Notes to Chapter 7: Hâsa and Hâsya distinguished in Rasa-Theory

1)     [page 204>] Hâso nâma—para-ceSTânukaraNa-kuhakâsambaddhapralâpa-paurobhâgya-maurkhyâdi-bhir vibhâvaih samutpadyate / tam abhinayet pûrvoktair hasitâdibhir anubhâvaih / bhavati câtra zlokah: 

Para-ceSTâbukaraNâd dhâsah samupajâyate / smita-hâsâtihâsitair abhineyah sa paNDitaih //  NâTya Zâstra GOS VI.10

2)     [206>] See the discussion of the passage in its larger context of the legitimacy of zânta-rasa in J.L. Masson and M.V. Patwardhan, Zântarasa and Abhinavagupta’s Philosophy of Aesthetics, pp.120-43. “Some say that zama is the sthâyibhâva  of zânta and that it arises from vibhâvas such as ascetic practices, association with yogins, etc. It can be represented on the stage by anubhâvas such as the absence of lust, anger, etc. Its vyabhicârins will be firmness, wisdom, etc. Others however do not accept this, because, they say zama and zânta are synonyms” (zama-zântayoh paryâyatvât…)—ibid., p.120 = Abhinavabhârati vol.1, GOS, p.332. In other words, the objectors insist that there is no difference between the real spiritual tranquility brought about under certain circumstances in the world, and it aesthetic counterpart evoked through its representation in drama through a ‘support’ (âzraya).

3)     [207>] Zama-zântayoh paryâyatvam tu hâsa-hâsyâbhyâm vyâkhyâtam; siddha-sâdhyatayâ, laukikâlaukikatvena, sâdhâraNâsâdhâraNatayâ ca vailakSaNyam zama-zântayor api sulabham eva / Abhinavabhârati vol. I, p.335, we have translated the text as corrected by M&P, Zântarasa, p.115 (translated by them on p.128).

4)     [208>] na câyam rasâdir arthah “putras te jâtah” ityato yathâ harSo jâyate tathâ / nâpi lakSaNayâ / api tu sahRdayasya hRdaya-samvâda-balâd vibhâvânubhâva-pratîtau tanmayîbhâvenâsvâdyamâna eva rasyamânataika-prâNah siddha-svabhâva-sukhâdi-vilakSaNah parisphurati / …. / tena tatra zabdasya dhvananam eva vyâpâro’Rtha-sahakRtasyeti / vibhâvâdy-artho’pi na putra-janma-harSa-nyâyena tâm citta-vRttim janayatîti jananâtirikto’Rthasyâpi vyâpâro dhvananam evocyate /  Abhinavagupta, Dhvanyâlokalocana, ed. J. Pathak (Chowkhamba Vidyabhawan: Varanasi 1965), pp. 80-81.

5)     [213>] Atha hâsyam lakSayitum âha—atheti / âtma-zabdenedam âha—ratir âsvâdanâkhyam pratîtim vidadhânâ na tâm rati-rûpâm eva vidhatte / pramukhe vibhâvâdau sâdhâraNyât (corrected by us into asâdhâraNyât) / hâse tu ya âsvâdah so’pi vikRta-veSâdînâm sâmâjikân prati loka-vRttena hâsa-hetuteti vibhâva-sâdhâraNya-dvâreNa tad-eka-svabhâva eva iti hâsâtmaka-rasanâkhya-carvaNâ-carvaNîyatvâc câsya / rati-zokâv eva parama-taj-jâtîya-samvid-âsvâdana-dhârârûDha-sukha-duhkha-rûpatvena nih-sâdhâraNâtmîyatva-niyama-graha-gRhîta-hetu-balâd evotpadyate yatah ato’nayor muninâ prabhava-grahaNam kRtam / anyeSu tu vibhave sâdhâraNya-sambhâvanât tadâtmaka-grahaNam / naya-vinayâder anyâya-kâriNah samânam kâlâder apûrva-vastunaz ca sarvân praty utsâha-krodha-bhaya-jugupsâ-vismaya-hetutvena sâdhâraNya-vibhâvatvâd ity alam bahunâ / Abhinavabhârati GOS vol. I, p.312. In the line tad-eka-svabhâva [214>] eva iti…câsya / the iti is rather superfluous, for Abhinava normally uses it to mark off the preceding phrase a causative clause. If not, the terminating phrase must be the main clause and cannot be in the ablative; in which case we would suggest the correct reading as –d dhâsyah / instead of –c câsya /, making the whole proposition a (pseudo-) etymological definition of hâsya: “Hâsya is so called because it is a relishing that is of the same nature as its object hâsa.”  Note that the iti in hâsa-hetuteti is used to merely mark off the preceding as a causative clause. [In retrospect, the final asya could well be correct as referring to the ‘taste’ (i.e., âsvâdasya) of hâsa. – SV, 5/22/2002.]

6)     Tad atra sâkSât-kârâyamâNatve paripoSikâ natâdi-sâmagrî, yasyâm vastusatam kâvyârpitânâm ca deza-kâla-pramâtR-âdînâm niyama-hetûnâm anyonyapratibandha-balâd atyantam apasaraNe sa eva sâdhâraNî-bhâvah sutarâm (???) puSyati / Abhinavabhârati GOS I, p.281. Cf. the translation of R. Gnoli, in The Aesthetic Experience According to Abhinavagupta, p.58. It is this elimination of space and time from the aesthetic object—and not some vague process of ‘idealization’, as often claimed—that frees it from being a ‘particular’ (vizeSa, as opposed to sâmânya ‘universal’), which does not mean that Râma has lost his particularity to become an ideal generalized abstract hero, or that Zâkuntalâ has become the abstraction [215>] of the universal beloved. Râma and Zâkuntalâ remain very much themselves in all their specificity, but the elimination of temporality, of here and now, from their perception deprives them of their capacity to stimulate purposive activity with respect to themselves. This is all that ‘universalization’ (sâdhâraNî-karaNa) amounts to. Te yad âgamena varNyante tadâ tad-vizeSa-buddhir yadyapi râmâyaNa-prâyâd ekasmân mahâkâvyâd ullasati tathâpi vartamânatayaiva vizeSânâm sambhâvyamânârthakriyâ-sâmarthyâtmaka-svâlakSaNya-paryavasânân na ca teSâm vartamânatety upagatâ (apagatâ?) tâvad vizeSa-buddhih / kâvyeSv api hRdaya [hRdaya????] eva tâvat sâdhâraNî-bhâvo vibhâvâdînâm jâtah / Abhinavabhârati GOS I, pp.35-36, cf. Gnoli, op. cit., p.89, but his translation on pp.94-95 is not reliable; hRdayam especially seems to have a very technical sense here corresponding to Abhinava’s use of the term in IPVV II, p.178. Cf. also Abhinavabhârati I, p.291: uktam hi deza-kâla-pramâtR-bhedâniyantrita rasa iti /.  

7)     [216>] We shall not discuss the sentiment of disgust (bîbhatsa) here at length, but considering Bharata’s definition of it in terms of determinants (vibhâva) like blood and excrement, charged with (ritual) impurity for a society modeled on brahmanical norms of purity, it is easy to comprehend how the presentation of such determinants could be sufficient to provoke disgust directly in all the caste-Hindu spectators. It may be noted that whereas Abhinava spoke only of the possibility of the determinants of rasas other than love (zRngâra) and pathos (karuNa) being common, PaNDitarâja speaks of the determinants of hâsya and bîbhatsa being always common. Whether the latter is true is however questionable, for bîbhatsa in the case of sophisticated determinants (like hearing unpleasant news) may be ‘exclusive’ (asâdhâraNa) and hâsya, as we are just about to see, is at its fullest when it is based on ‘exclusive’ determinants.

8)     [217>] Nanu rati-krodhotsâha-bhaya-zoka-vismaya-nirvedeSu prâg udâhRteSu, yathâ’’lambanâzrayayoh sampratyayah na tathâ hâse jugupsâyâm ca, tatrâlambanasyaiva pratîteh / padya-zrotuz ca rasâsvâdâdhikaraNatvena laukika-hâsa-jugupsâzrayatvânupapatter iti cet / satyam, tad-âzraya-draSTR-puruSa-vizeSasya tatrâkSepyatvât / tad-anâkSepe tu, svîya-kântâ-varNana-padyâd iva rasodbodhe bâdhakâbhâvât /  PaNDitarâj Jagannâtha, Rasagangâdhara, pp.186-87, Varanasi 1970, ed. B & MM Jha with Sanskrit and Hindi commentaries.

9)     [219>] Compare with Abhinava’s description of the impersonalized aesthetic ‘sentiment of terror’ (bhayânaka-rasa):…bhayam eva param deza-kâlâdy-anâlingitam, tata eva bhîto’ham bhîto’yam zatrur vayasyo madhyastho vetyâdi-pratyayebhyo duhkha-sukhâdi-kRta-hânâdi-buddhy-antarodaya-niyamavattayâ vighna-bahulebhyo vilakSaNâm nirvighna-pratîti-grâhyam sâkSâd iva hRdaye nivizamânam cakSuSer iva viparivartamânam bhayânako rasah / tathâ-vidhe hi bhaye nâtmâtyanta-tiraskRto na vizeSata ullikhitah / evam paro’pi / tata eva na parimitam eva sâdhâraNyam api ti vitatam… / Abhinavabhârati GOS I, p.280, cf. Gnoli’s translation, op. cit., pp.55-56.

10) [221>] Dvi-vidhaz câyam âtmasthah parasthaz ca / yadâ svayam hasati tadâ’’tmasthah / yadâ tu param hâsayati tadâ parasthah / NâTya Zâstra GOS p.313. The text continues (p.314): Atrânuvamzye ârye bhavatah /

viparîtâlankârair vikRtâcârâbhidhâna-veSaiz ca / vikRtair artha-vizeSair hasatîti rasah smRto hâsyo // 49 //

vikRtâcârair vâkyair anga-vikâraiz ca vikRta-veSaiz ca / hâsyati [hâsayati??? check] janam yasmât tasmâj jñeyo raso hâsyah // 50// NâTya Zâstra GOS I, chapter VI.

From the purely aesthetic point of view the distinction between laughter situated-in-oneself (âtmastha) and situated-in-another (parastha), though valid on account of the infectious nature exclusive to laughter (hâsa) alone, does not seem to be of much significance. But considered in the light of the two preceding verses, it seems clear to us that this distinction is not the result of a general reflection by ‘Bharata’ on the psychology and aesthetics of hâsya as it is presented in its prime focus on the Sanskrit stage, the vidûSaka. It is the desire to distinguish the vidûSaka’s laughter—for who else corresponds to the above description in verse 49 but this ‘chief character’ (pradhâna-pâtra) of the drama—from the laughter of the audience (or of other characters on the stage) at him that seems to really underlie the emphasis given to this ‘self/other’ (âtmastha/parastha) distinction. It will be suggested that the vidûSaka’s laughter, like that of the Pâzupata and Rudra’s ‘explosive laughter’ (aTTa-hâsa), is ‘sacred’ laughter, as opposed to the profane laughter of the audience, and marks him as a taboo-violator. Since Abhinava, as we shall see later, characterizes him with the ‘semblance of humor’ (hâsyâbhâsa) instead of humor (hâsya) proper, his general incongruous aspect and particular but stereotyped incongruous details (cf. artha-vizeSa above) must have a more profound non-humorous signification that is [222>] camouflaged by the hâsya aspect. This is probably the reason behind the special importance given to his own (âtmastha) exaggerated laughter as the means of ensuring that the audience readily assimilates all the symbolism centered on his person in the form of determinants (vibhâvas) of hâsa. Abhinava, however, discusses only the psychological aspect of this distinction. Note also that the central motif in all the determinants is incongruity (vikRti).

11) [227>] Dvi-vidhaz câyam iti / âtmasthair vibhâvair vikRta-veSâdibhir vidûSakah svayam hasati sa tasyâtmasthah / devîm ca hâsayatîti tasyâh parasthah—tad idam asat / evam hi vibhâvânam âtmasthatva-vibhâgah syât / na hâsasya / kimca svâminah zoko’nujîvîSu zokam [223>] karotîti parasthatâ sarvatra syât / svayambhûr hi paratra devy-âdau ced gambhîrasya prabhor anujîvi-gato’anubhâva-vyakta-krodho’pi parastho bhavet / tad-vibhâva âtmastho’to(nya)vibhâvakas tv anya iti apy asat / para-hâso’pi tad-dhâse vibhâvah syât / etac ca raty-âdiSu sarveSv apy asti / tasmâd ayam atrârthah—param hasantam dRSTvâ svayam vibhâvân apazyann api hasan loke dRSTah / tathâ vibhâvâdi-darzane’pi gâmbhîryâd anudita-hâso’pi parakîya-hâsâvalokatvena tat-kSaNam hâsa-vizeSah sampadyata eveti svabhâvah / yathâ’mla-dâDimâdi-rasâsvâdah sankramaNa-svabhâvo’nyatrâpi dantodaka-vikârânurûpa-sankrama-darzanâd eva sankrâmatî evam hâsah svabhâvatah sankrama-zîla iti kâSThâ (kâ’sya) bhûyiSThatâ / Abhinavabhârati GOS vol. I, pp.313-14. M&P, having separated the meaning of the phrase ending anudita-hâso’pi (“though not [yet] responding with laughter” from the following phrase beginning with parakîya-hâsâvalokanena (“on noticing someone else’s laughter”), declare that “Abhinava’s point is not clear” (Aesthetic Rapture II, note 438, p.86). In fact, they should be read together and the idea corresponds to the mechanism described in chapter II, point number 10 (pp.15-16) deduced from Gurdjieff’s theory of laughter.

12)  This is a comment on NâTya Zâstra GOS I, chapter VI.61, p.316: [224>] 

Ity eSa sva-samutthas tathâ para-samutthaz ca vijñeyah / dvi-vidhas tri-prakRti-gatas tRy-avasthabhâvo raso hâsyah // 61 //

On which Abhinava comments: sva-samuttha ity asankânta-smitâ-vihasitâpahasita-lakSaNah / para-samutthah sankrânto hasitopahasitâtihasita-rûpah / hasitâdi-rûpa-sankramaNayo(mevo)tkRSTa-prakRtau smitâdi-rûpam / rati-krodha-zokâdes tu na sankramaNam bhavatîty uktam eva / tatra hi yugapad eva vâ sa eva vibhâvas tac-citta-vRttimân va puruSo vibhâvatâm eti / na tu ta eva vibhâvas tasya citta-vRttim prastûya sankramayâdyasya (mayanty anyasya) prastuvatah / hâsam iva (sa eva) sarveSâm âtmastha-parastha-bhedopalakSaNam etad ity anye / etac câsat / anubhâva-siddham eva hîdam hâsah sankrâmatîti / anyas tv âha—tisruSu prakRtiSu tRy-avastho vibhâva-târatamyât dvi-rûpah / punar âtma-parasthatvena dvividheti dvâdaza-bhedo’yam iti kârikâ-tâtparyam iti / atra ca pRthag vibhâvânam api bhavati / tat tv atiprasangâvaham tan-matam iti nodâhRtam /  Of the six varieties of laughter-response (R) distributed in pairs according to increasing intensity among the three types of character, Abhinava suggests that the first member of each pair (smita, vihasita, apahasita) is âtmastha while the second (hasita, upahasita, atihasita) is parastha. But he does not reject the [225>] other interpretations according to which the members of each pair are distinguished not by the above opposition but only by gradation of intensity. Since each of the six varieties could be either âtma- or para-stha, there would be twelve varieties in all. The text is corrupt and hardly intelligible at some crucial places.

13) [227>] Aucityena pravRttau citta-vRtter âsvâdyatve sthâyinyâ raso, vyabhicâriNyâ bhâvah, anaucityena tad-âbhâsah, râvaNasyeva sîtâyâm rateh / yady-api tatra hâsya-rasa-rûpataiva, “zRngârâd dhi bhaved dhâsyah” iti vacanât / tathâpi pâzcâtyeyam sâmâjikânâm sthitih, tanmayî-bhâvana-dazâyâm tu rater eva âsvâdyatêti zRngâratâiva bhâti paurvâparya-vivekâvadhâraNena “dûr-âkarSaNa-moha-mantra iva me tan-nâmni yâte zrutim” ity-âdau / tad asau zRngârâbhâsa eva / tad-angam bhâvâbhâsah…. Abhinavagupta, Locana, pp.79-80 (edition cited).

14) Yathâ râmasya sîtâyâm ratir âsvâdyate tato mâtrayâpi nirvizeSam ity arthah; yah pûrvâpara-vivekah tam utpadyamânam sthagayitvety arthah / Dhvanyâloka by Ânandavardhana and Locana by Abhinavagupta with Kaumudî by Uttungodaya and Upalocana by Kuppusvâmî Zâstri, Uddyota I (Madras 1944), p.145.

15)  [228>] PratipattRRn prati sâ pratibhâ nânumîyamânâ, api tu tad-âvezena bhâsamânety-arthah / yad uktam asmad-upâdhyâya-bhaTTa-tautena—“nâyakasya kaveh zrotuh samâno’nubhavas tatah” iti / Abhinavagupta, Locana, p.93.

16) G.B. Mohan, The Response to Poetry, p.74.

17) [234>] This technique, exploiting the intellectual component of the bisociation, is pushed to its extreme in that form of humor called irony defined by the Concise Oxford Dictionary as “expression of one’s meaning…by the simulated adoption of another’s point of view or laudatory tone for the purpose of ridicule.” As Koestler elaborates: “Thus irony consists in defeating an opponent on his won ground, that is, by accepting his premises, his values, his prejudices, his methods of reasoning, for the purpose of unmasking their implicit absurdity. It pretends to take seriously what it doesn’t; it enters into the spirit of the other’s game to demonstrate that the game is absurd…. The ironical statement thus moves on the line of the intersection of two fields: it expressed the opinions of A but couched in the terms of reference of B, which may be the system of values, habits, and prejudices of a society or class. Irony is the subtlest weapon of derision, because it presupposes A’s capacity of seeing through the eyes of B, of projecting himself into the other’s mental structure” (Insight and Outlook, p.98).

18)  [236>] For the dissolution of ego-consciousness during the universalized relish of aesthetic emotion, cf. “Expérience esthétique et desindividualisation” in Michel Hulin’s exemplary study of Le principe de l’ego dans la pensée indienne classique: la notion d’ahamkâra, pp. 341-58 (chapter 3 of Part III on «La notion de PûrNâhamtâ dans le Zivaïsme de Kazmîr»). “This paradoxical lived experience that possesses all the vehemence of ordinary emotion, but decanted, purified of all reference to the private ‘self’ of the one experiencing it, is none other than rasa” (p.349).

19) Certainly, Koestler is careful to distinguish various degrees of self-assertiveness which becomes very rarefied in the highest forms of wit and humor, but there is no doubt that for him the determining factor in humor is this aggressive-defensive component, absent in sorrow. “The more sophisticated forms of humor evoke mixed, and sometimes contradictory, feelings; but whatever the mixture, it must contain one ingredient whose presence is indispensable: an impulse, however faint, of aggression or apprehension. It may be manifested in the guise of malice, derision, the veiled cruelty of condescension, or merely as an [237>] absence of sympathy with the victim of the joke—a ‘momentary anesthesia of the heart’, as Bergson put it. I propose to call this ingredient the aggressive-defensive or self-asserting tendency… In the subtler types of humor this tendency is so faint and discreet that only careful analysis will detect it…” (Act of Creation p.52).

20) Koestler’s thesis that the cognitive structure of our experience of both tragedy and comedy is bisociative and only the emotional charge differs in its quality, “self-transcendent” in tragedy and the opposite in comedy, has been rightly questioned by critics; cf. for example, Wimsatt and Brookes, Practical Literary Criticism, p.580: “But Koestler seems to commit himself to a more questionable proposition—namely, that the emotional charge can in fact be quite sharply and cleanly separated from the cognitive ‘layout’.” [238>] The Indian aesthetician would have even more fundamental objections. Firstly, it is the nature of the emotion involved, hâsa in the comic and sorrow (zoka) in tragedy, that differs and not its “quality” which can be self-transcending in hâsya despite its necessarily bisociative cognitive structure. Secondly, dramatic illusion, the exemplary type of which is for Koestler tragedy, is never bisociative in the sense in which he understand the term: as a dual cognition split or oscillating between the represented (anukârya) and representing (anukartâ) elements (i.e., between role and actor). One of the reasons why Abhinava rejects Zrîzankuka’s definition of drama (nâTya) as “imitation” (anukaraNa) is that the simultaneous perception (bisociation) of imitator and imitated can result only in laughter (hâsa) and not in rasa. [Sanskrit text]. NâTya Zâstra VII.10 / Abhinavabhârati vol.I, p.36; following Gnoli’s amendments in Aesthetic Experience, p.90; translated on p.98). In that unique form of apperception (anuvyavasâya-vizeSa) called ‘drama’ (nâTya), there is no distinct (focal) awareness of the representing medium (upâya) but only a subliminal awareness of it merged into our focal awareness of the representation. Wherever a separate awareness of the medium emerges unexpectedly to interrupt our focus on the latter (anyâdi-buddhi), the bisociated perception is felt to be incongruous (vikaraNam) and provokes laughter.

21) [239>] “On the one hand the self-transcending emotions—participation, projection, identification—inhibit the self-asserting tendencies: they soothe, calm, eliminate worry and desire, purge body and mind of tensions. On the other hand, the act of self-transcending identification may stimulate the surge of anger, fear, cruelty, which, although experienced on behalf of somebody else, nevertheless belong to the self-assertive, aggressive-defensive class and display all their bodily symptoms…. Anger, fear, and the related ‘emergency-reactions’ use the same physiological mechanisms whether the threat is directed at one’s own person, or the person with whom one has identified oneself. They are always ‘self-assertive’—although the ‘self’ has momentarily changed its address—by being, for instance, projected into the handsome and guileless heroine on the screen…. The glory and tragedy of the human condition are closely related to the fact that under certain circumstances the participatory tendencies may serve as mediators or vehicles for emotions belonging to the opposite class; whereas under different circumstances the two tendencies counteract and harmoniously balance each other” (Koestler, Act of Creation, p.279). Koestler is evidently [240>] contradicting himself here when he claims that these emotions remain “self-assertive” though sustained by “self-transcending identification,” for above he insists on just the opposite. In Indian aesthetics, the same “participatory tendency” (tanmayîbhavana = ‘aesthetic identification’), that “mediates” or “vehicles” the nourishment of the permanent emotional dispositions (sthâyins) in the connoisseur, also ensures their being relished in impersonal or self-transcending form. As M. Hulin aptly puts it: “a certain inner animation is not in contradiction with serenity, the veritable peace of consciousness is a simmering peace. All the rasas are thus perceived on the basis of Appeasement (zânta)” (op. cit., p.355). Koestler’s difficulties become further and hopelessly complicated by his confusing the dis-individualization proper to aesthetic identification with the extension of ordinary ego-feeling whereby one identifies oneself with one’s family, race, religion, etc. The latter, even the personal love of God, is counted as a ‘worldly’ emotion (bhâva) in Abhinava’s aesthetics and not as “self-transcending” rasa.

22) [243>] Tatra loka-vyavahâre kârya-kâraNa-sahacarâtmaka-linga-darZane sthâyy-âtma-para-citta-vRtty-anumânâbhyâsa-pâTavâd adhunâ tair evodyâna-kaTâkSa-dhRty-âdibhir laukikam kâraNatvâdi-bhuvam atikrântair vibhâvanânubhâvanâ-samuparañjakatva-mâtra-prâNair ata evâlaukika-vibhâvâdi-vyapadeza-bhâgbhih prâcya-kârâNâdi-rûpa-samskâropajîvana-khyâpanâya vibhâvâdi-namadheya-vyapadezyair (…) guNa-pradhâna-tâtparyeNa sâmâjika-dhiyi samyag yogam sambandham aikâgryam vâ sâditavadbhir alaukika-nirvighnâ-samvedanâtmaka-carvaNa-gocaratâm nîto’rthaz carvyamâNataika-sâro na tu siddha-svabhâvas tât-kâlika eva na tu carvaNâtirikta-kâlâvalambî sthâyi-vilakSaNa eva rasah / Abhinavabhârati GOS I, p.285. Cf. note 4 above, pp.207-09. Note that tât-kâlika here clearly does not mean ‘momentary’ but ‘contemporaneous’ [‘simultaneous’], cf. note 23, p.49.

23) [244>] George Meredith, An Essay on Comedy, pp.88-90 (London 1927, reprint 1934, Mickleham edition).

24) Cf. I.A. Richard’s distinction between the “sensitive” and the “obtuse” person above, p.96, note 7. Cf. also Abhinavagupta IPVV, vol. II, pp.177-79 on the difference between the connoisseur or ‘epicure’ (bhuñjâna) and the glutton (audarika) in their enjoyment of a delicious concoction (rasa); translated and commented by Hulin (op. cit., pp.323-36), M&P (Zântarasa, pp.44-45).

25) sâ câvighnâ samvic camatkârah / tajjo’pi kampa-pulakollukasanâdir vikâraz camatkârah / Abhinavabhârati GOS I, p.281. Being involuntary manifestations of inner enjoyment, these symptoms are also called ‘camatkâra’ by secondary extension of the primary sense applied to the aesthetic rapture itself.

 [this concludes the Footnotes to chapter 7: “Hâsa and Hâsya distinguished in Rasa-Theory”]