ABHINAVAGUPTA’S AESTHETICS AS A SPECULATIVE PARADIGM*

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An argument is made for the aesthetic grounding of the great Kashmiri philosopher’s metaphysical theology—rather than the more usual reverse argument. A new translation of the Sāntarasa-prakarana of Abhinava’s Bhairavi is appended, which both improves Masson’s and Patwardhan’s version, and supports the above interpretation.

Since the publication of K. C. Pandey’s pioneering Indian Aesthetics, one of the leitmotifs of scholarship on Abhinavagupta’s remarkable aesthetic theory has been commentary on its “philosophical” basis. The main thrust of this inquiry has borne on Abhinava’s own expositions of the Kāśmirī Śaiva tradition, which provide the necessary background for an assessment of his aesthetics. While not wishing in any way to contest the usefulness of this approach, I have wondered for some time whether it would be equally illuminating to examine the main theses of Abhinava’s metaphysics in the light of his aesthetics. In an equally important

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1 Ch. 2, pp. 74ff., esp. p. 91: “The main object of the[se] volumes, which are being written on Abhinavagupta, is, therefore, to revive the monistic Śaiva tradition and to put his aesthetic theory in the proper perspective of his general philosophy.”

2 Esp. the voluminous Tantrāloka and the two Vimārśinis—the ĪśvaraP(ratyaḥbhijñā)V. and the ĪśvaraP(ratyaḥbhijñā)VivrttiV.—Abhinava’s chief expositions of Śaivism in the tāntrika and the śastraic perspectives. All have been published in the Kashmir Sanskrit Series, but my references to the I.P.V. herein are to K. A. Subramania Iyer’s and K. C. Pandey’s edition (in two volumes: Allahabad, 1938 and 1950), which also contains the Bhāskari of Bhāskarakaṇṭha. Abhinava’s Parātṛiṁśiṅgīvīvarana also makes many substantial comments on the arts, esp. music.

3... not, indeed, by adopting the straightforward strategy of T. S. Eliot, who has at times seemed to want to consider religious liturgy an object of delectation, but nevertheless suggesting that Abhinava’s “world view” owes as much to his psychology of awareness as his theory of art does to his notion of salvation. See Eliot’s essay on Lancelot Andrewes, quoted in F. O. Matthiessen, The Achievement of T. S. Eliot, 125; also the remarks on Eliot which conclude my essay “Rasa as a Category of Literary Criticism” (in Sanskrit Drama in Performance, ed. R. V. Baumer and R. Brandon [Honolulu, 1981], 253–54).

4 Sāntarasa and Abhinavagupta’s Philosophy of Aesthetics (Poona: B.O.R.I., 1969), a work which brings together conveniently many of Abhinava’s dispersed pronouncements on aesthetics. The authors observe (p. 158): “This then is Abhinava’s final position. To have provided a coherent philosophy of aesthetic experience is no small achievement.” The brief text conveying the rasika image, the “Dhyānaśloka,” is translated by Pandey (Abhinavagupta, 2nd ed. [Varanasi, 1963], 20–22). In that connection, Masson and Patwardhan observe (p. 40), “What is of interest to us is the similarity this process bears to a dramatic performance....” Yeats’ two poems, “Sailing to Byzantium” and “Byzantium,” might also be adduced as illustrations of the transformation of ritual into art.

5 ŠAPA, viii, “Introduction.”
think, rather, we may better appreciate Abhinava's problem by asking how a sovereign aesthetics might help a Śaiva mystic develop a philosophically accountable notion of the Lord, who is, after all, at play.

The problem we propose accords as well straightforwardly with the chronology of Abhinava's works accepted by Pandey. On his view, Abhinava's mature period is defined by his two Vimarsinis, which present a fully developed theory of recognition [pratyabhijñā]—that the world in its active multiplicity is a real manifestation (spanda) of a single conscious essence. Our task here will be to ask how these works may profitably be read in the light of Abhinava's novel and remarkable aesthetic speculations.

I believe, as do Masson and Patwardhan, that Abhinava's notion of śānta rasa ('tranquillity') provides the nexus through which the relation between philosophy and aesthetics is characteristically developed. Śānta rasa, indeed, occurs at the cutting edge of the issue we are both concerned with. But while they seem content to view this unprecedented ninth rasa as the philosophical "buttress" that the aesthetic theory needs, I will again concentrate on the paradox that it implies, both for Abhinava's aesthetics and his metaphysics. The ninth rasa is a rasa in a different sense than the other eight of the tradition. To assert it as a rasa involves an aesthetic paradox, for while the eight rasas are clearly understood as modifications of the basic emotional constituents [bhāva] of our mundane personality, the new rasa implies rather a suppression of those very constituents: it is a state untroubled by emotion of any sort. That is why, of course, the discussion of śānta rasa, in the Indian texts, is chiefly an inquiry into its sthāyin, that is, an effort to discover the bhāva that may without contradiction be assigned to it, and of which it is a "modification." If it should appear that śānta rasa has, in fact, no corresponding bhāva, then its status as a rasa would not only be paradoxical in explanation, but impossible of manifestation—something like a "hare's horn." I will discuss Abhinava's solution to this paradox below, as well as Masson's and Patwardhan's account of his solution, but first, I want to point out that śānta rasa poses also a paradox, in an even greater sense, for Abhinavagupta's philosophical thesis.

Śānta rasa, all agree, derives its pretext from the fourth purusārtha ('life goal'): moksa, 'liberation.' But śānta rasa, if indeed it functions as claimed by Abhinava, and is accomplished in the terms he proposes, would appear to possess the attributes of moksa, the supreme goal of life, and thus becomes either a synonym of moksa, or renders the latter notion superfluous. In either case, the boundary between "art" and "reality" (which is as important to Abhinava as it is to Aristotle) would disappear, and metaphysics would in effect have been reduced to aesthetics. There are several ways of stating the implications of this unpalatable reduction, but one of them is that the view thus sketched appears

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6 Abhinavagupta, ch. 2 (pp. 27–77, esp. pp. 32–34); in general, the sequence of works provides a basis for dividing Abhinava's literary life into three periods: the tāntika, the śālāṅkārika, and the śāstrika.

7 This has been called a "realistic monism"—to distinguish it from Śaṅkara's idealistic monism. Both Vīmaśrinīs are commentaries on the Īśvara-pratyabhijñākārikā of Utpaladeva (to whom we owe the term pratyabhijñā), the first (also called the Bhṛati) on Utpala's auto-commentary (Vṛtti), the second (or, Laghvi) directly on the Kārikā. It is usual to abbreviate the former, I.P.V.V., the latter, I.P.V. Nota bene, by Pandey's account the shorter work is also the later work.

8 We will not make the stronger claim, though it is implied, that his theoretical work also owes a great deal to his aesthetic speculations.

9 See Edwin Gerow and Ashok Aklujkar, "On Śaṅta Rasa in Sanskrit Poetics" (JAOS 92 [1972]: 80–87) for an earlier treatment—exclusively from the perspective of aesthetic theory. (This was a review article of Masson's and Patwardhan's book.) Kamaleswar Bhattacharya's very laudatory review of ŠAPA may also be consulted: "Śāntarasa et Advasta," Journal Asiatique CCLX (1972): 89–105. Bhattacharya, however, succeeds only in emphasizing the fundamentally "philosophical" character of Abhinava's aesthetics.

10 Mutatis mutandis. The question of what kind of modification—whether a real transformation or a "manifestation" of something more basic—has been discussed at length, and we may take Abhinava's answer to the question as a given. What we experience when we experience "rasa" is nothing more than those constituents themselves, freed from the contingent qualifications of concrete situation, etc. In other words, the aesthetic experience brings us, reflexively, into contact with the generalized possibility of experience itself: that vāsanā, which in Indian psychology denotes not only the latent impressions that our present life enlivens, but the vehicle underlying the continuity, and therefore the possibility, of experience from one life to the next. We experience, in art, not love for X, but love as such, insofar as all men share such a determination.

too close to that of the Bengali Vaisnava: aesthetics has become, not a theory of beauty, but a formula for action—a practical ethic that does in fact not only improve us but fundamentally alters our condition. To see such a view already implied in Abhinava is not only anachronistic, but conflicts with several positions Abhinava clearly adopts, and which seem central both to his poetics and his metaphysics: for instance, that pleasure [ānanda] is the predominant mode of aesthetic experience, not instruction [śāsana, vidhi];12 that the locus of the aesthetic experience in its primary form is the contemplative spectator, not the working actor (to say nothing of the author);13 and most importantly, that rasāsvāda and brahmāsvāda are analogically related, but differentiable, experiences.14

For these reasons and others, sānta rasa represents a challenge to Abhinava's philosophical position, as well as to his aesthetics. Because he cannot be equated with the activist Vaisnavas, he must be understood as somehow distinguishing sānta and mokṣa. In this sense, his metaphysics does in fact depend on the solution to a problem that is "aesthetic"—the reality paradox of sānta rasa (vis-à-vis mokṣa) depends on resolving satisfactorily the aesthetic paradox of sānta (vis-à-vis the

12 "tatra ye svabhāvato nirmalamukuruddayās ta eva saṃsārocitakrodhamohābbhāṣa paravāsāmanaso na bhavanti | teṣāṁ tathāvihadāsārūpakārjanāsraye sādhārānasaranāta mahācaraṇa-vaṇa grahyo rasasaṅgacayo nātya lakaṣaṇāḥ spuṭa eva... tena nātya eva rasā na loke" (Bhārati ad N.Ś. 6.33 [vol. 1, p. 291]). See also I.P.V. ad 1.5.12 (vol. 1, p. 249).

13 "ata eva teṣāṁ (sahādyānāṁ) kāvyaṃ eva pritiyātpatikṛtāḥ... | tatra ca naṭo dhīyaṁ in vedārđhānapadam" (Bhārati ad rasasūtra [vol. 1, p. 287]). "... ye tv atātāhābhātāḥ teṣāṁ pratyakṣocitabahāsviḥ harcaraṇaṇābhāva na tāntād-prakṛtyā | svagatakrodhasākāśasañcālayaḥ sarvdhiḥhīnānāya gitaśākṛtyā ca muninā viracitaḥ | sarvanāgāhakam hi sāstram iti nyāyaḥ" (Bhārati ad N.Ś. 6.33 [vol. 1, p. 291]).

14 For Abhinava, as for Śaṅkara, the experience of absolute "truth" is marked by a "bliss" ne plus ultra: "... yad api vā (sukhāṁ) lokottarāṁ rasacaravātmakam tātāḥ... paramesvaraviśrāntyānandāḥ prakṛtyāte tātanādivipraṇamātra-vahāḥo hi rasāsvāda iti uktam... asmāḥḥīḥ" Locana ad Dīvanyālāka 3.44 (p. 228, N.S.P. ed.; quoted also ŚAPA, 154). Thus, though the relation between rasāsvāda and brahmaśvāda remains analogical, it confirms, by its quasiaesthetic formulation, the justice of our proceeding from aesthetics to metaphysics! Cf. K. Bhattacharya, "Śantarasa et Advaita," 95ff., who also stresses the anticipatory character of raśāsvāda, citing (and retranslating) the difficult passage from Abhinava's I.P.V.V. (vol. 2, pp. 178–79) that Masson and Patwardhan translate on pp. 44–45 of ŚAPA.

other rasas). Abhinava's solution, I would claim, is ingenious, for he turns these twin paradoxes to his advantage: the paradoxes themselves contribute to his philosophical argument.

Mokṣa, indeed, gives opportunity to sānta rasa, and the ambiguity of the rasa vis-à-vis the other rasas is in part a function of the ambiguity of the puruṣārtha vis-à-vis the other puruṣārthas. Recognizing this parallelism constitutes the first step in confronting the paradox. To the prima facie objection that sānta does not belong to the realm of art at all, because the "absence of affection" is not worth representing and cannot be enjoyed, Abhinava replies that it would be unusual if one of the four puruṣārthas—and the most important, by all accounts—were so different from the others, in terms of its grounding in the human psyche, that it could not be seen as arising out of the human condition, and be incapable of appreciation in some sense. Just as the rasa śringāra is grounded on the fact of "passion" [rati], and its appreciation involves a certain generalization and depersonalization of that common experience (which is evidently linked to the puruṣārtha kāma [desire]), so it seems likely that the phenomenon of mokṣa is competent to sustain our fascination, especially as it already involves, as its essence, a certain kind of depersonalization and generalization of experience.15 But this likelihood is grounded on a very abstract notion of rasa and puruṣārtha; if sānta is to be defended as a rasa, it must be shown concretely in the same psychological nexus as the other rasas—which means, in fine, that it must be shown in proper and essential relationship to a concrete experience [bhāva], of which it is a plausibly modifiable description. If we can answer the question: what is its bhāva? then the ancillary questions: how is it represented? [what are its vibhāvas] and what are its dramatic effects? [what are its anubhāvas] will be readily answerable. But it seems that we have simply restated the aesthetic paradox.

Abhinava concludes, after a very intricate argument, that the bhāva, or concrete experience, on which sānta rasa depends is none other than the "Self" itself.16 The ātman, understood both as the permanent background17 against which all transcendent experiences (including the other rasas) are projected, and as the object of that ex-
perience which consists of total clarity and perspicuity (tattvajñāna). But the ātman is also both the mode (as tattvajñāna) and the object of the tapasvin, the mutukṣu. Is then the aesthetic experience which that the yogin realizes? Or, is it art that provides the via facilior which then obviates the arduous journey of the yogin? If, like Plato, Abhinava has, at this point, collapsed the distinction, it is at the cost of the problems already noted. He seems to suggest this by referring approvingly to Gautama’s view that tattvajñāna is a recognized stage in the achievement of mokṣa. And as well, by pointing to the well-known yogic stages of yama and niyama as perhaps “helping” in the portrayal of śānta rasa. Yet this is an appearance only. Since Abhinava cannot be reasonably seen to have abandoned the distinction between “art” and “life,” we are obliged to understand what he has in fact done by putting śānta rasa in the deadly serious context of salvation; to wit: the metaphysical paradox.

All roads thus converge on Abhinava’s notion of śānta rasa. To resume: it is a rasa essentially different from the other rasas, pointing us toward philosophy; yet as having a psychic configuration similar to that of mokṣa, it risks, by its generality and ease, to make salvation “aesthetic.” In aesthetic terms, it appears to lead us away from aesthetics; in philosophical terms, it appears to make philosophy unnecessary. If we can see that these conundra are versions of the same problem, perhaps we will get closer to Abhinava’s meaning. By all accounts, not only does Abhinava’s aesthetics infringe upon the matter of his philosophy, but his account of philosophical matters is distinctly “aesthetic.” His doctrines themselves not only revolve around the paradoxes of śānta rasa; the paradoxes are also perhaps a way of asserting his doctrine. The key, I believe, lies in seeing why his philosophy presumes his aesthetics.

The fundamental difference between Abhinava’s advaita and Śaṅkara’s consists in the former’s effort to explain and account for activity as a constituent element of the absolute—for Śaṅkara, of course, activity is itself a sign of lesser reality (māyā), which will fall away in the gnosis of the absolute. Logically, Abhinava’s is a very risky thesis, for it appears to admit multiplicity and variety into the supreme principle. Abhinava appears to abet this ambiguity by speaking of two powers (śakti) which together characterize the absolute: that of knowing (jñāna) and that of acting (kriya). On the face of it, a dualism similar to that of the Śaṅkhya seems to have been posited. The absolute, in its guise of “knowing” is manifested in the subjective world of awareness and reflection; in its guise of “acting,” in the objective world of presentation, typology and change. Indeed, these postulates would appear to “realize” activity in a way more satisfying than Śaṅkara’s, but at the expense of positing an inconsistency in the character of the absolute itself.

The dilemma, of course, repeats the problem we have posed above: the principle of the subject, whose idealization is a repose in the absolute consciousness—would appear inseparable from the principle of the object, which is realized in variety and activity; on the

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18 We have, it seems, stumbled upon an Indian version of the art/life problem: witnessing a play is (or is not) activity essentially other than living the good life, is not (or is) reducible to (judgeable in terms of) life outside the theatre. In the West, the two opposed positions go back to (and have achieved their canonical formulation in) the moral aesthetics of Plato (the highest good is also the most beautiful thing; flute-playing is a danger to the state) and the imitative poetics of Aristotle (art is modelled on life; but its principles of construction and judgment are its own).

19 Of course, Plato’s aim in not recognizing a distinction between art and life was to devalue art and subject it to the discipline of life (censorship, etc.); what Abhinava seems to be doing here is rather the reverse: the way to capture what is most serious in life is to value its aesthetic component.

20 Nyāyasūtra 1.1.2 (ŚAPA, 126, n. 5).

21 ŚAPA, 116, ll. 18–19. These are the preliminary and basic forms of yogic discipline: abstaining from actions not conducive to self-realization, and suppression of passions that distract the mind from concentration. Yogasūtra 2.30 and 32: “actions” such as hīṃsā, “suppressions” such as saucā.

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22 The following outline is not intended in any sense to be original; it follows, in the main, the accounts of Pandey and Chatterji, and is seconded, where relevant, with appropriate quotations. My aim is to focus on those aspects of Abhinava’s metaphysics which in themselves appear to presume, or to have the structure of, an “aesthetic.”

23 “... ekam aneṣkavābhāvam kathāṁ syāt?: I.P.V. ad 2.1.1 (vol. 2, p. 9).

24 “... jñāṇāṁ kriyā ca bхūtanāṁ jivaṁ jivaṁ matam”: I.P.V. 1.1.3 (vol. 1, p. 61).

25 Treated in the jñānādhihikā, and esp. in 1.5.1ff. Reality in this mode appears as prakāśa, ‘illumination’ or ‘awareness.’

26 Treated in the kriyādhihikā, esp. 2.1.1ff. Reality in this mode appears as kriyā, ‘activity.’ Evidently, the inspiration for Abhinava’s “dualism” is not the Sāṅkhya, but Bhārtṛhari.

27 “... nanu pāramārśa nāma vikalpaḥ | sa ca avikalpā śūd-dhāsaṁvidvapuṣi bhagavati kathāṁ syāt?: I.P.V. ad 1.5.11 (vol. 1, p. 241).
other hand, a (re)active (or emotional) consciousness, multiple as it is, would appear to stain the absolute, if it is to be involved in it, with the variety of ordinary life. For Abhinava, the dilemma is resolved in much the same way a similar paradox is resolved by Bhartrhari:29 the seemingly opposed worlds of object and subject are made over into always corresponding aspects of a single consciousness, whose business (unlike the Sāṅkhya puruṣa) is not simply to be passively aware, but to provide for the underlying correspondence which every act of awareness supposes. Thus, its unity is in fact functionally dependent on maintaining a multiplicity; in being aware, the “I” is seen as a functioning agent30 of this universal consciousness, which even to be possible, must have been given its objects. Consciousness, now understood as providing those objects which appear in their appropriate awareness in the individual consciousness, is termed spanda: the ever renewing and ever present “urge” to be,31 an essential aspect of which is reflexive being, or individual awareness.32 In this way, the seemingly opposed aspects of subject and object—jñāna and kriyā—are made over, by the notion of creative correspondence—into the modus of realization of the one principle. The one is thus not the abstract and essentially empty unity of Śaṅkara, but is a plenitude in which we are privileged to share (by being conscious).33 Abhinava is also better able to account for the apparent unreality of the given world, accepting the cognitive implications of the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness (as did Śaṅkara), but without accepting its ontological implications: nihilism—“nothing” is.34 In fact, what is, is the power of the Lord, who in each instant, maintains and renews an ever active creation—not only for the subject, but including the subject, whose activity is thus also “real.”

Put in another way, it may be said that the view which simply opposes subject and object is arbitrary, and fails to grasp the most essential fact of the opposition—that for every act of awareness, there is a corresponding content of awareness. The duality, which appears to be a precondition of consciousness, is in fact, when rightly understood, nothing more than a sign that consciousness is occurring: the spanda, which involves (indeed, requires) “me,”35 but is equally implied by the mere presence of the object.36

When we describe the absolute in this way, it does appear that the concrete multiplicity of awareness is not alien to it, but is, so to speak, its manner of being.37 In the same way, it would make eminent sense for Abhinava to suppose that an aesthetic mode would figure in the very statement of the absolute principle itself.38 Of course, the mere fact of concrete awareness is the absolute only in a sense; the mundane is the mundane, and we must make a major effort to acquire the absolute—or at least the sense of the absolute.39 In this, the Śaivas and the Advaitins do not disagree. But if the absolute is as we have described it, the only apprehension of it that is possible is that of reflective awareness: the mundane consciousness becoming aware (not of its object—in this system, that is the given, the mundane) but of itself in the act of grasping its object: vimarśa.40

34 Nor is the world a “mistake.”
35 “... kumbhakārasyāpāro nāma paramārthathā issavare-chaita tadavabhāsātīkayaspandaparyantarā” (I.P.V. ad 1.8.9 [vol. 1, p. 419]).
36 “bāhyatvaṁ nāma ābhāsaṁ tvatantaravālye eva” (I.P.V. ad 1.8.5 [vol. 1, p. 409]).
37 The image of the mirror recurs frequently, e.g., I.P.V. ad 2.1.1 (vol. 2, p. 9): “atra ca utkaṁ citsvabhāvasya darpā-nāseyeva ekatānapabādhanāhā abhāsaṁ Mahābhāthmahākva ita virodhā iti tasmin pratyabhijnānabālāt eko ‘pi asau pādārthāmā svabhāvabhedān viruddhān yavat angikurute tva te virodhā eva... tam ekaṁ kriyāśrayaṁ sanipādayanti.” [Pandey’s text resolves sanidhi between words where clarity would benefit.]
38 “Aesthetic,” after all, derives from the Greek αἰσθήτικος, ‘awareness’.
40 “so ‘ham iti vimarṣāḥ” (I.P.V. ad 1.1.1 [vol. 1, p. 35] et passim). The vimarśa in and through which freedom is realized is called, simply, “recognition”—pratyabhijnā: “tasya [mahēśvarasya] dāssam ity anena tattpratyabhijnopādānasaya ma-
Thus is consciousness also essentially active, in its highest form. In this way, it may be understood that the primary reflexive apprehension of which we are capable is that of rasa itself—the emotional consciousness; not satisfied with delectation of itself in its appropriate content, be it the amorous act, or the heroic deed—it becomes aware of itself, as a generic awareness consisting of pure delight, utterly centered in itself—a condition we might call rasatvam (if it were not too Naiyāyika an expression). The content of this new awareness is then the very fact that consciousness has a content—but that original content must then appear as transient, for it is seen against the more fundamental background of the act of apprehension itself. It seems, in other words, that we have again discovered śānta rasa—for Abhinavagupta, that emotional awareness in which all the other rasas are apprehended as possible. That this still may be termed an emotional awareness may be doubted by some; but for Abhinava, at least, it is not mokṣa that we therein apprehend (any more than rasāsvāda is identical to brahmāsvāda).

This is the essential point of difference: even though the concrete rasas, like the bhāvas they arise from, are transient, they are a part of their very transience—philosophically, if not indeed experientially—to the awareness that is śānta.

The notion of mokṣa, in this system, may, if anything, be said to be modelled on that of śānta rasa: the principle of reflexivity whose concrete (affective) realization is a kind of appreciation of transience is given a rigorous cognitive dress in the “recognition” that the percipient subject is the Lord’s agency. That this is also accompanied by delight may truly be said to express the fundamentally “aesthetic” character of mokṣa in this system. But of course, it is not simply delight—as was the easier “recognition” of śānta. Liberation represents an active, and thorough, transformation of the life which sustains the cognition: it is not satisfied with a “delight” itself fundamentally impermanent.

In the final correspondence, then, it may be said that śānta rasa is to mokṣa as the concrete rasas are to the apprehension of “reality”; and the ratio works also vertically: both śānta and mokṣa involve reflexive apprehension of the act of awareness itself—which in its sense of immediacy, givenness, is variously manifested as purely cognitive “illumination” [prakāśa] on the one hand, and by the affective, or “reactive” absorption [vimāraśa] in the collective substratum [vāsana] of our being, on the other.

In Abhinava’s world, then, the duality of subject and object has been replaced by a duality of modes of awareness: one immediate, involving as its essence transcendence and dependence; the other reflective, surmounting that transciency and fully autonomous [sva-tantra]. But it may well be that the only “end” to transcendence available to Abhinava is the awareness of the utterly creative power of the Lord—which does not so much put an end to the coruscating series of images [vaicitrya], as enfold them all: the understanding of the immanence of all things. On this level, śānta rasa and mokṣa may indeed converge—but the standpoint is that of Śiva, and not perhaps that of the devotee. Mokṣa (or śānta) is as much as he may hope (in this

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41 Would it be too Spenglerian to suggest that in Abhinava we have found the Indian counterpart to Hegelian thought? Not only is the supreme principle a notion of reflexive (self-objectifying) consciousness, but Abhinava’s Sanskrit is at least as German as Hegel’s German is Sanskrit: “yady api ca prakṣāvimsarṣātmakaṁ cide kakeghanaṁ ekam eva saṁvidrūpaṁ tathāpi vyūptādaṁya tatparighaṁta eva ayaṁ vibhāgaṁ...” (I.P.V. ad 1.5.4–5 [vol. 1, p. 211]).

42 Not implying the “genus” present in the species, or the “species” present in the individual (which is not the usual Indian view, in any case)—but simply that “awareness” which is a generic thing, has (alone among genera) the capacity to posit itself as its object. See n. 131, below.

43 bhūtī: see n. 17, above.

44 The celebrated analogy is most explicitly formulated in Abhinava’s rasasūtra commentary: “rāṣāḥ... sattvadrekapra-kāśānandamanayanjasanviṣāṇāḥ kalakṣamanaṁ parabrahmāsvāda-savidhena bhogena paraṁ bhūtīta iti” (G.O.S. ed., vol. 1, p. 277). Though it appears there in a characterization of Bhaṭṭaṇāyaka’s view, it is, along with most of Nāyaka’s thesis, accepted by Abhinava.
life) to win. To Śiva alone is it given to laugh as his mode of creation.48

Many theories of metaphor call attention to its reflexive character.49 A general view on the subject of poetic diction is that it is self-referential—calls attention to itself as well as to what it says. If metaphor is the basic formal device of poetry50—by which poetry itself is differentiated from non-poetic discourse—it would appear that Abhinava’s notion that the absolute reality is reflexive consciousness is a necessarily poetic notion. And it has been given a psychology of aesthetics that firmly grounds its metaphysics in the processes of ordinary experience. Abhinava’s world is thus doubly reflexive: one recognition moves the witness from private experience (bhāva) to a universal experience (rasa), the second moves him from a world that merely appears to him (i.e., seems to be before him), to one that is essentially his contemplation of it (i.e., one that is for him).51 The link between the two reflections is perhaps śānta rasa: the aesthetic contemplation of a world in which the centrality of experience is the chief feature; wherein all merely concrete experiences are reduced to possibilities—experienced, that is, only in their becoming and passing away.

**AVATĀRANIKĀ TO A NEW TRANSLATION OF ŚĀNTARASAŚPRĀKARĀṆA**

Believing indeed that the understanding of śānta rasa is central to an understanding of Abhinavagupta’s thought, and that the widely available translation by Masson and Patwardhan on many crucial points is misleading or incomplete,52 I offer as my contribution to the discussion this new translation. Masson and Patwardhan, I am convinced, were frequently wide of the mark not because of any lack of philological sophistication, but because they had prejudged the text in one crucial respect: they saw it as an essentially philosophical or metaphysical defense of the notion of śānta rasa. The text is indeed highly abstract and thoroughly argued; but in my view, its chief aim is to defend the aesthetic adequacy of the notion—that is, to argue the place of this rasa among the rasas. Abhinava never (to my knowledge) addresses directly the question of śānta rasa and mokṣa, or tries to defend śānta rasa in terms of his understanding of mokṣa.53 The latter issue he has taken up for consideration in his later work—where his debt to his aesthetics is obvious, but again, where poetic issues figure as illuminating aside, never as conceptual bases. We are left to draw our own conclusions, and mine have been indicated above.

While taking issue with Masson and Patwardhan, I must acknowledge my (I think obvious) indebtedness to their work. Abhinava’s text is immensely difficult; Abhinava’s successors and copyists had as much difficulty with it as we do. The process of understanding Abhinava is essentially dialectical, and Masson and Patwardhan, by making the most difficult first step, have made the rest, if not easy, at least easier. My own ideas have often taken shape in reaction to theirs. So let not my frequent quibbles with their results obscure the respect I have for the effort they have made. The differences I have indicated are intended to highlight fundamental disagreements about the force of the text. And also to point out where I think I have been able to clarify what for them was obscure. But with Abhinava, one never knows.

I have translated all significant technical terms—with the major exception of rasa. Translators often take refuge in non-translation either to hide their insecurity,
or (which is worse) to make the text appear more accurate and technical than it is.\(^{54}\) The net result is a translation that no one can read except those who don't need to. And one slides easily into the false security of the Sanskrit, which now has become a jargon that exists entirely aside from normal communicative language. Thus it is easy to forget that \textit{sthāyībhāva} always meant something to Abhinava. Whether my translation 'stable emotional base' is correct or not, at least the reader will have to grapple with a text that not only comments on the Sanskrit, but demands to be made sense of as an argument—just as Abhinava intended.

The style, at least, of Abhinava's \textit{Vimarsinis} often calls attention to his earlier speculations on poetics. Many similarities in his use of language are apparent; many metaphors are common to the two enterprises. Striking is his use of \textit{bhitti} 'wall' in similar contexts, to call attention to the Self or ātman in its function as stable background on which the images of the emotions, and of real objects, are cast.\(^{55}\) The "mirror" metaphor as well, indicates the limitations of the "wall" metaphor— for in the last analysis there is no "external" source of projection, as there is in the case of the mirror.\(^{56}\)

The image of the dancer recalls the same usage in the \textit{Śāṅkhya-kārikā}.\(^{57}\) But references to the "beloved" show how easily Abhinava relies on rasasāstra, and, for emphasis, among the rasas, on the erotic.\(^{58}\) The crucial poetic term \textit{camatkāra}, 'striking, vivid', occurs with "striking" effect in a discussion of the supreme consciousness.\(^{59}\) Terms such as \textit{uparāga} and \textit{uparaṇjaka}—though they probably have the status of frozen metaphors—occur frequently in description of the relation between the transient multiplicity (of emotions, of consciousness-contents: \textit{vikalpa}) and the "stable background" (the ātman).\(^{60}\) The interesting term \textit{viśrānti} is, of course, ubiquitous in both periods of writing.\(^{61}\) It denotes the "repose," which is perhaps not the "nature," but is at least the token, of the Self.\(^{62}\) Its absence marks all that is "insentient" [\textit{jāda}].\(^{63}\) It is a term that affects all cognitive activity—as when a word or a proposition "comes to rest" in complete understanding.\(^{64}\) For Abhinava, perhaps, it is the key operational term expressing his notion that the universe is a correspondence of two realms: truth is thus also a \textit{viśrānti}.\(^{65}\)

\section*{The section on Sāntārasa from Abhinavagupta's \textit{Commentary on the Nāṭyaśāstra of Bharatamuni}}

The nature of "tranquillity" (ought also) to be stated, in the view of those who, on the other hand, read "nine rasas."\(^{66}\) Some (of them) say that tranquillity (is the rasa) whose stable emotional basis [\textit{sthāyībhāva}] is "peace" [\textit{sama}], that it is produced by conditional factors [\textit{vibhāva}] such as ascetic practice, association with ascetics, etc., that it is portrayed through consequential factors [\textit{anubhāva}] such as the absence of desire and anger, and that its transitory (affective states)

54 This is one of the flaws of Masson's and Patwardhan's translations generally.\(^{55}\)

55 \textit{Supra}, n. 17. Also see \textit{I.P.V.} ad 1.8.1 (vol. 1, p. 401); ad 1.5.13 (vol. 1, p. 253).\(^{56}\)

56 \textit{Supra}, n. 37. Also see \textit{I.P.V.} ad 2.1.8 (vol. 2, p. 27), and ad 1.8.11 (vol. 1, p. 423).\(^{57}\)

57 "... tattāpi kvacit ābhāse premāṭān ekikaroti nītabhinirvāta itva prekṣakaṁ" (\textit{I.P.V.} ad 1.5.10 [vol. 1, p. 239]); \textit{S.K.} 59.\(^{58}\)

58 "sā hi arthakriyā ābhāsabhedaniyatā | tathā ca kāntābhāsasya bāhyatve ‘pi satī ābhāsāntarasaya ālīgilanāllumaṁsaya vyapagame dūribhavati, iva itam iti ābhāsāntarasaya upageame ‘nyaiyā prakātanāḥlayāviparītā dṛṣṭyate arthakriyā" (\textit{I.P.V.} ad 1.8.6 [vol. 1, p. 414]), also ad 1.8.5, etc.). The simile seems unmotivated, except as providing vividness.\(^{59}\)

59 "... tasyāḥ (citikriyāyā) pratyavamarṣaḥ svātmacamatkāralaṃśa atmāsvabhavah | tathā hi āthaṇa svātmanā na camatkriyate, svātmanā na paramāṃṣyate, na svātmanā tena praksāyate ... | caivāraṇa tu svātmanā aham iti saṁraṁbhodyogollasavabhūtiyogat camatkriyate, svātma parāṃṣyate, svātmany eva praksāyate" (\textit{I.P.V.} ad 1.5.13 [vol. 1, pp. 250–51]).

60 See also n. 180, below.


67 "tathā parāmarṣanam eva ajādyajīvitam iti svātantrarūparthi svābhāvikam avabhāsaya svātmavrīṇaṁśaḥ ananya mukhaḥ prakṣiṇavāṁ śīmā (\textit{I.P.V.} ad 1.5.11 [vol. 1, pp. 242–43]).\(^{68}\)

68 "... nirvīraṁśatvāt jaḍam" (ibid.).

69 "... iti asmadarthaviśrāntih" (\textit{I.P.V.} ad 1.5.17 [vol. 1, p. 276]); "yata śi śvā iṣa pari pāramāṣaḥ sa iṣaṇāṅle jñātṛtvakāṛtvatattve visrāmyati" (ibid., p. 275).

61 Cf. \textit{I.P.V.} ad 1.4 passim, esp. kārikās 5 and 6.

62 "tathā parāmarṣanam eva ajādyajīvitam iti svātantrarūparthi svābhāvikam avabhāsaya svātmavrīṇaṁśaḥ ananya mukhaḥ prakṣiṇavāṁ śīmā (\textit{I.P.V.} ad 1.5.11 [vol. 1, pp. 242–43]).

63 "... Nirvīraṁśatvāt jaḍam" (ibid.).

64 "... iti asmadarthaviśrāntih" (\textit{I.P.V.} ad 1.5.17 [vol. 1, p. 276]); "yata śi śvā iṣa pari pāramāṣaḥ sa iṣaṇāṅle jñātṛtvakāṛtvatattve visrāmyati" (ibid., p. 275).
[vyabhicārī(hāvā)] are steadfastness [dṛṣṭi], reflection [mati], etc.67

This (view) others do not tolerate, because "tranquillity" and "peace" are synonyms.68 And also because the (traditional) number of affective states [bāhava] is given as forty-nine.69 Moreover, (they say) it is entirely proper, for example, that conditional factors such as seasons and garlands are distinctly apprehended [anusamdhiyate] (as elements) within the erotic (rasa)—which comes into being immediately after their (apprehension); (but) ascetic (practices) and Vedic study (which are alleged to be among the conditional factors of sānta) are not immediate causes of (the rasa) tranquillity.70 If it be proposed that they are the immediate causes of the knowledge of the truth [tattvajñāna]71 (which in turn occasions tranquillity), (these others reply:) in that case, effectiveness [prayojayatā] is attributed to the knowledge of the truth that has arisen (immediately) prior (to sānta rasa); consequently ascetic practice, Vedic study, etc., have (in effect) been given up as the conditional factors (which directly produce sānta rasa).72 Furthermore, the "absence of desire," and so on, is not a consequential factor (appropriate to the portrayal of this rasa), because it is often in evidence when the very opposite73 of tranquillity (is being portrayed); because (in itself) it conveys nothing;74 and because it is not something that can be suitably represented on the stage [prayogasamavāyītār]. For the cessation of activity is not a suitable subject for stage presentation. Even (conditions) such as sleep, delirium, and the like, are given consequential representation [anubhāyyante] by actions such as regular breathing,75 sighing, falling down, and lying on the ground. And (as for this rasa’s supposed transitory affective states) how can such things as "steadfastness," in which a passion for (attainable) objects is presumed,76 occur in (the context of) tranquillity (which, by definition, involves no passion for any object). It is not by doing nothing that the spiritual trainee [vineya] is educated in the means of knowing the truth;77 they whose minds are pained at (the spectacle of) another’s pain have not reached the condition of seeing correctly, but are (still) in worldly travail (samsāra). Thus, "tranquillity" is not a rasa.

67 The argument so summarily here stated follows closely Bharata’s outline of sānta rasa (G.O.S. ed., vol. 1, pp. 332–33), and is intended as a reply to an opponent’s view that sānta is not a rasa, because it has no sthāyin, and cannot be produced, or portrayed. See the following discussion. The terms vibhāva and anubhāva are part of the technical vocabulary of the nātyasāstra, and designate (roughly) the ‘conditions’ which a particular rasa presumes (and which, being in evidence, will be sufficient to provoke that rasa), and the ‘resultant manifestations’ of that rasa—such consequential behavior as is suitably associated with that rasa as its expression. E.g., for the erotic: “moonlit nights” and a “distracted air.”

68 I.e., no proper sthāyin has been named.

69 I.e., sama is not mentioned by Bharata among either the sthāyibhāvas (8), the sattvikabhāvas (8), or the vyabhicārībhāvas (33).

70 I.e., the sense of tranquillity does not arise immediately after witnessing them, but (see next) only after some intermediate event.

71 The first occurrence here of this crucial term.

72 Implied in this argument is the view that the vibhāvas are immediate preconditions of the rasa with which they are associated.

73 The note of Masson and Patwardhan to this term [vipakṣa] (SAPA, 121) is unnecessarily confused. Vipakṣa here has its logical sense of ‘the anti-focus,’ that is, the domain where the term to be proven (sādhyya) is never observed: e.g., a “lake,” in the case of “is on fire.” The pakṣa, of course, is the mountain, etc. Abhinava means then quite directly what Masson and Patwardhan propose after considerable contortion: because the “absence of desire” is often observed where sānta rasa is impossible (for instance, in the hāsya rasa), it cannot be considered an anubhāva of sānta.

74 Masson and Patwardhan do not appear to have translated this term (agamakatvā); the idea is that the “absence” of an emotion does not convey an affective response in the same way the presence of an emotion does. The “absence” of one emotion, perhaps, is the same as the absence of any other . . .

75 Lit., ‘breathing out’ (nihvāśa) and ‘breathing in’ (ucchvāśa).

76 The compound prāptavisayopāraṇaḥ I take to be a bahuvali with a tapaturuṣa as final member. Prāpta, it seems to me, is intended here in its śāstraic sense of ‘patent, presumed,’ “prāptasya punar upadege na kincit prayojanam asti” (Kumārila ad P.M.S. 10.8.40). “Steadfastness,” in other words, is usually seen in cases of determined pursuit of objects, goals, etc. But (in this pakṣa at least) sānta cannot be thought of as “goal-oriented.” Masson and Patwardhan (SAPA, 121, note) take prāpta with viṣaya (as in the unusual grammatical compound prāptodakah [grāmade?]—yāḥ graṁmaṁ prāptam udakam, sa prāptodakām grāmade). But as the example shows, what is “reached” (the direct object) is the extrinsic head (the “village”), not the term in agreement (“water”). Pandit Srinivasa Sastri’s explanation (though it does not seem to have been understood by Masson and Patwardhan as we have done) is doubtless the correct one.

77 This directed at the thesis that if “absence of passion” does not produce the rasa, at least it may produce the intermediate condition: tattvajñāna.
To this, (it is reasonable) to respond (atrocyanet). just as now the triad (of human goals, namely) religious duty, (well-being, and pleasure) is here (well known), equally well established is (the fourth) goal, viz., "liberation." (which) has been expounded (vyutpādyate) primarily in the śastras, and in traditional religious [smṛti] and epic [śilāsa] texts, (whose study serves) as means (to its attainment). But (those who insist that mokṣa is not suitable to kāya) should be asked: why may not the state of mind [citavṛtti] conducive to "liberation," the highest human goal, not also be capable of transformation into rasa [kimi ṛṣatvaṃ nānīyate]?—just as those states of mind associated with pleasure, (which are) called "sexual passion," etc., are indeed transformed into rasa, as the "erotic"—for an audience suitably endowed with a sympathetic sensibility [hrdayasamāvāda], and through the agency of poet and actor—means whereby (the states) are brought to a condition capable of being enjoyed.

That state of mind which is so (capable of transformation) is nothing but the stable emotional basis [sthāyibhāva] (of the rasa in question: sānta). The question is now posed: what is its name? Some assert: (it is the)

"indifference" [nirveda] which arises from knowledge of the truth. Indeed (they continue:) this "indifference" is different from the "indifference" which arises from poverty, etc., because the cause (of the former), knowledge of the truth, is different. It is for this reason that (Bharata) reads this (term at the juncture) between the (list of) stable emotions and the (list of) transitory affective states [sthāyisaṅgārīmādaye]. Otherwise, the sage, who always has his eye on the auspicious (utterance), would never have read (the verses) so. And when he denies that "disgust" [jugupsā] (may be used) as a transitory affective state in the erotic rasa, Bharata recognizes that all the (stable) emotional

nirveda may mean both 'indifference' and 'revulsion'; it is apparently intended in this latter sense by Bharata, who lists it as the first vyabhicārībhāva (6.18); the partisans of the view here presented (definitely not Abhinava's, as will be clear) have apparently sought to kill two birds with one stone: they discover a sāthyin suitable to sānta, but one that is mentioned in Bharata. Thus they have a "new" bhāva without violating the 49-bhāva limit! By adding the discrimination: tatvajñānothita, the sense of nirveda is restricted to the former of the two senses. Gary Tubb [personal communication] has suggested for nirveda the translation 'disillusionment'—which is fine, provided the specifically ethical (and Indian) shading of the term is stipulated: that sense of futility following upon the recognition of the transiency of all attainments, and leading to the desire for liberation.

See preceding note. "Revulsion" is here meant. In what follows, the tendency will be to discriminate this "worldly" [laukika] sense of nirveda from the other (ipso facto) alaukika sense. "Revulsion" involves a surfeit of emotion; "indifference," none.

The (sthāyī)bhāvas are given in 6.17; the vyabhicārībhāvas in 6.18–21. Nirveda is the first vyabhicārin listed. The defender of this view is alleging that nirveda may be read as the last sāthyin (in one sense), or the first vyabhicārin (in the other).

I.e., if nirveda were intended only in the second—inauspicious—sense (viz., 'loathing') it would never have been mentioned first (the auspicious position) among the vyabhicārins. Masson and Patwardhan regard this as a "weak argument" (ŚAPA, 123, note), but indeed among Indian interpreters of canonical texts, it figures as a very powerful one. Cf. the grammarians' jhāpaka. (This is "authorial" intention authenticated!)

jugupsā is given as the sthāyibhāva of the rasa bibhatsa 'the fearsome'; yet Bharata (text 6.45/46: [G.O.S. ed., p. 306]) denies its use as a vyabhicārin in śīvāgāra. The clear implication is that he views the sthāyibhāvas as "stable" in relation to their primary rasa, but, in relation to others (where they may also occur), as "transitory." The category is thus relative, and not absolute.

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78 The use of an impersonal passive leaves us in some doubt as to whether the view presented here may be strictly identified as Abhinava's position. But of course it is not unusual for classical authors to seek an impersonal mode of expression. Abhinava, too, rarely rejects in toto the views of his interlocutors.

79 Iha perhaps refers to the world of kāya: belles-lettres—rather than (as Masson and Patwardhan, 'in this world.' The context of the sentence supports this. It would be odd for Abhinava to take so historicistic a stance as Masson and Patwardhan suggest (ŚAPA, 122, note); rather Abhinava is probably stipulating the accepted fact that the triad is the staple of kāya; the fourth pūruṣārthha, however, though equally well known, is not well established in kāya, but is attested in the other genres, of which he names three.

80 I.e., why may they not be capable of being expressed as rasa?

81 The rasa, of course, is always pleasurable, even though the raw emotional state on which it is based is not always so. The play, in general, is seen as means to that transmutation into "bliss." Abhinava's point is that, qua citavṛtti, nothing prima facie excludes the fourth pūruṣārthha from this rasa-transformation.

82 The argument so far, as can be seen, is by indirection: if the pūruṣārthahas are parallel in other respects, why not in respect of rasa? But if so, then what shall we call the bhāva thereby implied? (All rasas must have an emotional basis.) I don't think Abhinava has declared his view yet.
states may figure (sometimes) as primary, (sometimes) as ancillary, and (even) as involuntary or (voluntary) consequential factors—inserted (in the play) as suitability (demands), and brought out by circumstances or by language. Now the "indifference" which arises from knowledge of the truth suppresses all the other stable emotions. Would not that stable (emotion), which is

88 The text reads ambiguously: bhāvānāṁ sarveṣāṁ eva. Masson and Patwardhan take this to refer literally to "all the bhāvas"—the sthāyī-, vyabhicārī-, sāttvika-, and anubhāvas—which would make the statement appear to say that any one of them can become any other of them—circumstances demanding. They adduce a passage in the Locana (pp. 174–75, N.S.P. ed.) in support of Abhinava's acceptance of this view. But that passage, like this one, is clearly labelled as a representation of an alternative standpoint (... iti kecid vyācakṣyāre), and the text does not unambiguously support even the broad interpretation they give it. The statement of Ānandavardhana's on which the comment is made (etac ca sarvarh yesāṁ raso rasāntarasya... ) asserts only the view that one rasa may be vyabhicārī to another, and the question seems to be whether the other "rasa" really means 'rasa,' or (as the others believe) 'bhāva.' In our present case as well, the passage makes perfect sense as referring only to the supposed "stable" bhāvas—the question then being whether they must always be "stable" or may also function as transitory bhāvas. It is hard enough to conceive what Abhinava may mean by suggesting that the stable bhāva may become as well an anubhāva or even a sāttvika bhāva (see next), without making him say that sāttvika bhāvas and anubhāvas (to say nothing of the 33 vyabhicāris) may become stable bhāvas! That would imply that there should be a rasa corresponding to the transitory bhāva marana 'death!'

89 citatā is a synonym for sāttvika(bhāva)—a special kind of anubhāva which appears to be differentiated from the general class only because it is (normally) involuntary, and thus not easily simulated on the stage—sweating and horripilation are examples (N.S. 6:22). According to R. K. Sen, the sāttvika bhāvas are also signs of the veracity of the rasa experience in the spectator (Aesthetic Enjoyment [Calcutta, 1966], 264ff.). He traces their discussion (and much else relevant to the rasa theory) back to the medical literature. See esp. his treatment of nirveda [pp. 295–300].

90 If this text is genuine, it represents a point of view not otherwise advanced (as far as I know) by anyone, including Abhinavagupta. Whether the sthāyin may assume the character of a vyabhicārībhāva is of course another matter. But it is hard to see what Abhinava may mean by allowing a stable emotion (such as "sexual passion," or the present "disgust") the status of an involuntary bodily reflex!

91 Masson and Patwardhan are puzzled by this statement, but surely it is the capstone of the position being advanced here, stable by nature, truly suppress the others—in contrast with sexual passion, etc., which thrive on the variety of emotions [bhāva]?

This (position) must be investigated. He who asserts that indifference born of knowledge of the truth is the stable emotional basis (of the rasa "tranquillity") in effect asserts that knowledge of the truth (is the stable basis of the rasa "tranquillity"). How can (activities such as ascetic practice, association with yogins, Vedic study, etc., which) bear the seeds of detachment [viz., eventuate in detachment: vairāgyasabijādiṣu], be understood as conditional factors (to this "indifference")? If it is maintained that they promote it, such a usage would attribute "conditionality" to the cause of a cause, and this extends (the notion of "conditional factor") beyond is accepted range. Now, "indifference," which ever consists in an attitude that (such and such) is not to be sought after, may be defined as "detachment" and it, on the contrary, is helpful to knowing the truth. For the detached person always strives so that in himself knowledge of the truth arises—indeed it is from knowledge of the truth that liberation (comes); it is not that first knowing the truth he then becomes indifferent, and from indifference (arises) liberation. For these gentlemen agree that "from detachment comes merger into material nature."

which begins with the observation that there is a bhāva (viz., nirveda) that may be both sthāyin and samācārin, proceeds with the observation that Bharata allows this flexibility to all the (sthāyī-) bhāvas, and now concludes with the clincher that this one is so potent as to supersede the others (which, in relation to it, are "by nature" transient!). What the text means then, is only that nirveda must be the sthāyin, whenever it figures in the context of the other bhāvas, not that it "cannot . . . tolerate the presence" of the others (SĀPA, 124, note).

92 This "investigation" is directed at the position stated, not by those holding the position ("They also raise the following objection . . . ") (SĀPA, 124).

93 Masson and Patwardhan take this as an objection. It is, in fact, Abhinava's position.

94 The model Abhinava is anticipating here is, in fact, the reverse causal chain: nirveda causes tattvajñāna. So if it is asserted that a certain vibhāva (say, detachment) causes nirveda, it will not be the vibhāva of tattvajñāna. Nirveda itself is (as Abhinava will say) the vibhāva. One vibhāva does not condition another, in normal usage.

95 The reverse had been maintained by the opponent: "knowing the truth" was the source of "indifference."

96 Sāmkhyakārikā 45. This implies that the position Abhinava is here examining is held by some or all Sāmkhyas. Indeed, the Sāmkhyas hold that tattvajñāna is alone the cause of
It if be countered that the detachment of him who knows the truth always becomes stronger—for even these gentlemen say, “and beyond (even) that [viz., vairāgya] is the absence of appetite, which proceeds from knowledge of the spiritual essence [purusa]”97—that (alone) may be taken as a conditional factor to “indifference,” (but “indifference” in this sense amounts to) “revulsion” [kheda]. For example:

Useless—milking a bull
that I had taken for a cow heavy with udder!
Useless—embracing a eunuch
that I had taken for a lovely girl!
I hoped for beryl
when I saw the piece of glass shining!
O foolish me who worshipped
miserable you! worthless and unsophisticated!

We will (further) explain this (mundane indifference) at that time.102

But has the revered Aksapāda103 not asserted, in the aphorism beginning “the source of suffering . . . .” that the predilection for objects of sense, which has its root in false knowledge, is quieted by knowledge of the truth? (This implies, does it not, that) knowledge of the truth—which destroys false knowledge, is the cause of detachment—defined as the falling away of (such) defects (as false knowledge)?

If so, what of it?
Well, isn’t “indifference” [nirveda] (a form of) “detachment” [vairāgya]?104

Who asserts such (a proposition)? “Indifference” (after all) is a mental state characterized by an effusion of the current of grief; “detachment” is the cessation of passions and the like.

Or, let us assume (for the purposes of argument) that “indifference” is (a kind of) “detachment.”105 Still, the teacher did not include it in the aphorism, understanding that liberation was (the effect thereby) to be accomplished, because, even though it would have come between (cause and effect), it is under the control of its own cause.106 He would, rather, on the ground that

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97 Yogasūtra 1.16. Abhinava seems not to distinguish here the Sāmkhya and Yoga dārśanas, referring to partisans of both as tatrābhidhavantah.

98 As Masson and Patwardhan point out, this quote (approximately) appears in Vīśa's gloss ad Y.S. 1.16 (“jānānasyaiva parā kāśṭhā vairāgyam”), but Abhinava attributes it to Patañjali himself (using an attribute “whose lord is the serpent” that usually belongs to the Viṣṇukarana Patañjali—which implies also that Abhinava thought the two Patañjalis one). The first confusion is more curious than the second.

99 Throughout this passage, which we take to be a Sāmkhya view, no distinction seems to be drawn between sānta and mokṣa. It is on this ground alone not Abhinava's final position. Similarly, the terms sthāyin and hetu are used, if not synonymously, at least interchangeably.

100 Masson and Patwardhan (ŚAPA, 125, note) take this as “Abhinava's own position,” but are puzzled by the optative bhavet. If I am right in seeing here a Sāmkhya thesis under examination, there is no problem: Abhinava is saying somewhat magnanimously: even they would have to accept this view—(which indeed) is close to my view! He has not yet announced his own position, but this argument does anticipate it: tatvajñāna will be an essential element, but not the entirety.

101 I.e., because of a deception based on a mistaken judgment. This mundane “knowledge” is of course not the tatvajñāna which results from the cessation of a transcendental error. See nn. 83 and 84, above.

102 Presumably, in the commentary on N.S. 7 (the bhāvaprakarana), now lost, except for a short section at the beginning.

103 Gautama. The reference is to Nyāyasūtra 1.2. The Sāmkhya here defends the view that indifference may be the effect of knowledge (as cause).

104 The point is not that they are “the same thing” (ŚAPA, 127, note), but that nirveda belongs to the genus vairāgya—hence falls under the scope of the sūtra cited. The net effect would be to salvage nirveda as a possible sthāyin of sānta.

105 We are still attempting to ascertain the purport of N.S. 1.2. The two pākṣas considered appear to be based on the two senses of nirveda. See above, nn. 83, 84 and 101.

106 Vīśa. tatvajñāna [N.S. 1.1]. If we accept the view that vairāgya cum nirveda is a consequence of tatvajñāna, we
indifference arises from knowledge of the truth, have used the term “indifference” (in the aphorism) instead of “peace” [śāma]. The terms “peace” and “tranquillity” have been understood (here) as synonyms—just as are “laughter” [hāsa] and the “comic (rasa)” [hāsya]; their difference can (also) easily be stated (as it has been in our own aesthetics) in terms of the relation between the given and that which is to be realized, or that between the mundane and the transcendental, or between the common and the special. Therefore, “indifference” is not the stable (emotional basis of “tranquillity”).

Still others affirm the following: eight particular mental states only have been spoken of (by Bharata)—sexual passion, etc. They become even more variegated [vicitra] when (over and above the factors already mentioned) they are conjoined with special otherworldly conditional factors such as (the study of) revealed texts in solitude. One among these (extraordinary varieties) (must be) the stable (emotional basis of śānta). Indeed, sexual passion (itself) may be the stable (emotional basis, for) having as its object the uninterrupted, blissful Self, it is the means to liberation. As has been said:

He alone has no task left to do
Whose delight is in the Self,
Who is satisfied with the Self,
Who is pleased by the Self.

In this way, any one of the (permanent mental states), from sexual passion and laughter up to amazement may be posited as the stable (emotional basis of śānta)—insofar as liberation is achieved by him who perceives that the entire (realm of sense-)objects is incongruous [hāsa]; or who looks on everything as lamentable [soka]; or who sees worldly affairs as offensive [krodha]; or who has taken refuge in a heroism both uncompromising and undeluded [utsāha]; or who is afraid of all sense objects [bhaya]; or who has conceived disgust for those things, such as young women, etc., that are sought after in the world [jugupsa]; or who is amazed at the extremity of the unprecedented attainment of his Self [vismaya].

Nor is this (view) disproved of by the sage (Bharata). Inasmuch as he enumerates specific emotional states [bhāva], using terms like “sexual passion,” etc., and then incorporates others which are modes of these, using the term “and”—he acknowledges that sexual passion and the rest (also may) aim at final release [apavargaviśaya], brought into play by transcendental causes that are different from those (which bring about the ordinary states listed). But those who

will simply have adduced an intermediate cause between tat-tva-viśāna and mokṣa—the ultimate effect in the causal chain. Abhinava explains that it is for this that vairāgya was not mentioned in the sūtra—even if it be regarded as a consequence; the operative cause of mokṣa is still tat-tva-viśāna; vairāgya is only an intermediate condition—something like the stick between the potter’s hand and the pot. Masson and Patwardhan have translated svakāraṇavaśāst (or not at all?): sva must refer, not to mokṣa, but to nirveda.

107 Masson and Patwardhan (ŚAPA, 127–28, note) have, I think, misunderstood this passage. It is not, as they aver, the siddhāntin’s position, but continues the indirect argument against those Naiyāyikas who assert nirveda as the sthāyin of śānta rasa. The difficulties alleged disappear when it is remembered that Bharata (in the probably spurious sānta-rasaprakaraṇa) has mentioned śāma as the sthāyin of śānta (see above, note 67); it is this view that those who adduce nirveda are attempting to rescue (supra, notes 68, 83). Abhinava is here saying simply that if this nirveda had been intended by Gautama as a proximate cause of mokṣa (and hence a possible sthāyin of śānta), he could hardly have failed to mention it—for it would have supported the view that the śāma mentioned by Bharata was indeed the sthāyin! The only stipulations that would have had to be made are that śāma and nirveda be synonyms (and this is easily granted), and that śāma and śānta be related as the names for bhāva and rasa—according to one of the criteria stated. The fact that Gautama did not take this straightforward route proves conclusively that he did not accept śāma as sthāyin, and that those of his followers who do, are wrong. It is, of course, the case that the siddhāntin would not disagree with the view here expressed.

108 It is odd, perhaps, that Abhinava dismisses with such a flourish the view that in our editions of the śānta rasa section seems to be Bharata’s also. V. Raghavan (Number, 15–16) adduces this is still another reason for considering the sānta-rasaprakaraṇa spurious. Certainly, the view on which Abhinava is commenting takes its major stand on nirveda, not on śāma, but this may be a sign only that Bharata’s view had been by Abhinava’s time superseded. The view now attributed to Bharata is—here and at the beginning of the commentary—considered by Abhinava (c.f n. 3, p. 35).
speak thusly—who allow (the sthāyins) alternately to replace one another, in effect undermine the stability of (any) one.115 The notion contradicts itself on its face which asserts that any one [tasya tasya] (of the eight bhāvas) may become the stable (basis), depending on this or that condition.116 (Furthermore), because the stable (emotional basis) is different for each person, the rasa itself arguably would be infinite.117 If (in response to this, it is argued that) the rasa would be one, because it is the cause of a single (result, namely) liberation—then (one might as well argue that) the heroic [vīra] and the violent [raudra] (rasas) were one because they eventuated in a single result, namely, the destruction (of the enemy)!

Still others say that it is because sexual passion and the rest have become indistinguishable—like the flavors in a drink—that they (together constitute) the stable (emotional basis of sānta rasa).118 This also is not an attractive (thesis), because the mental states do not occur simultaneously, and because (some of them) are incompatible (with others).

What then is the stable (emotional basis of sānta rasa)? It is said:119 to the extent that knowledge of the

The several ca ‘and’ in this sūkta are alleged to justify reference to bhāvas other than the eight named—particularly the alaukika forms of each that are the ground of sānta. 115 This is one of Abhinava’s most telling remarks—directed against those who, despairing of fixing one bhāva as the sthāyin of sānta, would allow any of the bhāvas (alternately) as sthāyin, and thus not preserve the distinctiveness of any rasa; this applies as well to sānta: however unusual or differently motivated it is, it cannot be reduced to the others (or the essence of the others: see Gerow and Aklujkar, “On Santa Rasa,” 81).

116 I don’t think Masson and Patwardhan have got the exact flavor of this sally. It does not claim that the bhāvas, on the opponent’s view, “would cancel each other out”—but rather that the notion of sthāyin itself has been sacrificed, if it is made conditional on variation among the other bhāvas. The assertion of a conditional sthāyin, in fact, contradicts itself—not that it is “(as good as) already refuted” ( ŚAPA, 129).

117 I.e., even the “sānta rasa” which this pakṣa hopes to justify would disappear in a myriad of private “rasas.” I agree with Masson and Patwardhan here ( ŚAPA, 130, note).

118 This view must have been intended as a reply to the deficiencies alleged in the former position. Only by mixing them up does the sthāyin emerge!

119 This I take to be Abhinava’s first sketch of his siddhānta. The impersonal ucyate is not too surprising, inasmuch as the question of tattvajñāna has already been broached in reference to the Sānkhyā position discussed above. The difference between that statement and this is one of modality only: there it was asserted that the (Sānkhyā) position under discussion

truth is a means to the (accomplishment of) liberation, it is that alone that ought to be stable where liberation (is concerned).120 But “knowledge of the truth” is nothing but knowledge of the Self—knowledge of a Self, as it were, an object apart (from mundane objects). For if the Self were indeed “beyond” [para], it would not be a self.121 This has been dealt with extensively by our teacher,122 and we also have elsewhere expatiated upon it—so we will not insist on it here.123 It follows then that the Self—possessed of untainted qualities such as knowledge and joy, and untouched by affections for presumptive objects124—is the stable (basis for sānta

would amount to identifying tattvajñāna as the sthāyin—if understood correctly; here that implication is taken as basis for the further statement of the siddhāntin’s position. As we will see, it is not tattvajñāna as such that Abhinava accepts as sthāyin, but the ground of tattvajñāna—the ātman.

120 My translation [tasyaiva mokṣe sthāyita yukta] attempts to retain the distinction (which I feel is essential to Abhinava’s thesis) between the domains of art and reality. Tattvajñāna, if it is a means to the achievement of mokṣa, is also a sthāyin where mokṣa is represented. The “oddness” in the reference to mokṣa (ŚAPA, 130, note) stems only from Masson and Patwardhan’s determination to obscure this distinction.

121 anātma: could this be a bahuvrihi—“have no (mundane) self”? In other words, the Self cannot be known like external objects, and yet must, because immanent in all knowledge, be knowable! This understanding agrees with K. Bhattacharya’s: “Ātman, étant un autre (para), ne serait qu’un non-ātman (anātman)” (“Śantarasa et Advaita,” 90).

122 Perhaps Bhāṭṭa Tauta, his teacher in poetics, or Lākaśmanagupta, his teacher in Pratyabhijñā. Abhinava also uses the honorific plural in referring to his teacher (there doubtless Tauta) in the Bhārati [G.O.S. ed., p. 274].

123 Of course we cannot be sure what Abhinava intends here—the works of his teachers have not survived. But I must register my disagreement with Masson and Patwardhan who consider these obscure phrases “very clumsy.” Such an imperfect judgment reveals only their determination to force a view on the words—which I have taken literally, and I think, made them say what they can. Indeed, considerations of grammar alone would rule out their translation: “The knowledge of any object other than the Self is the knowledge of worldly objects. For anything that is different from the Self is nothing but non-self.” Abhinava is simply pointing out that the “Self” [para ātma] exists on a different level of reality than do the mundane “selves”—and so its poetics would also involve an element of transcendence. I accept Raghavan’s reading vijayasyeva.

124 parikalpitavaiṣya: “objects” (in the mundane world) are always presented to, or postulated by the Self—they do not correspond to its “nature.” Masson’s and Patwardhan’s “imagined” (ŚAPA, 131) is too Buddhist!
Its "stableness" is not to be argued in terms of the "stableness" (of the other emotive states). The other states such as sexual passion, whose mode of existence (ever) is to be (either) facilitated or obstructed, in accordance with the appearance or disappearance of various causal factors, are said to be "stable" relatively [āpekṣikātāvā], to the extent that they attach themselves for a time to the wall127 of the Self, whose nature it is to be "stable." Knowledge of the truth, however, represents the wall itself (on which are displayed) all the other emotions [bhāvāntara], and is (thus), among all the stable (emotive states), the most stable.128 It need not be separately mentioned (among the sthāyibhāvas)129 because it by nature is an always realized stable emotional basis, which converts all the mental states, such as sexual passion and the others, into ancillaries [vyabhicārībhāvanāy] (of itself).130 For the same reason, it is not proper to count it separately (as a "ninth" bhāva). One does not count "bovinity" a third, in addition to (the bull) with half-grown horns, and with no horns.131 Thus the figure of forty-nine, (for the) emotions, remains intact. If132 we are asked: why has it not been separately mentioned? we would reply: because it is not associated with any separable bliss.133 Unlike sexual passion, and the rest, this form of the Self we have described is not, in its unalloyed form [asamprktena vapusā], within the province of the ordinary understanding.134 It appears, though in itself [sva-gata] not subject to any predication [avikalparūpa], as soiled by the other mental states,135 when it is examined at the moment in which its permanent characteristics136 (have been recognized).137

Or, let it appear so in the world.138 Nevertheless, there is no counting of stable (emotions) simply because they are possible, because such would not be among entities they inform; they are indeed not separable from (= not opposable to) the other rāsas, being presumed by them. Whether this makes them into Aristotelian genera is an open question. Note also that 'bovinity' [gotvā] here is intended as the abstract universal [sāmānaya], which on the usual Indian view, does not comprehend the individuals—and is more akin to a property [dharma] than what we would call a genus. Putting it on the same "counting" level as the viśeṣa is clearly improper.

We have established that there is no need to mention tattvajñāna. Now we advance a positive reason for not mentioning it.132 Abhinava means that the "blisses" associated with sex, heroism, etc., appear to be different; when one occurs, the other does not, etc. The "bliss" of the Self of course is not "separable" in this sense—but ubiquitous. The reading āsvādayogat which Masson and Patwardhan prefer (contra Raghavan) is clearly a lectio facilior, and I see no reason to adopt it. If adopted, nevertheless, the line would refer to the 49 bhāvas, not to tattvajñāna: "why have they been separately mentioned? Because their respective blisses are discriminable. . . ."

. . . answering the question: why, if it is ubiquitous, are we not constantly aware of it?

. . . because these states appear to be predicated of it: "the Self experiences (sexual) joy, etc."

A vyutthānasāinskāra is one that is not suppressed, when those that are suppressible are: see Y.S. 3.9. Normally, such sāinskāras are cognized only during meditation, etc.

This accounts for the "appearance" of the Self, seemingly as transitory, and as associated with the other states of consciousness. But it is not for these reasons to be "counted separately."

This is not really a "concession" on Abhinava's part. It is simply a restatement of the implication of the preceding conclusion. The atman does appear so in the world—whatever it may be really. Thus there is no reason to attribute that conclusion to a "pūrvapaksī" (ŚAPA, 131, note).
useful given the rasas that have been declared.\(^{139}\) But rather they would have been defined (simply) as transitory (emotions)—and not otherwise.\(^{140}\) Thus (again) the version is sound (which accepts) forty-nine emotional states.

Now, further, the nature of the Self does not admit of transitoriness—because this is impossible,\(^{141}\) and because (the Self) does not convey diversity [vaicitra],\(^{142}\) and because (even if such a Self were possible, it would) not be suitable (to dramatic representation).\(^{143}\) The “nature of the Self” is (indeed) “peace”—and the sage (Bharata) has indicated this (nature) by using the term “peace.”\(^{144}\) Whether he indicates this by using the term “peace,” or the term “indifference,” does not compromise (our position).\(^{145}\) Only (it appears) that “peace” is one mental state, “indifference” another; (the latter) is akin to the (mundane) “indifference” that arises from other conditional factors, such as poverty, etc. Being kin (to that other state) it may be designated by the term for it, even though there is a difference of cause—as are sexual passion, fear, etc.\(^{146}\) And so, “peace” (mutatis mutandis) is nothing but this “nature of the Self”—viz., knowledge of the truth.\(^{147}\) Moreover [tattva ca], sexual passion and the rest are specific (forms) of affection which stain the Self; even though it is accompanied by them, (he who), by dint of uninterrupted meditation, understands its pure form, (achieves their) pacification as soon as its permanent characteristics (have been recognized).\(^{148}\) It is said: “(Its) pacification is conveyed by (suppression of the antagonistic) affections.”\(^{149}\) Before the stable (affective state), knowledge of the truth, the entire group of mental states, both mundane and transcendental, becomes “transitory.” (They become) its consequential factors [tadanubhāvā eva], together with the consequential factors that are aided by abstinence and suppression,\(^{150}\) and those natural gestures that will be explained in the three chapters beginning with “glances...”\(^{151}\) Thus

\(^{139}\) On the level of appearance, the appearance of the ātman (in meditation, etc.) would otherwise justify the separate counting of sthāyibhāva, etc. But as explained above, this sthāyin is a sthāyin of a different sort—not “apparent” (as are the eight bhāvas).

\(^{140}\) And even the bhāva underlying sānta would have been “transitory”—that is, apparent.

\(^{141}\) I.e., self-contradictory. We now address the question: is this rasa capable of dramatic representation? It is interesting that this section has presented more problems to Masson and Patwardhan than any other—probably because they were determined to understand it as “philosophic” (ŚAPA, 130, note). The problems for the most part disappear when Abhinava’s reference is seen as the play.

\(^{142}\) Perhaps in the sense that “variety is the spice of life”—and certainly of the other transitories—which are ever arising and disappearing.

\(^{143}\) The view that “the Self is subject to diversity” is on its face inadmissible. I follow here Visuvalingam’s understanding of the series of hetus enchainés as referring to stages of aesthetic experience.

\(^{144}\) As the sthāyibhāva of sānta, in the section of the text we are now commenting on, What Bharata intends by sāma will help answer the question of the rasa’s playability.

\(^{145}\) Referring doubtless to the dispute among the pūrva-pakṣins with which the commentary began: “some say... ‘peace,’ others... ‘indifference.’” Supra, n. 67.

\(^{146}\) Masson’s and Patwardhan’s puzzlement at this line stems perhaps from not having appreciated the implications of the term tadvypadēṣya—Patañjali the grammarian’s term for metonymy. The issue is how two different things can have the same name. Now neither rati nor bhaya (which stand here for the sthāyibhāvas of the eight rasas), when considered from the point of view of their various causes (or, in the drama, their vibhāvas), appears to be a single phenomenon—and yet, because of other similarities, a single term is used. Abhinava’s point here is not only that the laukika and alakukika nirveda are called by the same term; he thereby implies (this is the main point) that any difference between the alakukika nirveda and śama may be discounted.

\(^{147}\) The terms of the predication are reversed.

\(^{148}\) See above, n. 137. Or: “remains in a state of utter tranquillity even after the meditative recognition (i.e., the return to normal consciousness: vyuṭṭhāna) is accomplished” (so Visuvalingam).

\(^{149}\) Y.S. 3.10. Masson and Patwardhan do not translate this sūtra, and profess to see no relation between it and the preceding remark of Abhinava’s. I do not see their problem: prastātā expresses exactly Abhinava’s view that the “colorations” are essential to the experience of “tranquillity”—for it is the recognition of them as transient that leads the aspirant to a cognition of the permanent self. Throughout this section, Bharata’s śama is shown to imply various views consistent with Abhinava’s view that the purification of the Self is an apt theme of poetic (as well as metaphysical) discourse.

\(^{150}\) yamaniyama: the first two stages of Yogic discipline; see n. 21, above.

\(^{151}\) upāṅgābhinaya: the reference is to chs. 8–10 of the N.Ś. Masson and Patwardhan (ŚAPA, 132, note) take this sentence as a truism: “its anubhāvas are anubhāvas...” But, surely, Abhinava is here asserting the three kinds of anubhāva suitable to sānta: tadanubhāvā eva presumes its logical subject from the immediately preceding kalāpaḥ svabhāva I understand as a reference to the sātvikabhāva (supra, n. 89: cittaja).
these (consequential factors) properly belong to it [etadviṣayā eva]. For this is (its) nature.

Similarly, (its) conditional factors are such things as the supreme Lord's grace. And (thanks to this), the depiction of sexual passion, etc., may be enjoyed as about to be extinguished. Just as (are enjoyed) longing, in (the rasa of) erotic separation; or the “complete festival of the beloved,” in (the rasa of) erotic union. And as (are enjoyed) fierceness, in the violent rasa, or disinterest, steadfastness, fright or joy, in the pitiful, heroic, fearsome, or marvellous (rasas). Even though these (states) are transitory, they appear as primary; similarly, in (the rasa) tranquillity, (states like) disgust (may appear to be primary), because they are utterly antagonistic to passion. And similarly, the “main point” (SAPA, 133, note) of his argument is that snta may be enjoyed—precisely because, in presentation, it employs (a fortiori!) the same technical means provided by the other rasas!—though one must be careful to observe that when they appear to be primary, it is just an appearance.

155 The remark seems to me to follow appropriately (SAPA, 132, note). The play is playable if it has suitable anubhdvas.

156 A vyabhicdrin associated with raudra (G.O.S., vol. 1, p. 321). These are variously vibhdvas, anubhdvas or vyabhicdrbhhdvas of the rasas in question. The same remark applies.

157 I think Abhinava is not using these terms here in their narrow technical sense: as objects of enjoyment, these impermanent states and conditions occupy the center of our attention.

158 In this passage, Abhinava stresses the similarities of snta’s anubhdvas has now been solved: they are not the “absence” of certain states (supra, n. 67), but may be found among these three positive categories: laukika mental states understood as transient; alaukika (yogic) mental states; and among certain gestures natural to snta. Again, the dramatic force of snta is the issue. The question of anubhdva—to which the entrée was provided by the discussion of sama, above—is after all the key issue where the play’s playability is met. The questions of anubhdva and abhinaya are inseparable; Bharata constantly links them.

159 In the first case, a vyabhicdrabhiva, in the second, an alambhanavibhava. I think Abhinava means that, as subsidiary elements, they are, though adventitious and impermanent, enjoyable—and indeed, because they are impermanent, they are enjoyed.

160 Abhinava's point is probably that such practices are also “antagonistic to passion.” The remainder of this line is “very corrupt” and difficult to emend (Raghavan, Number, 100). It may refer to other tantric or yogic practices apparently “disgusting.”

161 As in the preceding cases, “disgust” is a necessary ancillary to achieving equanimity. As Masson and Patwardhan point out (SAPA, 133, note), the begetting of children by levirate should not involve any intentional delight, but proceed from duty alone.

162 usāha: the sthāyibhava of vira rasa. Even this, in the sample, is subordinated to a transcendent, and apparently emotion-free, condition. Masson and Patwardhan appear to take this statement as a general observation, not as further comment on the levirate. But I think Abhinava’s point is that even such matters are within the scope of drama.

163 I.e., who has realized in himself the Self.

164 etat: referring, I think, to the usāha of the preceding line.

165 I see no evidence that it is snta rasa that is being called dayavira, etc. (SAPA, 133)—although it is clear that such scenes will be the staple of those works emphasizing snta rasa. In all these examples, the antimony “energy/peace” is orchestrated in such a way as to (1) make clear that peace is the primary term; and (2) that the “attractiveness” of the scene (which none would deny) is a function of the secondary term.

166 abhimkara: lit., the ‘I-term’. The principle of the narrow, individual “self” or Ego.
erence in (scenes of) sexual passion.\textsuperscript{167} In verses such as: 
"My bed is the grassy lawn ...\textsuperscript{168} The preeminence of striving in order to accomplish the welfare of others, is noticed. No (human) condition is ever devoid of striving—apart from the effort (to fulfill one's) desires, one would be a stone! Since then they who have apprehended the lower and the higher (selves) have nothing left to accomplish in reference to their own Self—their minds now being tranquil—the sacrifice of their own body, or wealth, for the welfare of others, is not incompatible with (their) tranquillity.\textsuperscript{169} The preservation of one's body, etc., is enjoined for those who have not accomplished what is to be accomplished—in accordance with the maxim: "he should protect himself ...\textsuperscript{170} Ascetic renouncers, however, lack any intention to preserve such (things). For example:

The life-breath is the established condition
Of religious duty, profit, desire, and liberation. 
When it is gone, what is left to destroy? 
When it is safe, what is not saved?\textsuperscript{171}

The motivation \textit{nīdāṇa} for preserving the body is thus shown to be its instrumentality in achieving the four well-known aims of life. One hears, in the case of ascetic renunciation, that "he who has accomplished all should fall\textsuperscript{172} into water, into fire, into a chasm." So, in one way or another, (the renouncer) must abandon his body. If it be abandoned for another's sake, is there something that is not realized thereby? If it be objected that such as Jimūtavāhana\textsuperscript{173} were not renouncers, what difference does that make to us? Certainly he (is understood to have) possessed knowledge of the truth. Otherwise, it is inconceivable that one who equated body with self, and made (his) body into the be-all and end-all (of existence), should abandon (it) for another's sake, without reference to religious duty, and the like. Even in battle, the hero does not strive (directly) to abandon his body; rather he acts in the interest of conquering the enemy.\textsuperscript{174} So too, by throwing (one's body) off a cliff, one hopes\textsuperscript{175} rather to acquire a more resplendent body (in the next life). Whatever is done—teaching, giving of gifts, and finally the abandoning of the body—without reference to one's own interest and for the sake of another, is wholly inconceivable on the part of those who have not acquired a knowledge of the truth of the self.\textsuperscript{176} Those (who have) do know the truth. Both revealed texts and recollected authority (support the view that) in all stages of life, liberation belongs to those who are wise. As has been said:

Even the householder is liberated  
Who is devoted to the service of the god,  
Bases (his deeds) on knowledge of the truth,  
Is kind to guests, performs the funeral rites,  
And gives liberally of his substance.\textsuperscript{177}

It is only from (performing) religious duties that are done with the intention of helping another, and conceived in connection with the essential result of another's welfare,\textsuperscript{178} that there arises (in the next life) another body suitable to that (duty, and this is the body) of Buddhas-to-be, and as well, of those who know the truth.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item Does Abhinava have the \textit{Śākuntala} (act 5) in mind?\textsuperscript{167}  

\item \textit{Nāgānanda} 4.2. The discussion of this play—as a possible locus of \textit{sānta} rasa, will now be taken up. Note that Abhinava introduces the subject with a quotation, focussing our attention on the dramatic manifestation—a quotation which incidentally marks the major transition in the play, from lovers' intrigue (acts 1–3) to scenes of compassion and self-sacrifice (acts 4 and 5).\textsuperscript{168}  

\item Masson and Patwardhan (\textit{ŚAPA}, 133) take this as a direct reference to \textit{sānta} rasa. That is possible, but given the earlier reference to "tranquil" minds, not entirely clear.\textsuperscript{169}  

\item \textit{Gautamadharmasūtra} 1.9.34 (Ānandāśrama ed., p. 63). The commentator, perhaps a New Yorker, adds: eko na gac-ched adhvānām ...\textsuperscript{170}  

\item Source unknown.\textsuperscript{171}  

\item \textit{patet}: viz., throw himself into ... The root \textit{sru} 'hear' and derivatives, generally indicate that the source is a revealed text. If so, this one is unidentified. Masson and Patwardhan (\textit{ŚAPA}, 134, note) call attention to the legend of Abhinava's entering the Bhairava cave, never to be seen again.\textsuperscript{172}  

\item Source unknown.\textsuperscript{173}  

\item \textit{abhisamādhi} and result \textit{phala} are both important.\textsuperscript{174}  

\item Lit., ... the hope gapes [\textit{vijṛmbhate}]. The language is also resplendent. Is Abhinava being ironic?\textsuperscript{175}  

\item Ergo, heroism of this sort is not really compatible with \textit{sānta}: the hero of this sort is not so much abandoning his body (which could be taken as a form of asceticism), but seeking conquest: Arjuna's very problem!\textsuperscript{176}  

\item The ascetic hero of the \textit{Nāgānanda}. The play provides the sub-text for this entire discussion. Jimūtavāhana was a king and \textit{vidyādāra}, not a yati. The objection is literal.\textsuperscript{177}  

\item A very active ethic is superimposed here by Abhinava on the Indian ideal of ascetic withdrawal. All meritorious activity is derived from \textit{tatravāñhāna!} And if this be the case, the utility of witnessing dramas and the like will not be compromised!\textsuperscript{178}  

\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
And even when (it figures properly among the) subsidiaries, we observe that a calm [viśrāntī] is reached, because this is also appropriate to (its own) nature. For example—Rāma acceding to the command of his father, where (it is) subsidiary to the heroic. The same (relationship) is to be supposed in the case of the subsidiaries to the erotic and other rasas. Thus, even though tranquillity is stable (by the preceding argument), it may figure as secondary (in a work). In the case of Jīmūtavāhana, (it is so) because what is viśrāntī is necessarily observed among the rasas. The use of sthāyiśiva in reference to a rasa is a bit puzzling, but I take it as a kind of haphazard: "even though its bhāva is by nature stable, tranquillity . . ."

179 The prior discussion has dealt with the question of sānta as a pradhāna rasa. This is what is implied in the search for its sthāyiśibhāva: if such a sthāyin can be found, ipso facto, sānta is a possible "major" rasa in a work of art. But the rasas also frequently figure as subsidiary to another (as pradhāna). Anandavardhana, in book 3 (vs. 18ff.) of the Dvānyāloka, discusses the "blending" of rasas, emphasizing that the quality of the work is often a function of maintaining the primary rasa in and through its dynamic contrasts [aucitya]. In this section of the commentary, we take up the ever thornier question of sānta as a possible "subordinate" to other rasas. This of course is the usual mode of its appearance in drama—but Abhinava's theoretical defence of sānta makes it very difficult to see how it could possibly be subordinate to anything—its sthāyiśibhāva being, by nature, sthāyin, etc.

180 viśrāntī seems intended here as a synonym of śama, above. But since "peace" (qua "knowledge of the truth") is the stable basis of sānta, a different term is needed to designate the "cessation" of a subsidiary rasa. The subsidiary will by its nature be appearing and disappearing—this applies to all rasas (cf. the discussion of bhāvaśānti, bhāvodaya, etc., in Kavyaprakāśa 4.36 [Andandārama ed., pp. 130ff.]). Abhinava's point is that just as śama may be found at the center of the energy of the primary rasas, so does a "coming to rest" [viśrāntī] figure in the nature of the secondary. viśrāntilābha, according to Masson and Patwardhan, means rasapratiti (ŚAPA, 135, note), and text: "the attainment of 'repose' [i.e., aesthetic enjoyment]"). This, though not incorrect, is too general for the context: see my note 6, Gerow and Akłąjkar, "On Śanta Rasa," 81.

181 viṛāṅge is a tapāruṣa, not a karmaḥdhāraya (ŚAPA, 135: "... though this aesthetic repose is only secondary!")! The idea that viśrānti and rasa are synonymous has misled Masson and Patwardhan throughout this passage. Abhinava means that the act of self-abnegation here is secondary to the main rasa of Rāma's character: the royal "heroic." (But is this the main rasa, if the Utrarakānda be considered?)

182 Again, it is not śṛṅgāra that is subsidiary here, but sānta in relation to śṛṅgāra!

183 The query of Masson and Patwardhan on this line is unjustified. Abhinava is simply repeating for emphasis the implication of the preceding illustration, etc. Even as secondaries, a

184 I take this as one possible view, not necessarily the sidhānta. Another—closer to Abhinava's—is introduced below: anye tu Jīmūtavānapaḥ . . . The person maintaining this point of view asserts that in the Nāgānanda sānta is a subsidiary, because the main theme is still "conquest"—acquisition of the three aims of man (dharma, artha, kāma). The hero employs paropakṛti to that end. The incompleteness of this sentence suggests that it is an aside. The problem raised by Masson and Patwardhan is thus avoided (ŚAPA, 136, note). Abhinava is not implying that sānta can "never be pradhāna . . ." but that, in this case, it may effectively be enjoyed, even though not.

185 N.S. 18.11 (G.O.S., vol. 2, p. 412). The nātaka is the main among the 10 types of drama—and the theoretical model for the others. Abhijñānaśākuntala is an example.

186 Jātayūna: Bharata enjoins various kinds of singing as accompaniments to the several rasas (N.S. 29.1–13) but does not mention sānta rasa.

187 I.e., the failure to mention sānta means only that these kinds of chanting are inappropriate to it. The sequence of thought here is not easy to grasp. I think Abhinava is suggesting that the presence of worldly display in a drama is not in itself proof that sānta is absent—this would tend also to dispute the view adduced above that the Nāgānanda, because it involves such a display, is not sāntapradhāna. But of course the question can be raised: which sorts of display are appropriate? The remark re chanting means that some are not appropriate. If I am correct, Abhinava, as he often does, is here laying the groundwork, by reviewing the views of others, for his own view—which is that sānta not only can be, but is, predominant—in the Nāgānanda, especially.
come to him for help. He has no power at all. Nor did he injure anyone else. 188

This we agree with. 189 It is after all not the province of Buddhas-to-be to live lives of high position, and full of motivation—even if they have the power (to do so). Injunctions do not instruct according to the rule of “the crow and the palm tree.” 190 It is thus established that the primary (rasa) in this (drama) is “striving” as characterized by compassion. 191

The other transitory (emotional states) may be (employed) according to circumstances. As has been said: “in the interstices (of a pacified mind) appear other cognitions, owing to the traces (of previous lives).” 192 For this reason, the view which holds that because of inactivity no consequential factors (are present), stands refuted. However, when one has reached the final stage (of meditation), there is an absence of consequential factors; this cannot be represented (in the theatre). Even in the case of sexual passion, grief, etc., it is proper not to represent their final stages. 193

The hearts of men concord (in finding delight) in (such scenes) as are made manifest through the traces (of former lives) that have their source in a knowledge of the truth of the sort (we have described)—as (Bharata) will say: “the dispassionate (rejoice) in liberation.” 194 This concord is not universal nor for all (men): in the fearsome (rasa), there is no heroic character. 195 It might be asked: in such a presentation, what delight is there for the hero(ic type)? We answer: where this 196 is represented [nibadhyate], there will necessarily also be (a representation of) erotic passion, heroism, and the like—as helpful to (achieving one or another of) the ends of life. 197 Delight for these (men) will be based on those (rasas employed as adjuncts). 198 Where, as in the case of comedy, a rasa such as the comic is primary, there, too, delight may be based on

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188 This view of Jimūtvahana contrasts with that mentioned earlier: “saving the old woman” was his accomplishment, rather than achieving the “three worlds.” He did as little as possible, being powerless to do either great good or evil. The reference is to Nāgānanda 4.9 (Chowkhamba ed.). The quoted words are Jimūtvahana’s, but he is paraphrasing the old woman, the mother of Śāṅkhacūḍa.

189 Doubtless, because it makes it more difficult to argue that rājavīrya—energetic heroism—is the principal rasa of the play.

190 I think this enigmatic reference is intended to explain the saktis cet of the preceding line: a bodhisattva will not expend his energy fortuitously (even if he has it); his principles (here: samnyāsa) must apply uniformly, not randomly—as crows appear, or (cocoa-)nuts drop. Thus is justified Jimūtvahana’s lack of activity. On the nyāya, see Mīmāṃsākūśa, 1433.

191 This we take to be Abhinava’s siddhānta—not exactly just that Jimūtvahana did nothing, but that his action was restraint of action: the dayāvīrya which Abhinava considers a synonym of sāntarasa (Locana ad 3.26, N.S.P. ed., p. 178)—and not a fourth kind of virarasa. Masson and Patwardhan have thrown up their hands at this passage (ŚAPA, 137, note); but the sense conveyed above is I think free of contradiction, and supports the view of the relation between sānta rasa and tatvarajñāna I have elsewhere defended. It is significant that the passages with which they have had the most trouble (acknowledged with a laudable frankness!) are precisely those that do not fit their thesis. Sānta, after all, is a rasa, and must be made to accord with its aesthetic kind.

192 Y.S. 4.27. The commentator explains that such cognitions as asmi, jāndmi, etc., are intended. Abhinava’s point is perhaps that even the yogin experiences bhāvās—and so in sānta also they may be suitably introduced. The play will thus have the surface texture of any ordinary play. As usual, Masson and Patwardhan see in this remark an effort to distinguish sānta from the other rasas. I see it asserting a generality.

193 Not “... it is correct that there is no possibility of representing ...” (ŚAPA, 137). Abhinava is again at pains to draw the parallel between sānta and the other rasas, as far as staging is concerned. The issue in the case of śṛṅgāra is doubtless propriety; of karuna, perhaps impossibility—but more likely propriety also—for one should not represent death on the stage. In other words, the lack of final representation is not an argument against accepting sānta rasa.

194 N.S. 28.58. See the note, ŚAPA, 137. Masson and Patwardhan take this as a remark tending to the implication that “concordance of the heart” is possible only for those who are adepts in sānta. Abhinava’s meaning is that just as the other rasas succeed in tapping the otherwise implicit or latent states [vāsanā] that constitute our common mental and emotional life (inherited, of course, from former lives), so does sānta—the vāsanās here being those which focus on our striving for liberation. The point (again) is rather that sānta taps into the same deep strata of our being as do the other rasas.

195 Presumably meaning that a “heroic” spectator will find little of interest here—and also, if he is heroic, he will not be easily frightened!

196 ayam may refer to the preceding bhayānaka, or generally, to any hostile rasa, such as (in this context) sānta. It should be borne in mind that the protagonist of sānta rasa is not a vīra ‘hero’ in the technical sense: see n. 191, above.

197 purusārthopayoṣīni. The locative (if correct) probably “agrees” with tatra: ‘there—in that work, which is helpful ...’

198 How are Masson and Patwardhan able to take the tat of tannisthas as referring to sānta? Both grammar and sense require that it refer to the immediately preceding “erotic passion ...” The question is still: what does the vīra enjoy? I.e., (by extension) what would men of ordinary temperament find enjoyable in a sāntapradhāna drama?
the other rasas which come into being along with the
( primary). Some assert that the cause motivating the di-
vision of drama [ṛūpaka] (into ten types) is predicated
on the (different) delights which properly belong to the
various tenants [adhikārin] (of those delights).199

Therefore, the rasa “tranquillity” exists.200 And so,
following (the phrase): “we will lead the stable emo-
tions to the condition of rasa . . .”,201 there is read in
certain old texts this definition of (the rasa) “tranquil-
li ty”: “tranquillity is (the rasa) having as its proper sta-
ble emotional basis ‘peace’ . . .”202 In (the view of)
these (texts), the delight of all the rasas is tantamount
to “tranquillity,”203 inasmuch as (all the rasas involve
a) turning away from (the gross) objects of sense.
(Their/its) being grasped as the main thing is “based
uniquely on other latent mental impressions [vāsanā-
tara] (deriving from earlier existences).”204 Here, to in-
dicate that it was the stuff [prakrti] out of which all
(the rest are made), it is indicated first.205 And in accor-
dance with the maxim that, in the world, one does not
count over and over again that which is common, its
stable (emotional basis) is not separately mentioned.206
But it has become separate, as the object of that un-
derstanding whose mark is the delight ( felt by) connois-
seurs who have discriminated ( it): even what is
common will be counted separately by one who dis-
criminates. And also, nine rasas are mentioned in the
epics [itiḥāsa] and purāṇas, and in the lexica—and
(most important of all) in the auspicious “conclusory
doctrines” (of our tradition).207 For example:

He should here visualize the “erotic,” etc.,
As belonging to the eight gods;
In the middle (of them), he should visualize
The “tranquil” form of the god of gods,208

Its conditional factors are ascetic detachment, terror
in the face of transmigratory existence [samsāraḥbhūtuḥ],
and the like. For it is cognized through these, when they
are fit together (in a composition). Its consequential fac-
tors are concern for teachings about liberation, etc. Its
transitory (emotional states) are indifference, reflection,
recollection, and steadfastness. Because “devotion” [bhakti]
and “faith” [śraddhā]—infused with recollection,
reflection, steadfastness and striving, and focussing
on contemplation of the Lord—are both in other ways
[anyathaiva] supportive [aṅga] (of it), these two are not
counted separately as rasas.209 Here we find the sum-
mary verse:

The rasa “tranquillity” is to be known
As (that) occasioned by the Supreme Self and liberation;

This perhaps refers ( obliquely?) to the other candidate for
śhāyin: the ātman as taitvajñāna. Or perhaps all it means is
that the śhāyin is not mentioned repeatedly [prihak prihak],
as being implied in all the other rasas. Visuvalingam adds:
“The apparent inconsistency is due only to Abhinava’s unwill-
ingness to express himself explicitly in favor of one or the
other tradition.”

207 siddhāntasastresu: or is this other example of Abhina-
va’s use of the honorific plural?

208 Or, “ . . . As the form of the god of gods, ‘tranquillity.’”
See, on this verse, ṢAPA, 139, note.

209 Other traditions add these two to the list of rasas.
The Bengali Vaisnavas make bhakti the supreme rasa. See Ragh-
van, Number, ch. 6. By anyathaiva Abhinava probably intends
the difference in locus between these candidate rasas (the tem-
ple) and sānta per se (the theatre).

199 A view with which Abhinava does not necessarily dis-
agree. It is seen as a further implication of what he definitely
does accept, namely, that each rasa, and each primary charac-
ter thereby implied, has its proper delight. The hṛdayaṁva-
vāda of spectator and character is based on this propriety.

200 This carefully argued conclusion has followed from a
consideration of the rasa’s sthāyin, its vi-, anu-, and vyabhī-
cartibhāvas, and its audience—or “delight.” The argument
alone shows how important it is for Abhinava to establish
sānta as a rasa!

201 This line is found in the prose between N.S. 6.45/46—
just before śṛṅgāra is taken up. Abhinava there explains it as:
“ye śṛṅgāre bhāva ... tāpi anīma rasatvam viśranti kṣeṣyāya-
tanatvenopadeśādīsaḥ nēṣyāmāḥ” ... we will lead these stable
emotions to a condition of rasa by showing them as (built
upon a) single foundation, “calm.”’ (Here viśranti occurs in
the context of rasapratiti as such—though it is not a syn-
onym. See n. 180, above.)

202 I do not understand the query put by Masson and Pat-
wardhan to this line (ṢAPA, 138, note); Abhinava here
defends textually those manuscripts that do include the
sthayin: the atman as tattvajinna. Or perhaps all it means is
that the sthayin is not mentioned repeatedly [prthak prthak],
as being implied in all the other rasas. Visuvalingam adds:
“The apparent inconsistency is due only to Abhinava’s unwill-
ingness to express himself explicitly in favor of one or the
other tradition.”

203 See n. 201, supra.

204 The iti perhaps indicates that Abhinava’s source text is
again being quoted. Tanmukhyaśālābhāḥ seems to point back
to sarvarasāmām—but it could, as Masson and Patwardhan
take it, point to sānta (prāyāh). In the former case, the view
here presented does not differ materially from Abhinava’s
usual view on the role of the vāsaṇā.

205 Again, Abhinava is probably referring to the text above
cited—which appears to have placed sānta just after the line
“we will lead . . .” (instead, as in our texts, śṛṅgāra).
Having among its causes the aim of knowing the truth;
And is associated with property of supreme felicity.\footnote{210}

Here, ("tranquillity") is shown through the three qualifications of conditional factor, stable basis, and consequential factor, in that order.

Taking up its several occasions
The rasa arises from tranquillity.
Its occasions then vanishing,
It is absorbed in tranquillity.\footnote{211}

By these and other verses, (this rasa's) being the stuff of the other rasas is summarized.\footnote{212}

Now, as to what (the sage) will say regarding the dima, namely, that it "employs six rasas, excluding the erotic and the comic,"\footnote{213} here (Bharata's) meaning: since the dima has as its primary (asa) the "violent" [raudra], in accordance with the definition immediately following, "... which originates in poetry of inflamed [dipha] rasa,"\footnote{214} there is not even the possibility (in it) of "tranquillity"—as incompatible with that (asa); so why bother to negate it?

But in that case, if tranquillity is impossible, why bother to qualify (the dima) as "originating in poetry of inflamed rasa"?\footnote{215} The occasion (for the qualification) is his having said that six (rasas) are to be employed, apart from the erotic and the comic.\footnote{216}

\footnote{210} A nearly identical verse occurs in the published text of the sāntarasaprakarana (G.O.S. ed., p. 333). I take mokṣādhyādima as a dvandva; Masson and Patwardhan (SAPA, 139) translate as if reading adhyātmamokṣa.

\footnote{211} N.S. (G.O.S. ed.), p. 335 (with important variations; the vrttis are materially relevant [praptatvata].

\footnote{212} Abhinava's comment implies that he sees the verse as making a statement about rasa, not about the emotional basis of rasa (see preceding note). The use of the term prakṛti here (as above) does suggest that Abhinava sees sānta on an evolutionary level prior to the other rasas. Of course, as he has explained above, the other rasas can also be seen as the prakṛti 'matter' of sānta! Perhaps then we should take the compound rasāntarasaprakṛti as a bhuvrihi: "having as its matter the other rasas."

\footnote{213} N.S. 18.84d–85b (G.O.S. ed., vol. 2, p. 443). The dima is one of the minor "ten genres" of drama. If Bharata's statement is taken literally, it would appear to exclude even the possibility of sānta rasa.

\footnote{214} Mutatis mutandis: or, the biter bit!

\footnote{215} The point is either (as Masson and Patwardhan have it [SAPA, 141]) that, without the qualification dipha, 'inflamed ...';

But this qualification also excludes (poetry) whose predominant (asa) is the pitiable, the disgusting, and the fearsome! (We reply:) no! for (that possibility) has been set aside by (the further qualification:) "... (the dima) is associated with the grandiose and violent manners,"\footnote{217} Since, however, the grandiose manner only is appropriate in (the rasa) tranquillity, (saying only that much) would not have excluded it. Therefore, far from (being an argument against tranquillity), the definition of the dima is an indication of its existence! The case of the erotic (asa) however (is different), for (it is consistent) with quite violent pursuits (and is thus) brought to mind (by the qualification "... inflamed ... "); and the comic, being supportive of the erotic,\footnote{218} also has to be negated, because (both of them) are materially relevant [prāptatvā].

Because (this rasa) is identical in all the others [sarvaśāyā], the attribution to it of particular deities, colors, etc., is inappropriate;\footnote{219} nevertheless, it should be noted that they have been postulated.\footnote{220} Now, the origin of (the rasa) tranquillity has already been demonstrated. Its involuntary consequential factor is the "comic" (asa).\footnote{221} The "heroic" and the "disgusting" any six of the seven remaining rasas could be used; or that, among the six remaining rasas, those forms have to be excluded that are not dipha. I prefer the latter, because the former appears to repeat the terms of the first question.

\footnote{217} sāttvayārhativṛttyisasampannah: N.S. 18.88b. The vṛttis are styles of speech and gesture associated with different types of protagonist. Cf. Lévi, Le Théâtre Indien, 88.

\footnote{218} Bharata derives four "subsidiary" rasas [hāsya, karuna, adhītha and bhayānaka] from four "primary" [ṅīgāra, raudra, vīra and bhībhaṣṭa]: N.S. 6.39. His meaning is not entirely clear. S. Visuvalingam's doctoral dissertation [unpubl.] treats extensively of these four interrelations.

\footnote{219} Abhinava means that, since the other rasas figure as its vyabhicāribhāvas, all their deities may by extension be attributed to it.

E.g., the color, svaccha 'clarity'; the deity, Buddha, or the Jina (Bhārati ad N.S. 6.42–46 [G.O.S. ed., pp. 298–99]).

\footnote{221} I agree with the guess of Masson and Patwardhan (SAPA, 142, note) that sattvabhāva means sāttvikabhāva. See n. 89, above. The "origin" of the rasa (preceding line), then, would refer not only to the origin (vibhāva, sādhayin) but also to the various manifestants (anuvṛttva) and associated states (vyabhicāribhāva). Indeed, sāttvika is the only factor that has not heretofore been specified for sānta. It is quite elegant (note, ibid.) to presume "laughter" as the involuntary manifestant of sānta: Śiva laughs! The text, of course, may be corrupt; several emendations have been suggested (e.g., Visuvalingam's tasyābhāsa for saivabhāva)—but I have here, as elsewhere, followed Raghavan's edition, despite its faults.
(rasas) are also among its conditional factors. It follows then, that this rasa (should) teach such things as abstinence, suppression, and contemplating the Lord; that its final benefit [mahāphala] is that it confers (skill in) acting; that it is the most important matter (in aesthetics); and that it suffuses (the elements of) the plot [itivṛtta], etc. Enough of proximity!

(If it be asked:) what sort of delight (is this)—this delight in the “truth” (that we say) (is appropriate) to it (viz., to sāntarasā)? (We) reply: the nature of the Self is such as to be affected by striving, sexual passion, etc., which themselves exude (their particular) affections—like a pure white string that shines in the intervals between rare and sumptuous [umbhita] jewels; once it has assumed this form, does the nature (of that Self) shine forth among the passions, all of them—such being the case [tathābhāvenāpā]—(attractively) affective, according to the maxim: “this Self appears once.” Devoid of all the complex of sufferings that derive from looking away (from it), it shines out from both poetic and practical works generally as that single consciousness through which is attained supreme delight—and, by distinguishing (itself) in the interior condition (of the spectator), effects a sensibility of the same sort, which leads to (the experience of) a transcendental joy.

Thus, there are but nine rasas. These many only have been taught, either as being useful in (attaining the) aims of man, or as (involving) a surfeit of delight. Thus the view has been refuted which asserts that this number has been fixed upon, even though others are possible, because (only so many) are familiar to the audience. This will be explained (further) in the chapter on the emotions. False (the notion) that there is a rasa “fondness” [sneha], whose stable basis is “unguency” [ārdratā]. Fondness is nothing but an “inclination” [abhīsaṅga], and it is completely subsumed in sexual passion, striving, etc. Thus the fondness of the child for its parents comes to rest in fear (that they depart); that of a youth for his friends, in (sexual) passion; that of Lākṣmaṇa for his brother (Rāma) in the heroism of duty, etc. Similarly considered is that of an elder for the son, etc. The same path may be taken, when refuting (the notion that there is) a rasa “fickleness” [laulya] whose stable basis is “greed” [gardha]. It is subsumed either in the “comic” or the “erotic” or elsewhere. The same may be said of “devotion.”

222 Note the ca here. Other vibhāvas were specified previously. I agree with Masson and Patwardhan that the line should be understood in this way (SAPA, 142, note), but do not have their problem in accounting for the mention of vira—since vira is not (see above) the chief rasa of the Nāgānanda!

223 Three readings here have been defended; I follow Ragha-van’s most recent suggestion (Number [2nd ed.], 116): abhinayopayogitayā. In the first edition (p. 105), he prefers anupayogitayā (apparently misread as: anupabhogitaya, by Masson and Patwardhan [SAPA, 142, note—and so translated]). Finally, Kavi gives anupabhogitaya as his preferred emendation (G.O.S. ed., p. 340). I do not see the problem Masson and Patwardhan have with Ragha-van’s second guess: the text is after all a commentary on the Nāṭya Śāstra; and it is inconsequential (on the theological level) to propose that the ma-hāphala of this awesome discipline is “eschewing enjoyment.” Doubtless, Abhinava’s point is that—as far as worldly “fruits” go—a fine performance is a fine thing! Compare Abhinava’s use of the term ma-hāphala in commenting on the mahā-śvarasya dāsya of the first kārikā of the Īsvarapratyabhijñā (vol. 1, p. 29). The actor is also a “servant.” Cf. also Abhinava’s comment ad N.S. 6.33: “... ye tv atathābhūtās teṣām pratyāyocitatatāhāvidhacarvanālabhāya nātadipakriyāsvagatakrodhaśākāśākāśaḥdayagrathabhaṅjanāya gītadipakriyāca muninā viracita” (vol. 1, p. 291).


225 I think this question concerns āsvāda only: “even if all you (Abhinava) have said is the case, what sense does it make to claim to ‘enjoy’ the truth?” Knowing it is enough. I take tattvāsvāda as a tatpurusa, parallel to tattvajñāna. We might also read tat tv āsvādah—the force of the question would be even clearer.

226 uparaka, uparāga: “affection” comes close to capturing the double entendre of a “color” that is also “attractive.”

227 Once recognized, it cannot be forgotten. The figure (itself beautiful) of the passions enhancing the beauty of the soul by “modulating” it—as the necklace gains in beauty by the multiplicity of its jewels—sums up Abhinava’s view of the role of art in the cosmos—a very ambiguous figure that seems to attribute to art a cosmic function!

228 Perhaps, “poetry” and “drama” (so Masson and Patwardhan, SAPA, 142). But prayoga is also used of “practical” worship, etc.

229 Appropriately, the sāntaprakarāṇa closes by reminding us of the major cosmic thesis of the Pratyabhijñā: the self-division of consciousness into outer and inner worlds, ever corresponding and ever finding delight in the correspondence. It is, it seems, in ānta that this delight is (from the inner side) met and recognized, but as the solemn phrases intimate, this inner delight is but a reflection of a cosmic delight informing all being. I do not think Masson and Patwardhan have grasped the full flavor of this passage.

230 The seventh chapter; the commentary is in large part lost.

231 Either rati is bi-sexual (?) or the “passion” it implies may be asexual! Normally, rati does not include “friendship.” Visuvalingam adds: “This remark is not so surprising—Sakti (incarnated in the sexed couple).”