Talking about the role of the international community in the demilitarisation of the Tibetan plateau it becomes necessary, at the very outset, to state unambiguously that the role being considered here is primarily that of an environmental concern in the global village, where no part can remain unaffected by the injuries caused to another. It needs to be conceded, however, that the horrendous ecological destruction that has taken place in Tibet has also taken place in other parts of the world since the end of the Second World War. In the case of Tibet it becomes unique on account of the role that the Tibetan Plateau plays in the weather patterns of the planet and its direct influence on the well being of vast swathes of the populations of China, East Asia and South Asia. Looked at in another way, it also becomes unique because one single country has it within its grasp to contribute effectively to reversing the global ecological decline by implementing restoration measures in a region as vast as Tibet. An action that would not only restore the ecological balance on the Tibetan Plateau but one that would send a strong signal to the rest of the world that China no longer requires to be coaxed on this score. In keeping with its new role in the world it would then become a leader for the ecological revival of the planet in the twenty first century.

The demilitarisation of the Tibetan plateau has now become an ecological imperative, which does not brook further delay. Continued militarisation of the Tibetan Plateau, and the attendant militarisation of the Eastern Himalayas as a direct consequence thereof, would not only affect the indigenous Tibetan population, but entire communities all the way from the Indus in the West to the Yellow River in the East. As a matter of fact such demilitarisation, to be meaningful, will have to encompass the demilitarisation of the Himalayas, or at least the Himalayas forming part of the Indo-Tibetan border regions. Militarisation of any region takes place on account of perceived military threats to that region. In the second half of the twentieth century the Chinese rapidly militarised Tibet to consolidate their grip on the conquered territory. In addition to the internal unrest caused by the occupation they might have had misgivings regarding the intentions of India and/or the USA. Mention is made of only these two countries because no other nation or community of nations had, or would be likely to have in the foreseeable future, the direct interest or the military wherewithal to mount any credible challenge to continued Chinese occupation of Tibet. Today the world at large and certainly USA and India are fully reconciled to the Chinese presence in Tibet. The misgivings that China may have entertained in the twentieth century - if at all - of being militarily challenged in Tibet cannot obtain at the dawn of the twenty first century. Therefore, since no country seriously questions the status quo, China can safely undertake the demilitarisation of the Tibetan plateau without any qualms. The raison d'etre of the militarisation of Tibet having disappeared altogether in the new millennium it is a good time for the international community to urge the Chinese to undertake the demilitarisation of the Tibetan Plateau.

Therefore, in a new era of enlightenment, Tibet can be deemed to have shed its traditional role of a buffer state between India and China. Instead, Tibet could become a bridge:

• between China and India
• between China and the West
• between peace loving people around the world.

In fact, if the issue is examined with any degree of objectivity the term 'buffer' loses its relevance in the context of the massive eco-destruction that has taken place. The moment one sheds the twentieth century mindset, as being totally inadequate, the realisation dawns that the simple issue of the recognition of the Dalai Lama has assumed such an extraordinary military dimension that one is hard put to find any parallel in recent times. The nature of the military build up in Tibet is just not commensurate to the challenge that the Dalai Lama poses. How on earth can a handful of followers of an itinerant monk militarily challenge the might of the People's Republic of China. The very notion is absurd. The threat, if any, that the Dalai Lama and his small band of followers could conceivably pose would be a spiritual one - only to the extent that the Chinese consider the Dalai Lama as an outsider; which he is not and can never be, in spite of his prolonged exile.

Whichever way the Chinese look at the problem the military dimension should not enter into the reckoning unless the Chinese wish to use Tibet as a launch pad for aggression against India at some future date. That assumption too becomes difficult to comprehend in the case of Tibet. In the eyes of the Government of India, except for not insurmountable differences on the boundary issue, the Tibetan question has been settled once and for all. The Dalai Lama has not advocated an armed uprising and nor would the Government of India countenance such action from Indian soil. Hence China is very comfortably placed vis a vis Tibet at the dawn of the twenty first century. By not demilitarising Tibet it is forcing India to militarise the Eastern Himalayas. Should over-militarisation again erupt into a major conflagration the 'settled' Tibetan question would automatically be re-opened, regardless of the outcome. The rest of the world acquiesced in the Chinese conquest of Tibet in the 1950s because India did so. Had India challenged the usurpation the world, without doubt, would have sided with India at that time. China should remain eternally grateful to India for not only serving Tibet to it on a platter but for compounding the Himalayan blunder by then going on to champion that country's case before the rest of the world, in the difficult years following the Communist take-over. Thereafter India maintained a stoic silence while the genocide in Tibet proceeded apace. Hence, from a geopolitical viewpoint it is vital to China's long- term interests to demilitarise Tibet with concomitant demilitarisation of the Eastern Himalayas on the part of India. The blueprint for the "Demilitarisation of the Himalayas as an Ecological Imperative" could serve as a basis.

While many of the leaders of the most militarised nations of the world still regard the military dimension as the all pervasive dimension, for the majority of the world's people it has become abundantly clear that today, at the dawn of the new millennium:

"The dangers that we face from eco-destruction dwarf the mere problems of national security".

The theme of the demilitarisation of the Tibetan plateau should not be tackled hereafter solely from the political plane, where it remained intractable for over four decades. Hence it is now suggested that the issue be tackled on a plane where no system, political entity or group of people need to feel alienated or excluded from the process. It would then become possible to rationalise the type of exchanges (between China and India) that could lead to an enlarged Tibetan cultural space as a prelude to the demilitarisation of the Tibetan Plateau. These could be viewed as:

• · Demilitarization of the Himalayas.

• · India-China geo-strategic realignment.

• · Sino-Indian cultural rapprochement.

• · Spiritual renaissance in China, especially the rural areas.

• · A manifold increase in trade between the two countries.

Similarly looking at the 'global' trends that could expand the Tibetan cultural space one could tabulate these as:

· The gradual development of a planetary consciousness.

• · The felt need across the globe for the Eco Revival of the Planet.

• · The growing clamour for nuclear disarmament.

• · The perceived need for demilitarisation of the Planet.

Since China remains the most important actor which can single handedly initiate the demilitarisation of the Tibetan plateau it would be worth looking at the new developments in China itself that could have a bearing on the future of the Tibetan space:

• · The slow but sure loosening of the grip of the monolithic communist party. (The inherent contradiction between the underlying philosophy of communism and the accommodations which have to be made with a free market economy).

• · Growing income disparity.

• · Emergence of a new class of bureaucratic capitalists.

• · Withdrawal of state social security net.

• · The long term effects of the assimilation of Hongkong - political, cultural, economic, language, etc.

• · Post- Tiananmen effects - physical as well as psychological.

• · The rise of a new class of technocrats to positions of authority.

• · Urban privatisation has led to decentralisation of powers at all levels.

• · More and more grassroots (local) elections are taking place. (On the face of it the process appears to be irreversible).

• · The contrary pulls of financial centralism opposed to local entrepreneurship.

• · Rise in the number of foreign trained students and specialists.

• · Advent of the internet.

• · The emergence of neo- Buddhist sects like Falungong.

• · The changing pattern of relationship with overseas Chinese.

• · The growing schism between the Eastern or coastal regions and Central and Western China.

Because the decision to commence the demilitarisation process will have to be taken by the political leaders of China one needs to examine the reasons which cause the Chinese leadership to feel insecure:

• · US attempts to force the pace of democratisation;

• · An unstated fear of the great military disparity with USA, in real terms.

• · Bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, perceived by the Chinese not as a mistake but a deliberate provocation.

• · Security pacts in East Asia (and possibly Australia) having assumed an unmistakable anti China bias.

With this brief review it should be possible to discern the lines that the international community can pursue to accommodate Chinese concerns in order to move towards the demilitarision of the Tibetan plateau. It has already been brought out that China does not face, nor is likely to face, a credible military threat in the region. Linked with this is the fact that unless the eco-restoration of Tibet is undertaken on a war footing all countries in the region would be overtaken by events. At that stage - not too far down the line in terms of years - it would hardly matter whether Tibet was over-militarised or demilitarised. Some of the pathways that can be reasonably followed by different groupings in the international community acting singly or in unison are spelled out in the ensuing paragraphs

European Union Initiative. The EU could initiate a dialogue with China to elicit its views on the demilitarisation proposal. Representatives of the Dalai Lama would have an observer status should the Chinese government not accept their presence as full dialogue partners. A permanent secretariat could be set up in Paris, Strasbourg, Luxembourg or The Hague for the purpose. The dialogue would look at the proposal de novo without any prejudices or pre-conditions. India could participate or be present as an observer till the outlines of the demilitarisation agreement had been agreed to, in principle.

US-China Initiative. Along the lines spelled out for the EU-China dialogue. It needs to be mentioned here that bilateral talks with major global entities who could influence the dialogue because of their burgeoning trade relations with China would seem to be a better proposition as compared to a multilateral initiative which the Chinese government might be averse to. The US-China dialogue for working out the modalities of the demilitarisation would be attractive from the viewpoint of China because of the ability of the USA to provide cast iron guarantees to China that the super power would not attempt to derive advantage from the demilitarisation process.

Model Sino-Indian Accord. An accord between India and China for a lasting settlement, necessitated not by the geopolitics but the ecopolitics of the region, would be the best answer to threats emerging due to the thoughtless eco-savagery perpetrated by the earlier generations in Tibet and the Himalayan region as a whole. An accord of this nature would not only bury past misunderstandings, but would lay the framework for a full-scale eco-restoration protocol spanning the next hundred years. When both parties actually sit down to take not of the scale of the damage that has taken place the relatively insignificant boundary problems would no longer appear to be issues worth grappling over. The Herculean task of ecological revival of the region would tax the ingenuity of both nations to the limit. The salient features of the millennial Sino-Indian accord would encompass, inter alia:

China

• · Full demilitarisation of TAR (outer Tibet) in stages by 2005.

• · Dismantling of the supporting military infrastructure in TAR to be completed by 2010.

• · Light para military garrisons to man border posts or for dealing with internal unrest.

• · Irrevocable pledge not to introduce offensive military forces (tanks, chemical weapons, nuclear elements of any sort, aircraft, heavy calibre guns, armed helicopters) into TAR. An instrument to that effect to be deposited before the International Court of Justice.

• · Phased reduction of offensive military forces from Inner Tibet by 2010.

• · Since the question of nuclear missiles located in Inner Tibet (regions adjacent to China) could be linked to perceived threats from countries other than India, this issue could be put on the backburner for the time being so that it does not interfere with the demilitarisation process in TAR.

• · Deposition of a pledge before the International Court of Justice and the Security Council to not launch an offensive against India through the demilitarised region of Tibet. A clause would be entered in the deposition to the Security Council that in case of a dispute arising from an Indian complaint of violation of its territory through the demilitarised region the veto of China in all cases relating to such disputes would remain suspended.

• · Refrain from providing sanctuary or support to any insurgent group operating against India.

India

• · Demilitarisation of the Eastern Himalayas by 2005.

• · India would pledge not to introduce offensive equipment into Sikkim and other areas along the Indo-Tibetan border.

• · India would pledge to not allow the Tibetans living in India or any supporters from other parts to undertake any form of military cross-border operations from Indian territory. India would give an undertaking not to introduce nuclear or chemical weapons into the Eastern Himalayan region.

Both Countries

• · Pledge to set up joint commissions for the eco-restoration of the demilitarised regions along the border. All such negotiations to be completed by the end of the year 2003. Non governmental agencies not linked to any political dispensation would be encouraged to participate in the ecological restoration.

• · Restoration of trade links through designated routes.

• · Complete ban on felling of trees in designated areas for fifty years. The decision to be jointly reviewed in 2050.

• · Notification of biosphere reserves.

• · Setting up of joint teams for the prevention of smuggling and poaching of endangered species in the Himalayan region or for the passage of such items harvested illegally from other regions.

• · Easing of travel restrictions.

Internet and the International Community. While government to government negotiations for demilitarisation would remain the anchor there is sufficient scope for the entire international community to take up cudgels for the Tibeto-Himalayan environment. Non governmental organisations can use their web sites to provide a constant update on the ravages taking place as satellite data has long been available for commercial use as well. The time may have come for ordinary citizens of the world, concerned with the future of the planet, to co-opt themselves into the epic struggle for the ecological revival of the planet. They had effectively ceded the middle ground to uncaring political hierarchies, the military industrial complex and the transnational corporations pushing the consumerist agenda. Care has to be taken not to politicise the issue. It can no longer be viewed as an issue to be settled between China and the Dalai Lama. Because of its extra regional dimension it is truly a global issue. The Chinese are no longer the adversaries. They will have to join hands with the eco revival forces around the world to try and tackle a problem that has assumed gigantic proportions. We are living today in a period where the collective decisions that we take in the years ahead will decide the future course of not only humankind, but all life forms that sustain the viability of the living planet.

Over a year ago this speaker was invited by the National Defence College at New Delhi to deliver a talk on the "Global Challenges for the 21st Century". The three most important challenges before mankind were listed as:

• · The Eco destruction of the Planet.

• · The Remilitarisation of the Planet (that is taking place).

• · The Dehumanisation of the Planet (as a result of the breakdown of the social cohesion of societies).

Therefore, if nearly forty percent of the total population of the globe decides to live in peace and harmony the prospect of world peace is immeasurably enhanced. If this large segment of humanity decides to eschew war and live in harmony then mankind itself will be forced to change course. The military dimension will then no longer be able to overwhelm the other dimensions of human endeavour.

Concluding Remarks

In a way, strong global currents, far stronger than the forces that unleashed war and planet-destroying consumerism on the world, are coming into the ascendant to re-shape the destiny of the planet. These stronger, humanity-embracing, currents represent the aspirations of ordinary people around the world.

The peoples of China, India and Tibet are civilisationally the best placed to use these currents, to harness them to their purpose, not only for the resurgence of China, Tibet, India and the region, but for the resurgence of the planet.

China is already a major force in world affairs. It might one day narrow the gap with the United States in nuclear and missile weaponry. It faces no military threat in the coming century. China could, instead, go under from the contradictions and pressures building up internally. Should its leadership, at the dawn of the new millennium, look at the world through different lens, they would be the first to realise that an historic compromise with the Dalai Lama automatically relieves pressure on practically all other fronts – the Western world, Falun Gong, internal unrest, and even Taiwan. The time has come for a great civilisation to turn a supposed adversary into an ally and thereby usher in a new destiny for the region and for the world of the 21st Century.