Chapter 8

The Role of Hâsya in ZRngâra

1.      [page 247>] Though Abhinava generalizes Bharata’s formula deriving hâsya from the ‘imitation’ or ‘semblance’ of zRngâra to (the imitation of) all the rasas, the privileged relationship of hâsya with zRngâra still needs to be justified theoretically and demonstrated practically. Bhoja’s objection that hâsya sometimes does not arise from zRngâra answered by restricting the scope of hâsya to love-in-union (sambhoga) and minimizing its role in “love-in-separation” (vipralambha). The principle of rasa-virodha.

2.      Jagannâtha on hâsa as inevitable vyabhicârin of zRngâra. Especially in love-intrigues of nâtikas and versified portraitures of the amorous mood in muktakas. The sub-divisions of the “gay” style (kaishikî-vRtti), that is the vehicle of zRngârarasa are replete with elements of hâsya: especially narma and narma-garbha. Transitory negative emotions of kaishikî are often integral components of its hâsya dimension.

3.      Hâsya, unlike the other rasas, is characterized by both poetic qualities (guna), ojas “energy” and mâdhurya “sweetness” because hâsa is expansive whereas hâsya is especially ancillary to zRngâra. Also hâsya being emotionally bisociative can comprise other rasas of ojas-nature. Mâdhurya predominates in sahâsya-zRngâra of kaishikî depending wholly on tanmayîbahavana, whereas ojas predominates in farces (prahasana) and the vidûSaka where hâsya is scarcely distinguishable from hâsa.

4.      Methodology of hâsya-analysis in practical criticism of muktakas: choice of verses depicting the âzraya justified and the objections of sva-zabda-vâcyatâ and parastha-hâsa answered. The laughter mentioned merely serves to (re-) organize the sahRdayas apperception into an emotionally bisociative pattern relished independently of the âzraya’s laughter.

5.      Mammata’s example of svazabda-vâcyatâ of vyabhicârins being exceptionally not a defect is actually an instance of these vyabhicârins contribution to hâsya that is not svazabda-vâcya. Example of narmagarbha involving complex interaction of three perspectives of which only two âzrayas are loci of hâsya: [page 249>] exploitation of the ambiguity of gesture.

6.      Since actual union is ruled out as tasteless but mutual pleasure must nevertheless be exploited to the maximum, the judicious introduction of negative transitory emotions that maintain tension and variety in the proximity of sambhoga relies on the very bisociative technique that is the soul of hâsa and hâsya. For these contrary emotions have to be immediately or even simultaneously countered by others favorable to union. Objective hâsa in the poem is transformed into hâsya in the sahRdaya when the constituent emotions of these bisociations are evoked through aesthetic identification with different âzrayas.

7.      The absence of hâsya in narmasphiñja is due to the direct intervention of fear in preventing the consummation of sambhoga. Fragments of other sentiments in narmasphoTa are often exploited for bisociative effects contributing to hâsya; without which the manifestations of mutual sambhoga are necessarily restrained. Narma proper without hâsya generally belongs more to vipralambha than to sambhoga.

8.      Hâsya is intrinsic to zRngâra due to the very technique of the latter’s presentation in drama and poetry. It shares all the mâdhurya of zRngâra because of its complete dependence on aesthetic identification. It’s generated especially at those strategic points where contrary perceptions criss-cross. The rasa-aesthetic privileges the “emotional center” in its treatment of hâsya proper, as evidenced by the fate of the elements of the “verbal wit-contests” (vîthyanga) in the development of Indian dramaturgy.

[page 249>] We have seen that the NâTya Zâstra attributes hâsya to the semblance of love (zRngâra) or rather to its ‘imitation’ (shRngârânukriti), see especially chapter IX, note ???. Although Abhinavagupta extends the principle to all the rasas, making their semblances (âbhâsa) the cause of hâsya, it is pertinent to raise the question as to whether there is a more intrinsic and natural relationship between zRngâra and hâsya than between hâsya and the other rasas, which would perhaps account for Bharata’s choice of zRngâra¹ in order to illustrate the evocation of hâsya through ‘imitation.’ “Bharata mentions in connection with the origin of hâsya, the imitation of zRngâra only, because we find hâsya in a large measure in love-dramas, as an auxiliary to love” (V. Raghavan, p.425).² Bhoja goes out of his way to demolish Bharata’s scheme of primary and [250 derivative rasas, understood quite literally by him. He seeks to demonstrate that hâsya can rise from rasas other than zRngâra, and that it sometimes does not arise from zRngâra (Raghavan, ZRngâra Prakâsha, pp.498-99). But understood as merely indicative of various causal relationships between the rasas, it is immune to such criticism. “Thus Bharata’s text must be taken to mean as indicating a study of rasas from the point of view of their interrelations of how emotions are closely related and how one leads to the other” (ibid., p.425). Here we are interested only in the role of hâsya in zRngâra proper, that is in love-in-union (sambhoga-zRngâra), and not love-in-separation (vipralambha-zRngâra). Whereas hâsya tends to destroy rasas like vîra (heroism), raudra (anger), karuna (sorrow), bhayânaka (fear), when it has the same âzraya (receptacle) as them,³ it tends, on the contrary, to stimulate and enhance zRngâra when [251] it occurs in the context of the latter. If it does not have prominence in vipralambha, this is because the element of sorrow (karuna) is more pronounced there and hâsya would tend to eclipse this vital element of pain.⁴ Thus even the example given by Bhoja to show how hâsya may not be produced even in the context of zRngâra depicting the meeting of lovers, is in fact only an instance of “love-in-separation due to jealousy” (îrSyâ-vipralambha) and not of sambhoga, though it could easily be converted into one:

Recalling all the resentful indignation spilling over
In the presence, so anxiously procured, of her beloved,
Now mutely chiding her confidantes in love,
Lamented she was, and not laughingly derided!⁵

[252>] A touch of hâsya here would not have destroyed the zRngâra but merely drawn it towards the orbit of sambhoga. As Raghavan observes: “The situation here is too pathetic for laughter. The thin border between comedy and tragedy is crossed. The situation does not produce laughter but only tears: ruditâ nopahâsitâ” (note, loc. cit.).

Hence Panditarâja Jagannâtha categorically states: “Wherever zRngâra is predominant, hâsa is an unavoidable ‘transitory emotion’ (vyabhicârin).”⁶ It is a fact that it is in the works of zRngâra, especially in the ‘romantic plays’ (nâtikas) where female characters abound and the focus is on light-hearted love-intrigues or in the isolated love-verses (muktakas) which frame the subtlest fleeting gestures of mutual love, that most of the hâsya in literature is found; excepting, of course, the ‘farces’ (prahasanas) and the vidûSaka, where hâsa itself predominates. Hence the kaishikî, i.e., the ‘gentle’ or ‘gay’ mode or procedure (vRtti), which is invariably used to depict the ‘erotic sentiment’ (zRngâra) is also replete with elements of [253>] hâsya:⁷ of its four divisions, viz. narma, narmasphañja, narmasphoTa and narmagarbha,⁸ the first, i.e. narman, is pervaded by humor and laughter in all its eighteen sub-varieties,⁹ and the last, i.e., narma-garbha has one of its two sub-varieties based on humor.¹⁰ According to the Dasharûpaka, pleasantry (narman) is clever jesting that [254>] serves to conciliate the beloved. It is of three kinds depending on whether based on hâsya alone (1), or expressive also of love or also of fear. The second kind (expressive also of love) is further subdivided into three types according to whether it consists in an allusion to oneself (as being amorous) (2), is expressive of (a desire for sexual) enjoyment (3) or of indignant jealousy (at the lover’s infidelity) (4). The narma may also be based on pure fear (5) or fear subordinated to some other sentiment (6). All six divisions are produced by speech, by costume (12) or by gesture (18). The pure hâsya of speech, costume and gesture no doubt applies above all to the vidûSaka¹¹ who is himself immune to Cupid’s arrows, but his association with the ‘light-hearted’ (dhîra-lalita) hero (nâyaka) is, in aesthetic terms, only the conjunction of hâsya and zRngâra. In the three (= nine) varieties expressive of love, the latter can easily and often does blend with hâsya by constituting at least the [255>] positive pole of the affective structure of the bisociations.¹² Similarly, in the two (= six) varieties expressive of fear, the latter comes naturally to constitute the opposing negative pole of the affective structure of hâsya (especially in ‘pure fear’), and where this fear itself is a form of ‘trepidation’ (trâsa) in the presence of the beloved generated by intense love, it is at the same time subordinated to zRngâra.¹³

Abhinava emphasizes that [256>] hâsa (hâsya) is dominant in ‘jesting’ (narman) and that this is the general definition. But he distinguishes only three varieties in Bharata’s definition:¹⁴ the hâsa is either indicative of jealousy (4 above), as a means of reproach (also 4?), or to agitate the heart of another. (But would it be difficult to point out instances where the joking remark simultaneously fulfills all three functions?). For jealousy, he cites the mature queen Vâsavadattâ (in ‘The Jeweled Necklace’ Ratnâvalî II.18) when, pointing to the figure of her younger rival, the heroine Sâgarikâ, drawn beside that of the king on the picture-board, she laughingly demands whether this too is the product of the vidûSaka’s (supposed) artistry¹⁵ (amorous jealousy given vent through laughter). For the second variety where the hâsa is meant to reproach, he cites from the same play (ad. III. 13) Vâsavadattâ’s protestations when the king tries to placate her after having realized his error in adoring in verse (III.11) her [257>] physical charms under the impression that it was Sâgarikâ that he was thus exalting.¹⁶ For the third and last type, the same play (II, before v.1) when the maid Susangatâ, having caught Sâgarikâ with her freshly drawn portrait of the king which the heroine tries to cover up as that of the ‘God of Love’ (Kâmadeva), draws beside the king the portrait of Sâgarikâ pretending with a laugh that it is only Rati (‘Sexual Enjoyment,’ name of the wife of Kâma) herself. Here there is the bringing of another’s heart close to one’s own. Though hâsya is not a necessary part of the definition of the other two divisions (narma-sphañja and narma–sphoTa) of the Kaishikî mode, it is certainly not excluded from them as we shall see towards the close of this chapter. The above restatement of the forms of Kaishikî was meant not only to underline the intimate and indissociable blending of hâsya with zRngâra but especially to provide an insight into the manner in which transitory negative emotions (vyabhicârins) of love like fear, jealousy, indignation, etc., may at the same time be effective constituents of hâsya. In the illustrative verses to be dissected below, we shall see concrete examples of the masterly exploitation of such possibilities. [258>]

So closely is zRngâra associated with hâsya in Abhinava’s aesthetic perception that it determines the choice of ‘poetic qualities’ (guna) he attributes to hâsya, while distributing them in various proportions among the nine rasas. Ânanadavardhana had already qualified zRngâra as “the sweetest and most delectable of all aesthetic sentiments. The quality of sweetness (mâdhurya) is securely grounded on poetry which is full of this sentiment.”¹⁷ Though laughter, by its explosiveness, is characterized by expansiveness (vikâsa) of the psyche which pertains particularly to the poetic quality called ‘energy’ (ojas),¹⁸ hâsya, unlike the other rasas, [259>] where either ‘energy’ or ‘sweetness’ predominates, is characterized equally by both ojas and mâdhurya, the latter quality being due especially to its essential role in zRngâra.¹⁹ “Because of its being accessory to zRngâra, hâsya has mâdhurya as predominant; due to its expansive nature ojas too is dominant—thus both are equally present” (Raghavan, ZRngâra Prakâza, p.326). The ojas element is also included because hâsya potentially contains within itself all the other rasas as constituents of its bisociative affective structure. When those characterized by ‘energy’ like anger, enthusiasm or terror²⁰ predominate they naturally impregnate the hâsya itself with this quality and one may expect such hâsya to be much more akin to the laughter of worldly hâsa, since these ‘inflamed’ (dîpta) emotions are released thereby). “Hâsya need not be ancillary to zRngâra only. It can be introduced in other rasas as well. It is mainly of the form of vikâsa and springing from ânanda (‘joy’), it can be justified that it has mâdhurya and dîpti as Abhinavagupta says” (Raghavan, ibid., [260>] pp.326-27). The conclusion is that whereas the hâsya of the Kaishikî mode depicting zRngâra is characterized chiefly by ‘sweetness’ (mâdhurya), the hâsya and hâsa depicted primarily in the ‘farce’ (prahasana), and to some xtent in the vidûSaka, reveals a greater proportion of ‘energy’ (ojas).²¹ Mâdhurya corresponds to the process of aesthetic identification (tanmayîbhavana) without which zRngâra and especially karuna (‘pathos’)  cannot arise (cf. chapter VII, pp.212-23 and note 5). This is clear from Abhinava’s understanding of the (term) ârdratâ (‘melting of the heart’) into which the ‘sweetness’ of zRngâra is transformed when it reaches its highest pitch in karuna through the intermediate degree of ‘love-in-separation’ (vipralambha). He glosses this ‘melting’ (ârdratâ) with “the shedding of the natural hardness (of indifference) due to non-participation” (non-identification).²² But since hâsya [261>] is incompatible with ‘pathos’ (karuna) and of limited scope in love-in-separation, precisely due to the intensification of the pathetic element, it is through its vital role in ‘love-in-union’ (sambhoga) that it acquires the rich mellowness of mâdhurya. Hence, hâsya as accessory to zRngâra, being more dependent on aesthetic identification (tanmayîbhavana) for its relish, is closer to the status of rasa proper than that where ‘energy’ (ojas) predominates and such identification is less crucial. But before we attempt to answer the question why hâsya should be an unavoidable vyabhicârin only in the case of (zRngâra) love (-in-union, sambhoga), it will be both illuminating and refreshing to examine some typical examples of ‘love-suffused-with-humor’ (sahâsya-zRngâra). As we shall see, it is the very vyabhicârins (‘transitory emotions’)  that are constitutive of (the inter-personal psychology of) love, all of them depending on aesthetic identification, that simultaneously become indispensable constituents of hâsya.

But first, a word of clarification. Since there may always be disagreement between literary critics as to whether a particular verse really contains an essential element of hâsya and, if so, as to where and how exactly the hâsya intervenes in the movement of the versified portraiture, we have restricted our analyses to those verses overflowing with zRngâra where at least one of the characters is explicitly described as laughing at a particular point in the development  (usually towards the end). Thereby, we can not only assure ourselves that hâsya is really present, but we also have a [262>] criterion (namely, the point of intervention) for deciding which factors in the total situation are relevant and which irrelevant for the humor.

But here the objection will certainly be raised that in the rasa-aesthetics, the rasa, and generally the transitory emotion (vyabhicârin) too like hâsa, should never be expressed directly and explicitly but only suggested through relevant determinants (vibhâvas) and consequents (anubhâvas)—the defect of “denotation by its own name” (sva-zabda-vâcyatâ, ad. Dhvanyâloka I.4). A further objection may be that the laughing person cannot, by our own argument, be the receptacle (âzraya) of hâsya for, our laughter being provoked by his laughter, it would be only a case of Abhinava’s category of “laughter residing in (deriving from) another” (parastha-hâsa; cf. p.222).

Both these objections can be easily answered by pointing out that the prime function of the hâsa here is to signal the presence of a bisociated cognition which is the cause of and hence independent of it. To be more correct, from the point of view of the connoisseur (sahRdaya), the hâsa induces us to organize the given elements into a bisociative pattern that will render the total situation coherent by justifying the laughter. To so this, it is wholly unnecessary that our own laughter be provoked by the mere description (S) “he laughed,” which is not all infectious like the real-life laughter in parasthahâsa. If, as sahRdayas, we cannot help smiling, this is because, alerted by the mention of hâsa, we immediately grasp the humor of the situation, which may otherwise have escaped our attention. Having grasped the humor, it now appears to us that we are participating in the hâsa of the âzraya. But we do so only by participating at the same time, and more fundamentally, in the bisociated affective structure underlying this hâsa; a bisociation where, unlike the usual unspecifiable character of worldly hâsa or of many jokes, both components are easily isolable and relishable [263>] in themselves (cf. chapter III, p.102). It is therefore a genuine instance of the tasting of the finest hâsya through aesthetic identification with the bisociated perception of the âzraya, and not the more familiar case of direct laughter at a stimulus under the purely catalytic influence of another’s laughter (parasthahâsa). Since these components are distinguishable in terms of their separate determinants and consequents (not to be confused with consequents of hâsa proper such as smile, laugh, etc.) and the hâsya is not evoked by the mere mention of hâsa, the defect of svazabdavâcyatâ too does not arise, There is, moreover, even less occasion for this defect when we realize that the laughter inscribed in the poem, the laughter which is the starting point of our analyses, is not the transitory emotion (vyabhicârin) hâsa but only its physical manifestation (anubhâva, but see note 46 below). With these preliminaries we may safely undertake the necessary surgical dissections without reducing the fragility of the living poem to the lifeless rigidity of the show-room cadaver. The examples to follow are both psychological analyses of the objective situations of laughter in order to reveal its underlying bisociative structure, and also samples of literary criticism pursuing the process whereby the sahRdaya’s perception exploits this structure to relish hâsya.

We may begin with the second invocatory verse, addressed to Gaurî, of that delightful nâtikâ of king HarSadeva, Ratnâvalî, from which Abhinava so often draws his examples, especially of the comic—it lays down, as it were, the predominant mood of the play to follow: [264>]

Starting in haste in her eagerness, speeding back through inborn bashfulness,
Again urged forward with those familiar coaxing of her kinswomen,
Seized with trepidation before her husband on her first meeting,
With sprouting horripilation as she was embraced by the laughing Hara;
May this fair Gaurî be ever favorable to you!²³

According to the accepted canons of literary practice, following Ânandavardhana, the mention of transitory emotions (vyabhicârins) like eagerness, shame, fear, etc., by their own names is not conducive to the evocation of rasa¸even if their respective vibhâvas and anubhâvas have been portrayed. Such mention is not only superfluous but actually detrimental to rasa.²⁴ Mammata, however, cites this verse in order to show that sometimes even this is not a defect.²⁵ The haste and [265>] the turning back, as also the horripilation, would not be specific enough if the vyabhicârins responsible for the anubhâvas had not been mentioned. Otherwise, one could easily associate these actions with a whole range of transitory emotions, with the result that they would convey nothing in particular.²⁶ But Mammata’s justification is not satisfactory for, on these grounds, it would be possible, with a little stretching, to justify almost all cases where the mention of the vyabhicârins by name accompanies and is accompanied by the relevant anubhâvas and vibhâvas. But we know very well that even in such cases, the poet’s skill falls short of the ideal of portraying the rasa without mention of the vyabhicârins. [266>]

In our opinion, such mention here in no way contradicts the accepted canon, but only seems to do so. It would have been a defect if merely meant to communicate the mental state of Gaurî, and no more. But in fact they serve the additional function transforming her anubhâvas into the vibhâvas of, not only hâsa in Hara but hâsya in the connoisseur (sahRdaya). It is the mention of the eagerness (autsukhya) and the bashfulness (hrî) that throws into sharp contrast the hastening forth and the turning back and makes them appear mutually incongruous for, in fact, both these conflicting transitory emotions arise from the single underlying abiding emotion (sthâyin) of love (rati). Similarly, her terror in the presence of Hara, also arising from deep love, is only half the reason for her sprouting horripilation. The hairs standing on end is also symptomatic of intense and indescribable bliss and this meaning, this transitory emotion of joy (harsha) , although unmentioned by name, is clearly suggested by her being embraced by Hara while in this condition. The sprouting horripilation plays a role analogous to the verbal pun in jokes: it simultaneously reveals fear (mentioned) and bliss (unmentioned but evident) and the incongruity of the two evokes hâsya in the onlooker. What sprouted as fear no doubt blossomed as bliss. If the transitory trepidation (sâdhvasa) had not been mentioned there would have been no bisociation centering on the manifestation of horripilation. That all these reactions of Gaurî are seen in an incongruous light by Hara is indicated by his laughter and thereby the connoisseur (sahRdaya) too is induced to focus his attention, through the eyes of Hara himself as it were, on the presented incongruities. Another incongruity is that her very attempts to conceal her overpowering love only reveal it all the more [267>] forcefully and renders her all the more charming as a determinant (vibhâva) of love (zRngâra).  It is clear then that, if the defect of “direct denotation” (svazabda-vâcyatâ) does not in any way detract from the poetic excellence of this verse, this is because the mentioned transitory emotions (vyabhicârins) positively contribute to the hâsya which is not mentioned.

But why is this an example of “love with humor as ancillary” (sahâsya-zRngâra) and not of humor itself as arising from the “semblance of love” (zRngârâbhâsa)? Because all the transitory emotions, consequent reactions (anubhâvas) and determinants are suggestive of love (rati) and do not contradict the latter as in the case of Râvana’s love for Sîtâ. The incongruity is only between the transitory emotions (fear and bliss) and between the consequents (hastening and retreating), and the hâsya produced with these as determinants (vibhâvas) is itself a transitory emotion of zRngâra, for its constituents are all arising from love. Further, it should be noted that, though both Gaurî and Hara are receptacles (âzrayas)  of mutual love, it is only Hara who is the âzraya of hâsa.

The following verse from Amaru is cited by Dhanika to illustrate Dhanañjaya’s hâsya-based sub-category of narma-garbha (see n.10 above), where the lover proceeds stealthily in order to achieve some purpose.²⁷ Here the lover on entering sees both [268>] his beloveds seated side by side on the same bench and, though intent on amorous sport, is faced with the dilemma of satisfying both without provoking the jealousy of the other, especially that of the senior:

Seeing his darlings seated together, stealing upon them from behind,
With due reverence, blindfolding the elder as if intent on play,
Slightly turning his neck towards the other……
……Her heart blossoming with horripilating love,
     her cheeks flushed with suppressed laughter…..
He kisses her, the rogue!²⁸

The incongruity here centers on the act of blindfolding the elder. The latter takes it as a manifestation of his love, even partiality, for her, and is thereby pleased with him. She is no way the receptacle (âzraya) of hâsya. The younger perceives this aspect of the blindfolding but is at the same time amused and delighted that her lover has resorted to such devious tactics merely in order to demonstrate his love for herself without the knowledge of the other. The blindfolding is ambiguous and ambivalent in that it simultaneously reveals his (apparent) partiality for the elder and conceals his (real) partiality for the younger. [269>] The latter suppresses her laughter in order to go along with the game and to enjoy his favor. Neither has cause for jealousy and both are satisfied, though only one is amused, because each considers herself the object of special favor. But there is also a second and subtler level of humor in that in reality it is himself that the sly lover has most favored for he has flirted with both simultaneously while allowing each the privilege of considering herself the favored one.²⁹ The sahRdaya is struck by the incongruity of an apparently impossible situation suddenly transformed into an ideal love-scene by the lover’s flash of amorous inspiration and his skill in the crooked ways of love (vijnâna). All three are determinants (vibhâva) of zRngâra and their reactions are also its consequents (anubhâvas) but hâsa is a transitory emotion especially of the younger and it induces the connoisseur (sahRdaya) to focus on the incongruity of its determinant, namely the blindfolding. As in the previous example, hâsya does not contradict the zRngâra here but is ancillary to it. [270>] For the opposed meanings of the blindfolding, though neutralizing each other to generate hâsa, are both conducive to zRngâra especially in the lover. The flushing of the cheeks is not only a consequent of hâsya but also consequent and determinant of zRngâra.

The next verse, also from Amaru, is twice cited by the Dhvanikâra, Ânanadavardhana, first to demonstrate how the delineation of the figures of speech should always be subservient and conducive to rasa,³⁰ and secondly, to show how opposing rasas should be kept secondary to the main or intended sentiment (rasa) to avoid marring the sentiment.³¹ Abhinava cites it independently for a third time to show how the effect of contrary transitory emotions (vyabhicârins) should be immediately countered by delineating such vyabhicârins as would nourish the intended rasa as well:³²

Tightly bound in the noose of tender quivering creeper-like arms,
Angrily dragged to her private chamber before all her friends at dusk,³³
His misdeeds laid bare by her accusing finger,
           with sweet faltering admonishments of “Never again!”³⁴
Though pleading his innocence, beaten indeed is the blessed lover,
           laughing while his darling weeps!³⁵

The offending lover with tell-tale marks of infidelity, like nail-wounds, on his body is here figuratively compared with a criminal bound in chains, dragged to the prison before his protesting kinsfolk, his crime publicly broadcast by his executrix [272>] and punished even as he persists in denying his guilt. The metaphor, beautifully suggested but not carried to completion, provides supreme nourishment to the intended rasa which is zRngâra.³⁶ As Abhinava remarks: “If the description of her creeper-like arms as a noose for binding had been carried to its logical conclusions making the beloved an executrix, her bed-chamber a prison or cage, etc., there would have been great impropriety…. Her voice falters under the influence of anger but is also sweet…. He is indeed beaten, i.e., the intercessions of her friends on his behalf are unheeded, for who can tolerate the cheek (hypocrisyJ) of this fellow, who, through his laughter is both intent on hiding his offence and also most dear to me.”³⁷ The initial metaphor with its reverberations through the rest of the verse serves to develop the aesthetic sentiment of anger (raudra), but it is not culminated because [273>] anger is destructive of love (rati) and has to be kept subservient to the latter. Abhinava explains that the consequents of anger superimposed by the force of the metaphor, such as “bound,” “beaten,” etc. are left undeveloped, for this very reason and both maxims, that governing figures and that relating to contrary sentiments are ensured through a single stroke.³⁸ He further analyzes the to show the anger, or rather the indignation (amarsha), introduced by notations like “tightly bound” is immediately accompanied by the ascertainment (anusandhâna) of jealousy, eagerness and delight, favorable (to love) from expressions like “weeps” and “laughing.”³⁹ The reason for this detailed exposition will become clear by the end of this [274>] chapter, but here we are interested primarily in the humor in the verse.

The lover laughs not only out of sheer delight but because he finds his situation and his beloved’s actions highly incongruous. The oppressive noose is none other than the ardently sought for love-embrace of her arms⁴⁰ quivering ambiguously with the intensity not only of anger but of love. Her voice faltering with anger at his unspeakable offence rings out sweeter than ever. And to be beaten by his dearest is the surest guarantee that he has not lost an iota of her love.⁴¹ Those very gestures that are meant as punishment are instead the springs of delight and it is the sharp incongruity between the anger they suggest and his love’s yearning they fulfill that makes the lover laugh. His laughter infuriates her all the more as he shows no repentance, and she beats him all the more desperately, delighting him all the more thereby. However, hâsya is ancillary to zRngâra because its negative component of anger is itself determined to be the [275>] manifestation of love on realizing that the beloved is weeping throughout—thus all the emotions including the anger and laughter are seen to be ultimately the transitory affects (vyabhicârins) of love (rati). Here again, though both are âzrayas of zRngâra, only the lover is the âzraya of hâsya.

The last verse, also from Amaru, is cited by Abhinava in his Locana, as an example of the suggestion of the “cessation of a transitory emotion” (bhâva-prazama). An exceptional delight is offered by the skilful presentation of the fading away of a passing mood, and that is why it is privileged as a separate category. According to Abhinava, the verse under discussion captures the subsiding of pride having jealous resentment (sulking) as its essence.⁴² But the same verse is again analyzed by Abhinava in his Abhinavabhâratî to show how vipralambha and sambhoga are not mutually exclusive but each necessarily includes the other. His remarks, if their implications are drawn out, will already permit the critically attentive reader to appreciate why hâsya is an inevitable ancillary of sambhoga-zRngâra. “Both these conditions (