Marriott

I found this at:

ftp://ftp.ibiblio.org/pub/docs/books/gutenberg/etext98/tprnc10.txt

Whenever those states which have been acquired as stated have been accustomed to live under their own laws and in freedom, there are three courses for those who wish to hold them: the first is to ruin them, the next is to reside there in person, the third is to permit them to live under their own laws, drawing a tribute, and establishing within it an oligarchy which will keep it friendly to you. Because such a government, being created by the prince, knows that it cannot stand without his friendship and interest, and does it utmost to support him; and therefore he who would keep a city accustomed to freedom will hold it more easily by the means of its own citizens than in any other way.

There are, for example, the Spartans and the Romans. The Spartans held Athens and Thebes, establishing there an oligarchy, nevertheless they lost them. The Romans, in order to hold Capua, Carthage, and Numantia, dismantled them, and did not lose them. They wished to hold Greece as the Spartans held it, making it free and permitting its laws, and did not succeed. So to hold it they were compelled to dismantle many cities in the country, for in truth there is no safe way to retain them otherwise than by ruining them. And he who becomes master of a city accustomed to freedom and does not destroy it, may expect to be destroyed by it, for in rebellion it has always the watchword of liberty and its ancient privileges as a rallying point, which neither time nor benefits will ever cause it to forget. And whatever you may do or provide against, they never forget that name or their privileges unless they are disunited or dispersed, but at every chance they immediately rally to them, as Pisa after the hundred years she had been held in bondage by the Florentines.

But when cities or countries are accustomed to live under a prince, and his family is exterminated, they, being on the one hand accustomed to obey and on the other hand not having the old prince, cannot agree in making one from amongst themselves, and they do not know how to govern themselves. For this reason they are very slow to take up arms, and a prince can gain them to himself and secure them much more easily. But in republics there is more vitality, greater hatred, and more desire for vengeance, which will never permit them to allow the memory of their former liberty to rest; so that the safest way is to destroy them or to reside there.

Commentary

What do you do with a free province once you have conquered it? First we should note that by `free' Machiavelli seems to mean here only a state or territory that is used to living by its own laws and customs, and not that it was (necessarily) formerly a republic. After all, the chapter title does say that this chapter is concerned with cities or Principalities that lived by their own laws. And therefore, or so we imagine, to a conquering new Prince, the territory of a hereditary prince may be thought of or referred to, in a manner of speaking, as a formerly `free' province.

It would also seem that to the new Prince all unconquered territories are equal. Thus, to the new Prince at least, all conquered territories were previously `free.' `Free,' of course, here means little more than unconquered by himself, the conquering new Prince. Can we understand this `free' to be in some sense also the `natural,' something our new Prince must somehow train or civilize? Is the new conquering new Prince a bringer of reason to an unreasonable unconquered world?

Machiavelli now says (with perhaps feigned indifference) that the Prince, having conquered a `free' territory, can do any one of three things; he can destroy the newly conquered territory, he can go live there, or he can let the inhabitants govern themselves through an oligarchy while drawing a tribute. As an aside we note that there are only three things one can do with a wild animal, one can destroy it, one can train it or one can ignore it. We end this pointless digression by pointing out that philosophy neither destroys nor ignores, it teaches.

Now, an oligarchy is a type of aristocracy, a government by the few. These few, we should note, would, of course, have their privileges (prerogatives) that even a new Prince cannot entirely ignore. And earlier we had implied, or perhaps only thought we implied, that our philosopher never speaks well of Aristocracies, or advocates their use. Perhaps we spoke too soon? In any case we should also note at the outset that in this chapter we are given no examples of the Prince going to live in the conquered `free' state …Why?

Machiavelli says of this oligarchy that they owe their existence to the new Prince and therefore they are loyal, while the people are satisfied because they are governed by their own. Their `own' of course are creatures in the thrall of the new Prince. The point appears to be that the people mind less being ruled by their own than they mind being ruled by someone that is not their own. We wonder here if the problem our philosopher is indicating is that it isn't so much the conquest by the new Prince that so annoys the conquered people but the fact that the new Prince is (also) foreign.

It would seem that the people are like loyal dogs; fierce to those that are strange (not their own) but gentle and loyal to their own. The people would then be the guardians of the laws and customs of the conquered city. But we should also recall here that in the third chapter, the one on mixed principalities, that we were told that men willingly change masters. Who guards the guard dogs? In any case, the locals that the new Prince has now empowered are either traitors to the previous prince (or regime) or merely bureaucratic timeservers and weathervanes. One wonders how the new Prince can be assured of the loyalty of such creatures, even though they are undoubtedly his creatures.

Nick now gives us two examples – we are shown the Spartans failing with the method of oligarchy and the Romans failing with the same method but succeeding with the method of destruction. Perhaps this is why our philosopher says of these conquered formerly free territories that "the truth is that there is no sure way of keeping possession of them, except by demolishing them." He continues by saying that if the conqueror does not destroy the conquered city he will be destroyed by it.

The only sure way of `holding' a free territory is to destroy it! But then we should wonder why anyone would bother conquering it. Why bother stealing what you must destroy? Also, as indicated above, any newly conquered territory (Republic or Principality) can be considered by this new Prince as, in a sense, formerly free. Our philosopher also indicates that `free' people never forget they were free. The people, like aristocrats jealously guarding their prerogatives, defend, at least potentially, the ancient laws and customs of the conquered territory. Why then bother conquering anything? In any case it would appear that aristocracies and their prerogatives (and the people and their laws that mirror them) are dangerous to a conquering new Prince. This Prince cannot trust either. Perhaps we should again emphasize that the people in formerly `free' provinces act as if they were aristocrats and thus obsessed with their imagined rights and privileges, the customs and laws of their conquered state.

Can freedom (perhaps in the `spirit' of this chapter we should say `freedom') once enjoyed, ever be forgotten? This astounding book is addressed to a Medici Prince who recently came to power in Florence. The Medici once ruled Florence, lost it, but now have it again. It should (perhaps) be more difficult to lose a second time as was mentioned in chapter three. But is it? The Florentines were free – they lived in a Republic. Have they forgotten? What does a new Prince, or hereditary prince, make of this chapter? Is the servitude of `free' men always temporary? I don't know about you but I wouldn't want such people as my slaves, as my servants, or, perhaps more to the point, as my advisors.

Machiavelli ends the chapter by pointing out that conquered people who did not live in republics are easier to hold than those that had lived in republics. He says that these people are slower to take up arms. The new conquering Prince only has to exterminate the former prince and his family. But this again introduces the problem of how does a new Prince prevent himself, or his heirs, from becoming or behaving like a passive or hereditary Prince? Any conquering new Prince faces a conquered people more or less attached to the old customs and laws. Exterminating the royal line is easy, exterminating or dispersing a people difficult and costly. If only the new Prince could get the newly conquered people to love his laws and customs then the extermination of his heirs, by some new conqueror, would be an irrelevancy. Hmmm...

The last words of this chapter are of our philosopher advising the new conquering Prince to either destroy the newly conquered territory or go live there. Go live there? Is he telling all new conquering Princes to live under the ancient laws and customs of a conquered territory, to be the apes of slaves? What?

Or is he telling our new Princes to be philosophers? …What?

Joe

PS The text of the Prince is supplied for convenience only. I am consulting a bilingual edition translated and edited by Mark Musa.

CHAPTER VI

CONCERNING NEW PRINCIPALITIES WHICH ARE ACQUIRED BY ONE'S OWN ARMS AND ABILITY

Translated by W. K. Marriott

I found this translation at ftp://ftp.ibiblio.org/pub/docs/books/gutenberg/etext98/tprnc10.txt

Let no one be surprised if, in speaking of entirely new principalities as I shall do, I adduce the highest examples both of prince and of state; because men, walking almost always in paths beaten by others, and following by imitation their deeds, are yet unable to keep entirely to the ways of others or attain to the power of those they imitate. A wise man ought always to follow the paths beaten by great men, and to imitate those who have been supreme, so that if his ability does not equal theirs, at least it will savour of it. Let him act like the clever archers who, designing to hit the mark which yet appears too far distant, and knowing the limits to which the strength of their bow attains, take aim much higher than the mark, not to reach by their strength or arrow to so great a height, but to be able with the aid of so high an aim to hit the mark they wish to reach.

I say, therefore, that in entirely new principalities, where there is a new prince, more or less difficulty is found in keeping them, accordingly as there is more or less ability in him who has acquired the state. Now, as the fact of becoming a prince from a private station presupposes either ability or fortune, it is clear that one or other of these things will mitigate in some degree many difficulties. Nevertheless, he who has relied least on fortune is established the strongest. Further, it facilitates matters when the prince, having no other state, is compelled to reside there in person. But to come to those who, by their own ability and not through fortune, have risen to be princes, I say that Moses, Cyrus, Romulus, Theseus, and such like are the most excellent examples. And although one may not discuss Moses, he having been a mere executor of the will of God, yet he ought to be admired, if only for that favour which made him worthy to speak with God. But in considering Cyrus and others who have acquired or founded kingdoms, all will be found admirable; and if their particular deeds and conduct shall be considered, they will not be found inferior to those of Moses, although he had so great a preceptor. And in examining their actions and lives one cannot see that they owed anything to fortune beyond opportunity, which brought them the material to mould into the form which seemed best to them. Without that opportunity their powers of mind would have been extinguished, and without those powers the opportunity would have come in vain.

It was necessary, therefore, to Moses that he should find the people of Israel in Egypt enslaved and oppressed by the Egyptians, in order that they should be disposed to follow him so as to be delivered out of bondage. It was necessary that Romulus should not remain in Alba, and that he should be abandoned at his birth, in order that he should become King of Rome and founder of the fatherland. It was necessary that Cyrus should find the Persians discontented with the government of the Medes, and the Medes soft and effeminate through their long peace. Theseus could not have shown his ability had he not found the Athenians dispersed. These opportunities, therefore, made those men fortunate, and their high ability enabled them to recognize the opportunity whereby their country was ennobled and made famous.

Those who by valorous ways become princes, like these men, acquire a principality with difficulty, but they keep it with ease. The difficulties they have in acquiring it rise in part from the new rules and methods which they are forced to introduce to establish their government and its security. And it ought to be remembered that there is nothing more difficult to take in hand, more perilous to conduct, or more uncertain in its success, then to take the lead in the introduction of a new order of things. Because the innovator has for enemies all those who have done well under the old conditions, and lukewarm defenders in those who may do well under the new. This coolness arises partly from fear of the opponents, who have the laws on their side, and partly from the incredulity of men, who do not readily believe in new things until they have had a long experience of them. Thus it happens that whenever those who are hostile have the opportunity to attack they do it like partisans, whilst the others defend lukewarmly, in such wise that the prince is endangered along with them.

It is necessary, therefore, if we desire to discuss this matter thoroughly, to inquire whether these innovators can rely on themselves or have to depend on others: that is to say, whether, to consummate their enterprise, have they to use prayers or can they use force? In the first instance they always succeed badly, and never compass anything; but when they can rely on themselves and use force, then they are rarely endangered. Hence it is that all armed prophets have conquered, and the unarmed ones have been destroyed. Besides the reasons mentioned, the nature of the people is variable, and whilst it is easy to persuade them, it is difficult to fix them in that persuasion. And thus it is necessary to take such measures that, when they believe no longer, it may be possible to make them believe by force. If Moses, Cyrus, Theseus, and Romulus had been unarmed they could not have enforced their constitutions for long--as happened in our time to Fra Girolamo Savonarola, who was ruined with his new order of things immediately the multitude believed in him no longer, and he had no means of keeping steadfast those who believed or of making the unbelievers to believe. Therefore such as these have great difficulties in consummating their enterprise, for all their dangers are in the ascent, yet with ability they will overcome them; but when these are overcome, and those who envied them their success are exterminated, they will begin to be respected, and they will continue afterwards powerful, secure, honoured, and happy.

To these great examples I wish to add a lesser one; still it bears some resemblance to them, and I wish it to suffice me for all of a like kind: it is Hiero the Syracusan.[*] This man rose from a private station to be Prince of Syracuse, nor did he, either, owe anything to fortune but opportunity; for the Syracusans, being oppressed, chose him for their captain, afterwards he was rewarded by being made their prince. He was of so great ability, even as a private citizen, that one who writes of him says he wanted nothing but a kingdom to be a king. This man abolished the old soldiery, organized the new, gave up old alliances, made new ones; and as he had his own soldiers and allies, on such foundations he was able to build any edifice: thus, whilst he had endured much trouble in acquiring, he had but little in keeping.

Commentary

Warning: the surgeon general has determined that understanding this chapter may get you sent to perdition. Just kidding – agreeing with this chapter will do that. A few preliminary notes before we get started. In the last chapter Machiavelli gave no example of our Prince going to live in the conquered territory – here in this chapter he will give examples. The drift of the preceding chapters seemed to indicate (at least to us) that all conquests were doomed, either the conqueror or his heirs would eventually fall to the human predilection for changing masters. This was so pronounced that we wondered why anyone would bother conquering at all. Up till now (through the first five chapters) our philosopher has used the word virtu only three times. In this chapter he will use it twelve times. Note also that the four men that he mentions in this chapter – Moses, Cyrus, Romulus and Theseus – are not all exactly considered to be historical figures. Romulus and Theseus are myths; Moses and Cyrus are not. Perhaps this is why we archers should aim high – we are to become like legends, like prophets, and not merely talented political leaders. In any case, these four are said to possess virtu. They are also said to rely on their own arms.

This chapter opens with a defense of imitation. Why defend imitation here? Now, Machiavelli, even in his own time, was much maligned for his `slavish' deferring to the ancients. As intelligent a man as Guicciardini could somewhere remark of our philosopher, "Surely it is wrong to quote the ancients at every turn!" Machiavelli defends his use of outstanding examples by saying that a prudent man should always take the path taken by great men. He is aware that it is unlikely that the imitator will achieve the virtu of the original but adds (amusingly) that the imitator will have the aroma of it. He ends the first paragraph by saying one should aim higher than ones goal – that way your own shortcomings will allow you to hit your goal. Can we say that our philosopher intends to use human shortcomings to build, well, to build whatever it is philosophers create with their books?

But again I ask, why mention all this (imitation) here? Machiavelli says he is discussing principalities that are completely new in respect to both Prince and state. This seems to indicate that we will now be discussing a principality in which everything, Prince, laws, and customs are entirely new. What is there to imitate here? But let us continue. Now, how can laws and customs be entirely new? Is he to create laws and customs; indeed, is he to create whole peoples, ex nihilo – out of nothing? It would seem that the only safe course for a conquering Prince is to be a god. As an aside we should perhaps ask ourselves if a prudent (uno uomo prudente) man would indeed ever choose to become a god? In any case, this creation of new laws and customs would certainly solve (for the new Prince) the problem of a conquered people's surly loyalty to the old ways! But is it immediately obvious that (human or non-human) creatures imitate their creator? It is, I think, immediately (to say the least!) obvious that such imitations are not always successful.

Machiavelli begins the second paragraph by saying that in this situation (new Prince, new principality) the ease that our Prince has in maintaining his possessions will have to do with the virtu he possesses. He says that this new Prince will rely on either virtu or fortuna, or both. He adds that it is best to rely on fortune as little as possible. Can this be understood to concede that no matter how virtuous our Prince/godling is he will need to rely, if only a bit, on fortune? The last time our philosopher directly tied virtu and fortuna together was at the end of chapter one. There it seemed to have something to do with relying on ones own arms or the arms of others.

Our philosopher continues by saying that this Prince, the Prince that creates his own principality, lives there as a matter of course. He has no other principality to concern himself with. Now Machiavelli names those that conquered, became Princes, through their own virtu, not fortuna; Moses, Cyrus, Romulus and Theseus. He seems to imply that there are others but they weren't as excellent, as outstanding.

After this he immediately says one should not speak of Moses but later he does.  He says we shouldn't speak of him because he simply executed Gods command; but he still should be admired for being worthy of speaking to God. Then he speaks of Cyrus and the others. He says that their particular actions and institutions do not appear to differ from those of Moses! He goes on to say that they received nothing from fortune except the opportunity, the occasion. He says they took the material that opportunity offered and shaped it into whatever they pleased. He ends the second paragraph by saying without the occasion the virtu would be extinguished, and that without the virtu the occasion would have been in vain.

One could well imagine that our philosopher is here speaking of some platonic demiurge that creates, not ex nihilo, but out of the chaos (the opportunity) he finds reeling all around him. Without chaos the (now dead) pagan gods could not create, or fashion a seemly whole, without gods that create (or fashion) there would only be empty and vain chaos. Do Princes (or do I mean philosophers) create ex nihilo? Again, it must be stressed that our philosopher compares Moses to Cyrus and the rest. In doing so we find ourselves wondering if he is indicating that Cyrus and Moses are a pair while Romulus and Theseus (the others) are another pair? It should also be noted that Cyrus and the others are pagans.

Machiavelli begins the third paragraph speaking of Moses – which he had earlier said one should not do because he was the executor of God's plan. Perhaps by speaking of Moses Machiavelli is indicating that he doesn't think Moses merely executed God's plan? Perhaps he is signaling that Moses was, like the others, a political man of the first rank. In any case, he speaks of him as he speaks of the others, as someone who took advantage of an opportunity. The previous paragraph ended with our philosopher saying that all these four needed was the occasion to display their virtu. This paragraph gives us examples of how our four godlings, excuse me, I meant Princes, only required the occasion, which for each is some unusual circumstance, and nothing else, from our most fierce lady, fortuna. The rest was the creative virtue of our statesmen. He ends this paragraph by saying that their nations were made renowned and they became prosperous. It would seem that for these four (at least!) heaven could be brought down to earth – and shared.

The fourth paragraph tells us that these Princes, the ones that fashion new Principalities, acquire their Principality with difficulty but hold it with ease. This seems to be the exact opposite of what the previous chapters were indicating of those other conquering Princes. I would like to point out (in yet another pointless digression) that of those earlier chapters we can say that the greatest Prince mentioned was (perhaps) Alexander the Great. He is famous for winning a great empire and then losing it on his deathbed. The four Princes named here certainly cannot be accused of that! Now, Alexander was a student of Aristotle. Is Machiavelli indicating that he will give those who attentively listen to him and follow his advice even more than the ancients, perhaps the best of the ancients, could give?

Be that as it may, Machiavelli continues by saying that the difficulties encountered are, in part, due to the fact that these new creative (or founding) Princes must introduce new orders and modes (nuovi ordini e modi) in order to establish their states and security. He then says that there is nothing more difficult to carry out or more dangerous to manage than the introduction of a new system of things. Perhaps we are to understand all this to mean that since this new, founding, virtuous Prince is the best he must take the most difficult burdens upon himself? One might also wonder how old Nick knows so much about founding new modes and orders. Where did the Florentine Secretary pick up this knowledge? Or, if one understands Machiavelli to be a philosopher (as we indeed do) then the question would, of course, be when (and how) do philosophers create new modes and orders?

Machiavelli now tells us how difficult this Princely founding is. He says that the one that introduces a new system has for enemies all those who benefit from the old system and only lukewarm friends. He says this tepidness originates partly from fear of the defenders of the old order, who have law on their side, and partly from the skepticism of the defenders of the new. For he says that men do not believe what they have no experience with. The enemies of a founder are fervent, but his supporters, at least in the beginning, are still doubtful.

This reminds us (yet again) of something Spinoza remarked in the preface to his Theological Political Treatise. There he says, "for the mass of mankind remains always at about the same pitch of misery, it never assents long to any one remedy, but is always best pleased by a novelty which has not yet proved illusive." We found occasion to remark on this quote at the end of the commentary on chapter 3. There we noted how it seemed to confirm Machiavelli's point, albeit his veiled point, on the futility of conquest.

But now we see, or think we see, that it confirms what Nick says in this and the previous paragraph. In this (fourth) paragraph he shows us, yet again, the tepid support all conquerors must endure. But in the previous paragraph he shows how the four great men turned chaotic occasions, mere circumstances, into success. In three of those four examples we find people, the people our heroes `save,' either enslaved, or dissatisfied, or dispersed. Perhaps the only opportunity that our founding demigods genuinely require in order to display their virtu is that the people are suffering even more than they usually do? But with Nick, or so it seems, the Romans are always the exception. The third paragraph doesn't mention the suffering of the Roman people at all. Perhaps the point is that with Republics, with people somehow (naturally?) disposed towards freedom, one can dispense with the need for pain? We should pause here a bit… We hadn't expected such sentimentality from this philosopher.

The fifth paragraph introduces, perhaps we should say, re-introduces, the theme of relying on ones own arms or the arms of others. He wants to know if these four innovators were obliged to beg or were able to use force. He says that in the first case one comes to ruin and in the second they will seldom find themselves in danger. It is here that our philosopher makes a most remarkable (and memorable) point – armed prophets conquer and unarmed ones come to ruin. He then adds that people are unstable and that "things should be arranged so that, when people no longer believe, they can be made to believe by force."

Now, Jesus was, of course, the unarmed prophet par excellence. He does not even resist those that are going to kill him. He has no power – at least as far as this world is concerned – at all. This would, of course, mean he lacks (Machiavellian) virtu. His movement, however, triumphed over an armed, a very armed paganism. Has not His enemies, the ancient pagans, been destroyed? Yes. Has His movement come to ruin? Perhaps, with the ever-increasing modernization of the (formerly) Christian world, one could indeed say yes. Christianity, as a lived and believed world-view, continues, or so it seems to me, to become more and more irrelevant to the every day life of the `Christian' world. For better or worse, we are almost all moderns now. But how did Christianity last 2000 years without being armed or fervently believed? Christians for most of those 2000 years, and even in Machiavelli's time, fervently believed. And more importantly, for our purposes here, back then it was even armed, the Papacy was a temporal power, the Pope was a prince. The Christian Church was armed. Now, our philosopher has mentioned this papacy before.

In chapter three we were shown two Popes successfully, perhaps I should say successfully instrumental in thwarting the French King. This King, we should recall, certainly helped ruin himself. These Popes behaved like any strong Prince would. One certainly cannot call Alexander VI or Julius II unarmed prophets or unarmed Princes. Who, besides Jesus, does our Philosopher have in mind? Oh yes, Savonarola. When the multitude no longer believed him he had no means of holding former adherents or making the disbelieving believe. Savonarola was a Christian reformer, who, unlike the later Luther, had no Princes willing to support him and his teachings. If he had this support perhaps the reformation would have started 2 or 3 generations earlier than it did. The Papacy, of course, opposed this teaching. All this should make us wonder if philosophers, pardon, if Princes use one religious doctrine against some other religious doctrine as circumstances dictate?

Be that as it may, he ends paragraph 5 by reiterating that the dangers the four Princes (of this chapter) face decreases over time, and, if their virtu in the early days was sufficient, they (and, we assume, the principalities they make) become powerful, secure, honored and prosperous. One could say that they, and their principalities and peoples, in a word their artifacts, were powerful and therefore secure, powerful and secure and therefore honored, and finally, powerful, secure, honored, and therefore prosperous. It is good, very good to be strong. Is it also good to have been manufactured by the strong?

Our philosophers seething anti-Christianity needs to be noted. It has been famously noted, in modern times, that Christianity is a Platonism for the people. This is treated as something of an atheistic revelation by people who really should know better. It is considered, by many, one of the great and original triumphs of modern thought. Of course, the only thing `original' in it is its contempt for Christianity. The ancient Christians were well aware of their many debts to Plato. One only needs to read The City of God by Saint Augustine to confirm that. The saint shows there both great respect and much agreement with the Platonists. And in the Renaissance Ficino was trying to revive a Christian Platonism under the protection of the Medici themselves. I think it plausible to conjecture that Machiavelli was aware of this ancient line of thought. Is Machiavelli the first to attack Platonism for the people?

In the final paragraph Machiavelli mentions Hiero, tyrant of Syracuse. He says that this is a minor example but adds it will in some respect compare well to the others. Now the Hiero he is speaking of is the second one. He is the one that, at the opportune moment, broke an alliance with Carthage and forged one with Rome, the Republic of Rome. He received nothing from fortune but the occasion, the people were oppressed, and by creating a new militia, a new alliance, and building well on this foundation, proved to all he was worthy to be a Prince. But when he died civil strife broke out and within a few years Syracuse was lost its freedom and became just another Roman conquest.

Why does Machiavelli mention Hiero II but not call him Hiero II? It is as if he was deliberately trying to make us, mistakenly, initially think he was speaking of the first Hiero, the one Xenophon wrote about. In this way, or so one imagines, he would have in this remarkable chapter drawn our attention to Aristotle, Plato and Xenophon in this subtle manner. And thus hinted that his philosophy was superior to theirs. But of course this is nonsense. Xenophon is much more famous for his life of Cyrus, and Cyrus has already been prominently mentioned. One could suspect that Nick ambiguously mentions the second Hiero in order to quietly advocate that those that create new orders and modes, or new Principalities, `ally' themselves with the values of the Republic. But these Romans, after the death of Hiero II, destroyed Syracuse. Is an alliance with (the values of) the Republic a prudent course for the Prince that would create his own Principality? It is something of a puzzle. Perhaps our philosopher merely expects this puzzle to draw us to a reading of his Discourses? And don't forget that way back in chapter 1 he promised not to speak of Republics. Fibber...

We would be remiss if we didn't discuss in a little more detail the dynamics between those mentioned in this magnificent chapter and the implication thereof. Back at the end of our words on the second paragraph we indicated that it seemed that Machiavelli had drawn a line between Moses and Cyrus and the others. Is the line between history and myth? Or is the line between principalities and republics? The dominions of Cyrus and Moses (Persia and Israel) became Kingdoms. The dominions of Romulus and Theseus (Rome and Athens) eventually became Republics.  Is our philosopher telling that Republics are founded on myth? Then what do the dominions founded by Cyrus and Moses have in common? Perhaps the common element is that they were founded by men that reshape, or attempt to reshape, myths into – what? Religion perhaps?

Mentioning Moses with these others is also quite interesting. Are we meant to understand that Moses simply saw an opportunity and took it? Or is that what God did? In either case the Exodus would not be particularly miraculous.  In both cases there would indeed be virtu, in one case on the part of Moses, in the on the part of God. Cyrus is mentioned in the Bible, he rebuilds the temple of Jerusalem (Ezra 1:1-4 or somewhere around there) and returns the Jews from their Babylonian captivity. Was Cyrus inspired by God or did he use God, the many gods, for political purposes? Again, why is Cyrus paired with Moses? If we understand Cyrus to have used the gods to build his empire then is our philosopher arguing that Moses did the same – but was never found out. The four names are mentioned in paragraphs 2, 3, and 5. Moses name is always first, while the others change position. The name Cyrus never is last. If the names had appeared a fourth time would it have been?

But again, Machiavelli says these men acquire their principality with difficulty but hold on to it with ease. Why? Is rapping oneself in the mantle of divinity the reason for this ease? Romulus and Theseus are mythical or semi-mythical figures. Moses and Cyrus continually invoke God or the gods. Is our philosopher indicating that the people believe in God more than they believe their governments? So, God or the gods are powerful, indeed, or so it seems, the most powerful of all. But that is not quite right. Better said – public speeches about God or the gods is what is the most powerful of all. Cyrus doesn't at all attack the gods; he uses them. Is Machiavelli indicating that Founding Princes should build their structures on the superstitions of the people? Does anyone else use religion in this manner?

And, continuing this line of thought, what is the reason that `there is nothing more difficult to carry out nor more doubtful of success nor more dangerous to manage then to introduce a new system of things?' It's new, and people do not believe the new. Is the only way to overcome this by saying that God has ordained it? This makes the new modes and orders an ancient thing, as old as God's will itself. Is this why they hold on to this principality with ease? Is our philosopher indicating that they have built their edifices on the superstitions on the people and that these superstitions are the greatest constant in human history? But that would mean human psychology, not politics, is the queen of the sciences! Would our philosopher, or any philosopher, ever say that?

Joe

PS The text of the Prince is supplied for convenience only. I am consulting a bilingual edition translated and edited by Mark Musa.

PPS here is a link to historical documents of what Cyrus said at the time according to Jewish and non-Jewish sources.

http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/ancient/539cyrus1.html

Note that in the non-biblical document Cyrus names every god he can think of. For those of you interested in pursuing this line of thought Xenophon's Education of Cyrus seems to show us a very political Cyrus, one that constantly and consistently acted to increase his power.

PPS Some good information on Hiero II can be found at:

http://www.mcs.drexel.edu/~crorres/Archimedes/Family/Hiero.html

I do not know exactly which of the ancients made the remark that Hiero II "lacked nothing to be able to reign except a kingdom." (Nick mentions it in the last paragraph of this chapter above.) It could have been Plutarch, Polybius or Pausanias or even Titus Livy. Machiavelli also mentions this statement, again without attribution, in the dedication or preface of his Discourses on Titus Livy. It is revealing of our philosopher that this quote meant so much to him that he would mention it in both of his masterpieces. Now, how would a philosopher, lacking a world to rule, go about acquiring, or creating, a Kingdom? We also wonder if our philosopher mentions Hiero II in order to have the opportunity to say these words "he lacked nothing to be able to reign except a kingdom."  When we read that phrase we wonder if we are to think of the philosopher Machiavelli… Has our philosopher, in this book and the Discourses, given philosophy the means to make its Kingdom? Should not the philosophers, the best of all, rule?