["Kashmir in the internal affairs of Pakistan" has been visited 107 times since 26 mai 2007]
[Article published in the review “National Defense, January 1997, Paris]
[Google translation still being proofed by Sunthar Visuvalingam - Lire la version originale en français]
The fundamental conflict that opposes Pakistan to India has a deep and remote origin. It results from the rivalry between Islam and Hinduism that was born right from the landing of the first Arab conquerors on the Sind coast, in the 8th century and developed over the centuries until the partition of the Indian subcontinent, i.e. until the birth of India (a state with secular laws but with a mainly Hindu population) and Pakistan (a Muslim, though not theocratic, state—which however did not acquire the totality of Muslims of the former British India, leaving in the newly independent India a strong Moslem minority). Today, the major discord between the two largest countries of the South Asia crystallizes around Kashmir. This question which is at the heart of the relations between the two countries since their independence provoked two wars in 1947-1948 and 1965.
Kashmir's place in Indo-Pakistani and, more generally, international relations is known [1]. It does not constitute the subject of this article, which will be devoted to the place of Kashmir in the internal affairs of Pakistan, a topic that is much less known but remains of importance.
It is undoubtedly not useless to recall some general facts on Kashmir. There are indeed several Kashmirs and it is essential to see on a map what that represents as much for India as for Pakistan, to know of what is at stake (see the attached map ).
Kashmir, in its broadest sense, has a surface of 222.236 km2 (i.e., less than half the area of France). After the first war with India in 1947-1948, Pakistan recovered 84.112 km2 (i.e, approximately 38%, a little more than a third) and India 143.304 km2 (or roughly 64%, a little less than two thirds). Since then, China took possession of a part of Kashmir (37 555 km2 seized from the Indians in 1956-1957 or militarily conquered in 1962 to which must be added the 5.180 km2 conceded by Pakistan in the boundary agreement of 1961). India thus controls today 100.569 km2 of Kashmir and Pakistan 78.932 km2.
As of independence, a debate started in Pakistan on the identity of Kashmir. Indeed, before the partition of the sub-continent, the Hindu maharaja, sovereign of a primarily populated State of Moslems, did not exert an identical authority on the whole of the territory, such as definite to the full extent above. Within this unit existed several entities, placed under the control of local princes who had a more or less large autonomy. It was in particular the case of the principalities of Hunza and Nagar and of the agency of Gilgit (which form all the three Dardistan), of Baltistan (whose principal city is Skardu) and of Kohistan. In fact, these principalities, subjected to the maharaja of the Kashmir of 1833 to 1876, had been then managed directly by the British. Those had given them to the maharaja right before the partition. As of December 1947, Pakistan, in a somewhat arbitrary way, detached these entities to constitute, since 1948, the “Territories of North” (divided into 5 districts) with like Gilgit chief towns but managed directly by Islamabad. Thus, nowadays, these territories covering approximately 67.000 km2 but only populated of 1.300.000 inhabitants are considered by Islamabad as belonging to Pakistan although their membership is not clearly expressed in the constitution. The mention of “Territories of North” does not appear nowhere in the Pakistani constitution of 1973. Only is mentioned in article 1 inclusion of States and territories, by accession or another reason.
What remains of the part of Kashmir under Pakistani control is called “Azad Kashmir”, which in Urdu means “free Kashmir.” “Azad Kashmir,” created on October 24, 1947, the capital of which is Muzaffarabad, covers a small surface (a little less than 12.000 km2, which is approximately 6% of the surface of the old kingdom) and holds a population close to 2.600.000 inhabitants.
The “territories of North” and “Azad Kashmir” are populated exclusively Moslem populations. In the part controlled by India, the majority of the population is of confession Islamic but not totality. The figures have also a certain significance: the 3.900.000 inhabitants who populate the “Territories of North” and “Azad Kashmir” constitute a small percentage of the population of Pakistan (approximately 130.000.000 inhabitants).
Islamabad maintains the legal fiction autonomous “Azad Kashmir”, not belonging to Pakistan. It is true that the Pakistani constitution of 1973 (including the amendments brought since) does not apply to “Azad Kashmir”. It mentions only only once the Kashmir to refer to its future fastening in Pakistan. This mention constitutes article 257 of the constitution. It is very short: “when the people of Jammu and Cachemire decide to reach Pakistan, the relations between Pakistan and this State will be given according to wishes' of the people of this State”.
(1) “the territories of Pakistan will include/understand:
...
- states and territories being able to be included in Pakistan by accession and another process.
Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament) can admit, by the law, in the federation of new States or zones under the conditions which it considers suitable”.
“Azad Kashmir” raises a bearing flag in its folds, in the left higher corner, a representation of the Pakistani emblem. It has a constitution described as temporary, adopted in 1974.
“Azad Kashmir” does not send representatives to the Pakistani Parliament. It has its own Parliament of 48 members (to tell the truth, the Pakistani provinces have also their Parliaments). The political vocabulary is different from what exists in the Pakistani provinces. “Azad Kashmir” does not have a governor, representative of the President of the Republic in the provinces, but a president. The government is directed by a Prime Minister and not by a minister in chief. Moreover, “Azad Kashmir” has a supreme court and a high court (the Pakistani provinces have also their high courts but do not have supreme courses).
Thus, in the legislature fields, executive and legal, “Azad Kashmir” seems to profit from a certain autonomy.
In fact, “Azad Kashmir” was not subjected to the martial law during the time of general ZIA whereas the whole of Pakistan underwent this mode of exception.
“Azad Kashmir” has its own radio station which also emits in direction of the Indian Kashmir.
In fact, the government cachemiri does not seem to enjoy more autonomy only the provincial governments.
“Azad Kashmir” does not strike a particular currency. Under the terms of the constitution of 1974, it is the Pakistani currency which has course.
Article 2 of the temporary constitution of the Kashmir does not make distinction between Cachemiris and Pakistanais since all are regarded as citizens of “Azad Kashmir”. The Pakistani can thus be members of the government cachemiri, the legislative assembly and, in a general way, carry on any activity. So the majority of the civils servant of the local government come from Pakistan. It results from this also a total freedom from circulation for the Pakistani in “Azad to kashmir”. In the same way, the inhabitants of “Azad Kashmir” move freely and work without obstacle in Pakistan. The nationals of “Azad Kashmir” travel abroad with passports Pakistani.
“Azad Kashmir” does not maintain police force and army. The temporary constitution of 1974 indeed entrusts to Pakistan the responsibilities for safety and defense.
The Pakistani army is much more present in “Azad Kashmir” and in the part of the “Territories of North” close to the Indian Kashmir (high plateaus of Deosai) that in the provinces of Pakistan. Nowhere elsewhere, the military density is not also large. In “Azad to kashmir”, as in the “Territories of North”, it is the regular army which supervises the line of control. 16 brigades of infantry are deployed on the 750 kilometers of the line of control. The Pakistani army is in direct liaison with the Indian army only with the Kashmir. On the border of 2.000 kilometers of Punjab and Sind, in fact paramilitary units ensure the monitoring (it is the same on the Indian side).
The government of Muzaffarabad is not deprived to express its sights as regards foreign politics, of course primarily to criticize the actions of India. Actually, its interventions do nothing but prolong those of Pakistan. In this field, Muzaffarabad constitutes a relay of Islamabad since the provisional constitution of 1974 indicates, in article 31-3, that the foreign politics of “Azad Kashmir” will be led by Pakistan. The means of action of the government cachemiri appear quite weak since no State, even Moslem, recognizes it. Pakistan itself does not admit the existence of a State cachemiri but only the existence of a disputed territory. “Azad Kashmir” is never represented as such in the international conferences (it was not even it with the meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the organization of the Islamic conference which took place in Karachi in April 1993).
In the majority of the cases, the political parties cachemiris are only emanations of the great Pakistani formations and carry very close names. It is the case, for example, of “Azad Kashmir People' S Party”, affiliated in “Pakistan People' S Party”, the party of Mrs BHUTTO. In the same way, “Muslim Conference” is assimilated to “Pakistan Muslim League”.
There exists in Islamabad a Minister for the Kashmir and Territories of the North which exerts the effective power with the detriment of the executive of Muzaffarabad. The existence of a single wallet for the Kashmir and the Territories of North shows that, despite everything, the Pakistani do not deny a fate common to the both administrative entities formerly joined together within the same kingdom.
Moreover, the temporary constitution of “Azad Kashmir” envisages, in its article 21; the creation of a council of “Azad Jammu and Kashmir”, placed under the presidency of the Prime Minister of Pakistan and including/understanding of Cachemiris and the Pakistani. This council can legislate in various fields (enumerated in appendix 3 of the constitution), in particular the shifts in population, the means of communication, energy, including nuclear power, economic planning, the industrial development and the customs duties. The council thus limits considerably the power of the legislative assembly more especially as the laws which he votes do not need to be endorsed by the president of “Azad Kashmir”.
Moreover, the president of the supreme court and the president of the high court are named by the president of “Azad Kashmir” on recommendation of the council (cf article 42 of the temporary constitution).
Lastly, the council of the Islamic ideology of Pakistan can be consulted for the preparation of the laws by the legislative assembly and the council. This Pakistani organization constitutes the reference for the checking of the constitutionality of the laws.
The quite real subordination of “Azad Kashmir” to Pakistan east thus.
The demographic pressure is stronger in “Azad Kashmir” (194 inhabitants per km2) that in Pakistan (140 inhabitants per km2). Many inhabitants of “Azad Kashmir”, in particular of the town of Mirpur, in the South, emigrate in the United Kingdom and repatriate part of their profits. The demographic pressure is non-existent in the “Territories of North”.
In these two entities, economic progress is slow. There is not any university, nor even of school establishment of good level. Industry misses. This underdevelopment does not generate however generalized dissatisfaction. It is true that the recent governments authorized of the social and economic efforts great for fidéliser the populations: construction of roads and runways, development of tourism, progress of medicine (there are more doctors per a thousand of inhabitants in “Azad Kashmir” that in Pakistan). The foundation Aga Khan has, on his side, contributed (with funds of various countries, in particular Netherlands and Canada) to the development of the valley of Hunza and of Baltistan in the “Territories of North” but its action blows itself.
The major political claims of the inhabitants of “Azad Kashmir” are not addressed to the government of Pakistan but to that of India. The occasional clashes which occur in the “Territories of North” between Ismaili Shiites of the area of Hunza and sunnites do not have a political connotation and do not call into question the law and order. The situation in “Azad Kashmir” as in the “Territories of North” east as a whole calm. Contrast is thus seizing compared to what occurs in the Indian Kashmir.
The only requirements with regard to Islamabad are formulated, with moderation, by the populations of the “Territories of North” which suffer from a democratic deficit since they do not elect a deputy for the national assembly and are not, either, represented with the senate. No true local assembly exists in addition. A council of the “Territories of North”, including/understanding 20 representatives of the 5 districts, elected for 5 years, is a consultative body. In fact, the populations of the “Territories of North” do not seem to express of particular desire to share the same fate as those of “Azad Kashmir”. Their claims go rather towards the granting of a statute of province, like Panjab, the Province Border of the North-West, Sind and Baluchistan.
No government can plan to grant a provincial statute to the “Territories of North” because of the international implications. Such a fastening in Pakistan would legitimate at the same time the existence of an Indian Kashmir.
The democratic play in Pakistan supports to a certain extent the cause militantist cachemirie. Majority and parliamentary opposition are believed obliged to make higher bid to impose the behaviour of a referendum in the whole of the Kashmir (in the Indian part and the Pakistani part), to denounce the exactions and to defend the human rights in the part of the Kashmir held by the Indians.
The political parties maintain about the same political line with regard to the future of the Kashmir. But they do not formulate any proposal to concretely organize the referendum initially envisaged by the United Nations. The foreseeable differences in votes by areas of the Kashmir (does Jammu with dominant Hindu woman, Ladakh with dominant Buddhist, remain with dominant Moslem woman) would be they taken into account to lead to a possible bursting of the Kashmir? This kind of debate seems absent. What distinguishes primarily the various political parties Pakistani vis-a-vis the problem from the Kashmir, it is before all the degree of militancy. In a general way, the parties which have vocation to control at the national level, “Pakistan Muslim League” and “Pakistan People' S Party” express their requirements in diplomatic terms, relatively moderate. On the contrary, the religious parties as the “Jamiat-i-Islami” speak a more committed and revolutionary language.
The problem of the Kashmir causes echoes in all the layers of the
Pakistani population. The repression exerted by the Indian police force
exacerbates even more the emotions. The proximity of the Kashmir of the
Pakistani capital exploits also a part mentalities (Islamabad is with less
than 130 kilometers of Muzaffarabad, that is to say at 3 hours of mountain
road).
The media Pakistani, as well the newspaper industry as the radio and television, devote long developments to the situation in the Indian Kashmir and the defense of the cachemirie cause.
The governments which follow one another Islamabad do not hesitate, without that being systematic and permanent, to make play passions, to use the objections against India very widespread in the population to reinforce the cohesion of the nation and to make pass in the second plan the internal difficulties. They do not hesitate to put forward the confrontations quasi-daily newspapers over the line of control and the glacier of Siachen, the most battle field of the world, as like to say it the Pakistani, nor the risks of skid which can degenerate into a true war. It is true that it is with the Kashmir that the situation is tended and most dangerous. Such an attitude, which consists in enlarging the external dangers to make conceal the internal claims, is found elsewhere in the world; it is an already tested method of government.
But Islamabad can also, when it is needed, calm the extremists. Under the impulse of the Pakistani government, the government of “Azad Kashmir” intervened on several occasions to thwart the attempts at crossing of the line of control, of Muzaffarabad (capital of “Azad Kashmir”) towards Srinagar (capital of the Indian Kashmir), by demonstrators mobilized by various political formations (of which the “Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Face”, party born in the Indian Kashmir). This action of the capacity deserves to be announced because it has a political cost which results in a dissatisfaction with the militants cachemiris with regard to the government of Muzaffarabad and that of Islamabad.
No government will be able to be allowed to take unilateral initiatives concerning the future of the Kashmir. All the political community is captive of the official declarations of the past, the feelings of the population deeply anti-Indians in the absence of being always pro-cachemiris and perhaps even more diffuse but real influence of the religious parties. To release ballast unilaterally, to compose with India would quickly be described as abandonment, of treason even.
A thing is about sure: no government will accept the questioning of the membership de facto if not completely of swears in Pakistan of the “Territories of the North” frontier of Afghanistan and China, close to the Central Asia and from now on crossed by the “Karakoram highway”, road built at the end of the years 1970 and connecting, except during the winter months, Pakistan in China and more precisely the plains of Panjab to the plate of Sinkiang. This road represents a strategic importance and symbolizes the co-operation between Pakistan and China. All the great political formations regard the integration of the “Territories of North” as final. The referendum would thus have, for them, to limit itself to “Azad Kashmir” and the part of the Kashmir held by India. There is a source of friction with certain political movements of “Azad Kashmir” which estimate on the contrary that the “Territories of North” belong to the Kashmir. Moreover, the high court of “Azad Kashmir” returned public on March 9, 1993 a judgement on the statute of these territories or at least some of them. It declared that Gilgit and Baltistan belonged to “Azad Jammu and Cachemire” and specified that the laws prevailing until now were to be regarded as null and not avenues. By doing this, it corroborated article 2 of the temporary constitution of 1974, according to which other territories can be included in “Azad Kashmir”.
Another disagreement also appears between certain political parties Pakistani and certain movements cachemiris. Indeed, for the majority of the politicians Pakistani, two choices arise at Cachemiris: fastening in India or fastening in Pakistan. Independence cannot be considered because it is not in the spirit of the partition of the Indian sub-continent decided by the British. Moreover, the article of the Pakistani constitution relating to the Kashmir regards as asset fastening in Pakistan. The temporary constitution of “Azad Kashmir”, itself, mentions, in its article 7, prohibition for the individuals as for the political parties, to lead contrary activities to the ideology of the State, i.e. the accession in Pakistan. Moreover, the president of “Azad Kashmir”, the Prime Minister, the Ministers and the members of the legislative assembly and council must pronounce an oath of fidelity to the cause of the accession in Pakistan. The possibility of choosing in favour of independence is thus not granted. An independent Kashmir, even excluding the “Territories from North”, would have the higher courses of Indus and its affluents. This natural water tower, not controlled by Pakistan, would then constitute a potential threat for the prosperity of the cultivated plains of Panjab. With these economic reasons are added strategic concerns: the bastion cachemiri indeed makes it possible to reach with a relative facility, by the valley of Indus and of its affluents, in the nerve centres of the Northern part of Pakistan, of which the capital. All the natural communications of the Kashmir emerge indeed towards South-west, i.e. Pakistan.
[1] See in particular the article
of Alain LAMBALLE “Kashmir or a paradise coveted”, published in the
review “modern Africa and Asia”, Paris, 1st quarter 1980.