["Army and Politics in Pakistan" has been visited 317 times since 20 May 2007]
[Article published in the French review Defense Nationale, March 2000, Paris]
[Google translation still being proofed by Sunthar Visuvalingam - Lire la version originale en français]
Studying the ties between the military and politics in Pakistan boils down to examining the role of the armed forces in the definition and conduct of politics or describing the relations that the armed forces maintain with the politicians, both upstream and downstream from political decisions. This is a hot subject following the military coup d'état of October 12, 1999, which is the third seizure of power by the military since the gaining of independence in 1947. Pakistan constitutes, today in the year 2000, a unique case in South Asia, for in the other countries of this immensely populated and extremely troubled region, the military plays a role that may be described as more normal although it is sometimes difficult to define normality.
In South Asia, it is incontestably in Pakistan
[1] that the military participates the most in the
elaboration of the national political life, in both the internal and
external domains. It has been so almost always since independence. The
reasons are varied. With the untimely death of the founder of the nation,
Ali Jinnah, and other prominent politicians, the country found itself very
quickly destabilized and the armed forces remained the only institution that
was really organized. The civil elites remained relatively very few because
the Moslem community of British India had, too often, refused Western type
education; some had in fact preferred to remain in India. Moreover,
vis-à-vis India's dominant position in all fields, political, economic, and
of course military, the importance attached to defense seemed self-evident
and to constitute a national priority. In addition, the army constituted the
cement holding together the constituent parts of the country, in particular
the two wings, Western and Eastern (until the birth of
Since the independence of Pakistan in 1947, civil and military regimes have followed one another.
Even when the army was not directly controlling affairs, it was never far from it, by exercising permanent pressure on the President of the Republic and the Prime Minister. However, the constitutions of 1956, 1962 and 1973 did not confer any power on the army. The most recent even explicitly forbade the military to engage in political activity. But in reality, apart from the periods of military dictatorships, a troika governed the destinies of the country. Not based on any institutional foundation, it included the President of the Republic, in general the weakest element, the Prime Minister and the Army chief of staff, often the true strong man during difficult times. The fights between the first two to name the latter correctly translate the central and determining role played by the military. Traditionally, it has been especially the army that gets involved with political problems, with the navy and the air force remaining aloof.
The forced connivance of civil governments has allowed the armed forces to have sufficient funds. In general, the military expenditure rose approximately to a third of the state budget. Between 1948 and 1959, they represented in fact 60% [2]; in 1999, they still exceeded 30%. Moreover, thanks to the tolerance of a weak civil power, the military supplemented their financial resources through various economic activities, in certain cases and at certain times, thanks to their intelligence services, even through drug trafficking.
The military chiefs, starting with the Army chief of staff,
always took part in the elaboration of the defense policy, in the
broadest sense of the term. In particular, they controlled the military
nuclear program from start to finish. In fact, the crucial decisions as regards
national defense, taken during the defense councils, are
almost exclusively prepared by the chiefs of staff of the three armies.
Within the army, a veritable directorate plays a dominant role; it is during
meetings assembling, around the chief of staff, his principal collaborators
in the central administration and the generals commanding the 9
army corps that the foundations of defense policy are elaborated, during
certain periods, even the overall politics of the country. The top military
hierarchy has sought, on several occasions, especially during periods of
crisis, to institutionalize its participation in the elaboration and execution of policy,
both interior and external. The Turkish model, which allows the military to have their say in the control of national
affairs, appeared to them applicable, at least partially,
to
Retired generals always occupied official political functions, even in normal periods. They were to be found, for example, as ministers, at the head of important portfolios (interior, Kashmiri affairs, foreign affairs, etc.) and governors of provinces. The latter positions are admittedly honorary in normal times but become important in the event of disorders. The constitution indeed confers upon them full powers when the provincial assemblies are dissolved and when the local government is suspended.
10% of the civil service posts are reserved for soldiers in retirement. Former generals thus occupied posts of senior civil officials like that of secretary general (the highest administrative office within each ministry) in various ministries, including besides sometimes in that of defense. Some occupied posts like that of president of the commission on privatization. Retired generals coming from the three army corps and simple senior officers can also become ambassadors (approximately 10% of the heads of diplomatic missions come from the armed forces). Some have been so in Greece, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, Bosnia, Croatia and Slovenia, Australia, Canada, Thailand, Brunei, Vietnam, North Korea, Azerbaijan, Qatar, Libya, Tunisia and in certain countries of black Africa; still recently, the ambassador to Germany was a former general of the army corps, who had directed the principal intelligence service. In certain cases, even the training of the police force was entrusted to military.
Sometimes, the military has exerted a true judicial power, moreover at the request of the political power. Thus, of the military tribunals of exception functioned, in an expeditious manner, at the end of 1998 to judge the authors of acts of violence, in particular in the province of Sind. But the Supreme Court invalidated them at the beginning of 1999.
Some former general officers created political parties, though without much success it is true. Thus the air marshal Asghar Khan, who was a respected and effective chief of staff of the Air Force, founded Tehrik-e-Istiqlal, violently opposed to the socialist program of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto in the years 1970.
The paramilitary forces have the role of helping the police force to maintain order and to supervise the border areas. They include in particular “Frontier Scouts” in the two Western provinces and the “Pakistan Rangers” in the two Eastern provinces. They are commanded by detached officers of the Army. Although attached to the ministry for the interior, they all work in close relation to the army units which are thus mixed up with the political life of the country. In the most extreme cases, the regular forces, primarily of the army, take the situation in hand. Such a situation occurred in 1970s to fight against the tribal revolts of Baluchistan and in the 1990s to try to put an end to the clashes between mohajirs (immigrants from India at the time of the partition or afterwards and descendants of these immigrants) and Sindhis in Karachi and in the other cities of Sind. The general commanding the army corps concerned with the operations of maintenance of law and order then takes on a considerable importance that largely exceeds the purely military framework.
The armed forces contributed to the maintenance of law and order during the various national and regional elections. They were also mobilized to ensure the proper conduct of the population census in 1998. Without its active participation, this could never have taken place.
Admittedly, the military complains about these nontraditional missions but these complaints were not always sincere. Thus, when Zulfikar Ali Bhutto created the “Federal Security Force” to ensure the maintenance of law and order without calling upon the army, the latter took offence and had it abolished immediately upon retaking power. It wanted to remain indispensable for crowd control.
Although the government and the army deny it, other types of forces exist
independently of these paramilitary forces on the Pakistani
territory, that are trained or at least controlled, in a certain manner, by the Army.
They are the militant groups of Islamist extremists whose vocation is to
intervene in
In a general way, the political formations also bear a large responsibility for maintaining the essential role for the army in ensuring the proper operation of institutions. When they are in the opposition, they refuse, most of the time, the rules of the democratic game, by not wanting to await the next electoral stakes and by not letting the majority party govern. They usually have recourse to street demonstrations that are orchestrated systematically on a national scale, while not hesitating, if necessary, to disrupt the life of the country. To restore order, the government then finds itself constrained to call upon the paramilitary and military forces (which amounts to almost the same thing, since the former are recruited by the latter). To avenge itself, it also tends to badger the opposition which becomes increasingly violent. This vicious cycle gives the military the feeling of detaining the true power and to play, on occasion, the key role of arbiter.
Even when, occasionally, the army could not make its voice heard, which was rare, it was always able to pursue its own politics through the interposed intelligence services. The “Inter-Services Intelligence,” known by its initials of ISI, collects and exploits political, economic, and military information outside the borders. This agency is comparable to our Directorate-General of External Security. But contrary to the state of affairs here [in France], its direction, at all levels, is in the hands of officers, most of the time from the army. For the Pakistani, as for the Indians, intelligence is second nature. From time immemorial in this part of the world, where India and Pakistan are to be found, the strategists doubled as masters in espionage. Kautilya, also called Chanakya, author of the famous Arthashastra, a work of economic science (this is what its title means) and also politics, precursor of Machiavelli's Prince, adviser of a Mauryan emperor a few centuries before Jesus-Christ, analyzed this aspect of power. Much later, the British improved upon this art and bequeathed to their Indian and Pakistani successors a tradition that has continued. Perfectly informed on the frontier areas, in particular in Afghanistan and in India, the Pakistani intelligence services were capable, independently of the government, to carry out their own politics, which is what they did with regard to the Taliban and the Kashmiri secessionists. The analyses of the ISI are complementary to those of the military intelligence services, which are decentralized at the level of each army corps. The army service, the “General Directorate of Military Intelligence”, fulfills its role perfectly as regards knowledge of the enemy Indian army but also as regards internal subversions like that which is tearing Sind apart by opposing the mohajirs to the natives. Very often also, the army controlled the civil intelligence services, the “Intelligence Office”, attached to the ministry for the interior but sometimes commanded by a former soldier. Even during the periods of civil government, the military's knowledge, sometimes not shared, enabled them to assume true power.
The military elite is present in the management of certain higher educational establishments. Various establishments teaching military or dual disciplines come under umbrella of the “National University of Science and Technology” (NUST). It is traditionally directed by a retired general. In addition, the “National Institute of Modern Languages” (NUML) has, often, at its head a general in active duty although the majority of the students who attend it are civilians. Some generals were also vice-chancellors of university.
Moreover, the role of military and former military personnel in economic life has always been important. They very often took on the general presidency of great nationalized or private groups, in particular in steel-works, maritime (container ships and tankers) and air transportation companies, ports, shipyards, road construction companies both within and outside of strategic zones and banks. The transport company for strategic products known as the “National Logistics Cell”, founded in 1976, which played a capital role in supporting the Afghan resistance during the Soviet occupation, was always placed under the command of a general in active duty, detached from his army corps.
There is a certain mobility between civil and military posts. Thus an air force general, detached during several years to assume the chairmanship of the national airline company, was then appointed chief of staff of his army corps before becoming the army chief of staff. In the same way, an admiral who directed the company of the merchant navy later became chief of staff of the national navy.
The armed forces themselves have economic groups exerting with the
activities in the most various sectors. Thus the Fauji foundation of the
Army, created since 1953, controls the cotton factories, flour-mills,
sugar refineries, an agro-alimentary complex, factories of manure,
cement factories, an oil terminal, hospitals and banks. The Shaheen
foundation of the Air Force has a fleet of passenger transports, “Shaheen
International Airlines”, a freight company, “Shaheen Air Cargo liner” and
a service company, “Shaheen Airport Services”. The Bharia foundation of the
navy has police stations, real estate companies (in
For the period which preceded the seizure of power by the military in October 1999, the latter had, at the request of the completely exceeded civil authorities, increased their power still further in the economic field. A general had become the head of the national electricity company. In addition, the Fauji foundation had received new missions like the maintenance of certain roads and highways (in this capacity, it collected tolls). More and more, there reigns a confusion of genres a somewhat like that which existed and still exists in China in spite of a certain will on the part of Beijing to put an end to it.
As in India, at all times since independence, the state has
granted arable lands to soldiers of any rank, to the generals as to
the privates, during their active duty or at the moment of their
retirement. These landed properties were especially in sensitive zones, in
particular on the Indian border. Thus the countryside around
Since the independence of the country in 1947, the army has seized power
on three occasions: from October 1958 to December 1971, from
July 1977 to August 1988 and most recently from October 12, 1999. The four
Generals having assumed or currently assuming the direction of the country
all belong to the Army: Ayub Khan since 1958 and replaced in 1969 by Yahya Khan, Zia ul
Haq from 1977, and Musharraf currently. They have moreover the
distinction of having seized power while they occupied the supreme
army rank, i.e. chief of staff. The coups d'état were thus done from the
top. There were various attempts to seize power by soldiers not
belonging to the top of the hierarchy (in particular in 1951 at the time of
the so-called Rawalpindi conspiracy and in September 1995 fomented by a
division general wanting to establish an Islamic dictatorship) but they
all failed. In total, direct military power was exercised during almost half
of the almost 53 years that have passed since
the creation of
For several years, the military had given the impression of not wanting to
assume power directly. They were satisfied to remain as it were the guarantors of democracy while ensuring, in particular, the
holding and
proper conduct of elections. But they could not accept being under the
supervision of the political power; the forced resignation in October 1998
of the general Jehangir Karamat from his post as Army chief of staff threw a cold,
which is at the origin of the resentments of the military with regard
to the Prime Minister. The withdrawal, imposed politically by
The military coup d'état of October 12 clearly reveals the triangular relationship that could exist between the political power, the military chiefs and the intelligence services, primarily the ISI. The Prime Minister had convinced the chief of the ISI to take his side. He had moreover taken the former's predecessor as his advisor. But they were probably betrayed by other members of the direction of the ISI, remaining faithful to the Army high command. The Army chief of staff knew, in all probability, in particular through the ISI, that the Prime Minister was plotting his dismissal. Everything was in place to counter this attempt as shown by the easy success of the coup d'état. The announcement of the sacking of the Army chief of staff, during the latter's absence from the country, triggered the process of the military seizing power as well as the arrest of the chief of the government and his principal allies. Unlike the Bangladesh army, which is often divided into factions, the Pakistani Army in fact was not divided; the ISI chief was very isolated. The 9 generals commanding the army corps as those of the staff have made common cause with their chief, the general Pervez Musharraf.
Justifications for the October 12, 1999 coup d'état are not wanting: corruption and inefficiency of the political class in general, whatever their agendas, political and social disorders, especially in Sind between mohajirs and sindhis, violence between Sunnis and Shias, dilapidation of the economy, lending to powerful people who did not repay, non-payment of taxes by the rich and in particular the agricultural owners,… the army remained the only institution still functioning normally.
Nevertheless it was the first coup d'état to have occurred in a nuclear country. It took place without bloodshed and with the tacit approval of the population, tired of being governed by dishonest and inefficient politicians.
General Musharraf, the army chief of staff, who thwarted the attempt of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif to remove him from office, assumes full powers from now on with the title of chief of the executive. He preserves, in addition, his attributions of army chief of staff.
The new master of the country instituted a rather complex system on three levels: national security council, group of experts, and government. The national security council, which he chairs, guides ministers. Such an organization had already existed when the military occupied power previously, in particular at the time of general Yahya Khan, in the late 1960s and early 1970s. This council, which holds the supreme authority, includes seven members among whom the chiefs of staff of the navy and the air force. Two of its members, recently or not, served in the United Nations and at the International Monetary Fund; they can thus be regarded as international technocrats. The group of experts is adjunct to the national security council to facilitate its task. As for the government, also chaired by general Musharraf, it will put into execution the decisions taken by the national security council. The cabinet includes a former member of an American bank, become Finance Minister, which accentuates a certain pro-Western connotation of the power apparatus. It includes also a general had just been retired, who has become Interior Minister, which shows that security constitutes one of the priorities of the new regime.
The power in the provinces was also reorganized. Henceforth, three provincial governors (Punjab, Sind, and the North-West Frontier Province) are former generals, that of Baluchistan being a former judge.
The constitution was not repealed but only suspended, and the President of the republic, stripped of real power, remains in place. Martial law has not been proclaimed. For the moment, the freedom of press subsists.
The high public office also receives new persons in charge. The new bank manager of State of Pakistan comes from the World Bank, where he was a director for Central Asia. This nomination, which can only favor the country's bonds with the World Bank, in addition confirms the tendency to call upon international civil servants.
In the past, the military hardly shone through its governance. Will they do better this time around? This is open to doubt. The officers corps does not necessarily harbor the talents needed to assume civil tasks of such enormous scope.
The new power accords a certain priority to the economy. Through constraint and the threat of sanctions, it endeavors to make the banks recover the sums borrowed in a fraudulent manner, an that would amount to 4 billion dollars. Moreover, efforts are being made to recover agricultural income tax. A new organization, entrusted to a general, was created to fight against fraud. A recasting of the taxation envisages a value-added tax. Admittedly, this last measure appears to be unpopular by nature but the fight against corruption and imposition by big landowners wins quite naturally the approval of the people. However the impatience of the masses could grow in the event of failure of the reforms. Moreover, if the new power alienates the economic leading classes, the reform of the country will remain a pious wish. Its room for maneuver thus seems somewhat narrow.
Since the army was always powerful and especially because it is today in power, its feelings with regard to Moslem fundamentalism merit analysis. The political currents within the armed forces will be decisive for the evolution of the situation. Because, from now on everything could be played out between the military and the fundamentalists. The fundamentalists are familiar with military matters that they pursue even outside of the army. But if they penetrate the latter, then Pakistan could undergo a true “talibanization” with all the possible consequences in the relations with India, in particular in Kashmir but also with Central Asia and China.
The army-religion relations appear somewhat troubled. In the land of Islam, religion and power maintain close ties since they are in theory inseparable. Islam, the state religion, is omnipresent in the barracks. The military ceremonies always include prayers. The official publications of the three armies very often refer to Islam. The problem is to know whether the army will make use of religion only for promoting nationalism or also to reinforce militant Islamism.
The high command appears, on the whole, Westernized. Many generals
studied abroad, in particular in the United States, but less than before.
They have sometimes interests or family ties there. Born in New Delhi in
1943, therefore a mohajir like general Zia ul Haq (who assumed power from
1977 to 1988) before him, general Musharraf has ties to the United States
where his son and his brother live. He has, however, never followed a
training course there. But he spent a year at the “Royal College of Defense
Studies” (equivalent to the French Institute of Higher Studies for National
Defense) in London. The new strong man of
In any event, the nuclear policy should not undergo any change. Islamabad will not proceed with new tests, except if India resumes its own, but will continue with its missile program intended to deliver nuclear weapons. The new regime by no means expresses the intention to sign the nuclear test ban treaty. Its decision will depend on that of India. The refusal of the American senate to ratify the agreement compromises the adhesion of the two nuclear countries of South Asia.
The Western reactions to the seizure of power by the military remain on the whole very measured. Admittedly, European countries like the United States expressed their regret and demanded the re-establishment of a democratic regime. Admittedly, the Commonwealth excluded Pakistan. The image of the country was tarnished whereas that of India improved. The economic sanctions, applied, with more or less rigor, since the nuclear tests of May 1998, worsen the already alarming situation. But the West, anxious to avoid the rise of Moslem fundamentalism, cannot let the country collapse. The Americans had put up with a military regime, with general Zia Ul Haq, at the time, it is true, of the struggle against the Soviets in Afghanistan. They could also have need of general Musharraf if he agree to fight against the fundamentalists and international terrorists. In the contrary case, if the military power made common cause with the fundamentalists or if it were constrained to submit to their pressures, Islamabad could end up very insulated on the international scene.
The reactions of the Arab countries appear rather favorable. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait maintain their traditionally close ties. Their financial assistance appears more indispensable than ever before.
New Delhi was rather quite satisfied with Nawaz Sharif. The latter led Pakistan towards chaos, which did not displease the Indians. However, they feared the growing influence of the military hawk and the uncertainty regarding the control of the nuclear armaments. For the Indians, General Musharraf had already shown evidence of his political immaturity by ordering and leading the military operations on the Kargil heights in Kasmir during the summer of 1999. There is hardly any doubt indeed that it is he who took the initiative in having mujahiddin groups, educated and armed in Pakistan, and regular units of the Pakistani army itself cross the line of control. The Indians will undoubtedly hesitate a long time before resuming negotiations with a leader qualified as a war-monger and usurper. The gestures in favor of troop disengagement on the border, but not on the line of control, hardly impress New Delhi that has become even more wary since the limited Kargil conflict. Normally and since a long time, the regular troops of the two countries remain indeed at a distance from the international border, which is supervised by paramilitary forces. The declarations at the end of October 1999 in the United Nations by the Pakistani permanent representative, who was pleased with the holding of a referendum in East Timor and demanded a similar consultation to Kashmir (as envisaged by an old resolution of the UN Assembly), do not represent any change in Islamabad's policy with regard to the disputed territory and receive obviously an end not to receive in India.