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This talk originally presented to the Indic Colloquium (July 2002) has since been published in Spanish in Sarasvat�, issue #7 (May 2004)
[An expanded version with footnotes has been published in 2005]
Sunthar Visuvalingam
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Abhinavagupta's aesthetics is the culmination, in
Emotions in real life are largely within the sway of the
laws of psychological causation: certain events or actions by others provoke a
specific emotional response that I express through characteristic, often
visibly recognizable, physiological reactions, effects that can in no way be
construed as the 'meaning' of the original actions. Moreover, my emotional
state, if sustained, would also be modulated by a succession of concomitant
transitory states of mind; for example, sexual attraction might express itself
as kaleidoscopic pattern of longing, trepidation, joy, jealousy, and so on.
What's represented on the stage are not just the 'causes' (vibh�va = determinants) of the
intended emotion but also the 'effects' (anubh�va
= consequents) that they evoke in another responsive dramatic personage (�zraya), who displays the
appropriate 'transitory states of mind' (vyabhic�rin
= concomitant). And what evokes rasa is the (connoisseur's attempt to restore meaning to
this) configuration as a coherent whole as perceived by the mind's eye. As we
'infer' the emotion in the �zraya,
the accumulated traces (samsk�ra)
of the same predisposition are awakened from our own subconscious and our
hearts begin to resonate (hrdaya-samv�da)
with their fluctuations depicted by the dramatis
personae. Instead of 'responding' behaviorally to the transposed
psychological causes, the focus is instead on understanding the interactions on
stage by supplying the relevant emotional motivations from our own store of
latent memories. This 'identification' (tanmay�-bhavana)
is so complete that we seem to be experiencing the same emotion without any
distinction of self and other. This is precisely why our
whole-hearted enjoyment of S�t�'s beauty through the eyes of Lord R�ma is
no stigma to Indian aesthetics.
Through aesthetic identification, an emotional stimulus that was originally unique (as�dh�rana) to a particular �zraya becomes in this way 'generalized' (s�dh�ran�-karaNa) into an object of relish for the spectators at large, who experience the corresponding rasa (e.g., zrng�ra = love) in an 'impersonal' mode in the sense of its being not conditioned by an ascertainment of the form "I am in love" (which would result in a purposive attitude) or "he/she is in love" (which would leave one indifferent). Worldly (laukika) emotion immediately engenders a stream of cogitation, impelled by purposivity towards the external stimulus, which sustains the feeling of self as distinct from other. The choice is between a 'personal' interest and the withdrawal of attention due to indifference or other more insistent matters. In the aesthetic context, the emotion, even while being nourished and intensified by the evolution of the artistic configuration, is arrested at the initial (i.e., pre-discursive) stage of development because the sustenance (and not just the 'production') of rasa depends on focusing the attention (avadh�na) on restoring coherence to the 'conjunction of determinants, consequents and concomitants' (Bharata's famous axiom on rasa). Though Bharata states that the 'basic emotion' (sth�yi-bh�va) 'becomes' the rasa through the action of these three elements, Abhinava clarifies that what is really experienced is only the rasa, and it is only by analogy that it's appropriate to identify it with the corresponding worldly emotion. As darkness envelops the galleries of our mundane day-to-day consciousness, such rapt attention is rendered possible by our voluntary suspension of purposive attitudes (artha-kriy�-k�ritva) in favor of an intentness to enjoy whatever the spotlight of a receptive consciousness reveals before us. This 'catharsis' that' purifies the emotions from their biological inertia and self-centeredness is also, paradoxically, what renders the experience of rasa all the more intense and enjoyable. Whereas our mundane psychology is characterized by a flow of ideation driven and buffeted by instinctual needs that are often below the surface and corresponding efforts of reason to negotiate and escape their thralldom, rasa is willingly evoked and sustained by the combined faculties of the discriminating intellect, thereby achieving the reconciliation of thought and emotion that constitutes culture. The spectacle thus also creates and reinforces a psychic bond among the 'participating' community even as had Greek tragedy or the sacrificial ritual.
The 'theatricality' (n�tya-dharmi) of the performance, that depends on a wide variety of artifices that are absent in real-life interactions, is also conducive to 'universalization' (s�dh�ran�-karaNa) in an additional sense: the space-time coordinates of the spectator's here-and-now neutralize those of the action being represented (there-and-then) on stage, so much so that the aesthetic experience is intrinsically not conditioned by space-time.
Rasa is
hence not the psychological 'effect' that the artistry 'produces' in us but
rather the (source and) inner organizing principle of the aesthetic
creation, its very meaning. We do not particularly relish the emotions of
others inferred in real life, so the aesthetic emotion cannot
be reduced to the rasa
merely deduced in the �zraya
(it's irrelevant whether the actor is really feeling that or any emotion). The
dramatic spectacle does not simply 'intensify' our worldly emotions, for we
would otherwise never lose an opportunity to fall into a fit of psychopathic
anger or wallow in suicidal depression. Nor is theater an illusion for we do
not mistake the objective configuration for something else, but rather
reorganize the sensory data through an active apperception (anuvyavas�ya) focused on the
enjoyment of rasa. For the
same reason, it's not an imitation, as the simultaneous (bisociated) perception
of the imitated and the imitating element can only amount to caricature provoking
laughter. Rasa is ultimately not even an emotional object presented to
consciousness but rather a specific non-mundane (alaukika) mode of cognition (bodha, prat�ti)
that is indistinguishable from an active relishing (�sv�dana, rasan�). Since emotions--not even love, the basis for
that most delectable rasa, the
erotic sentiment (zrng�ra)--are
not relishable per se, what is really enjoyed is the reflexivity (vimarza) of consciousness as
mediated by a particular emotional state. This is why Abhinavagupta repeatedly
equates rasa with a more
fundamental and universal 'aesthetic rapture' (camatk�ra) that reveals itself in a variety of
circumstances that are not artistic in the conventional sense, particularly in
modes of 'spiritualizing' otherwise 'worldly' experience. Though evoked or,
rather, mirrored by the emotions in the typical aesthetic context, rasa is ultimately an
inalienable property of consciousness itself.
The burden of conveying the sensory effects of the aesthetic
configuration (plot, etc.) is borne in poetry (k�vya) by language alone. What is lost in terms of the
vivid but relatively passive overpowering of the eye (gesture, costume, props,
etc.), and the ear (music, song, dialogue, etc.) must be compensated for by a
more subtle, discriminating and rarefied use of words that demands a
correspondingly greater (re-) creative effort on the part of the hearer. The
direct expression of feelings (e.g., "I love you") is in bad poetic
taste because it fails to evoke the corresponding emotion in the connoisseur. Rasa can only be 'suggested' (vyangya) through the presentation of
determinants, consequents and concomitants that may themselves be merely
suggested (e.g., the mutual glances of estranged lovers through averted
eyes). The highest form of 'suggestion' (dhvani) is where the poem is 'dramatized' (n�Ty�yita) by the imagination so
that all the signifying elements of sound, syntax, rhythm, rhyme, fact, figure,
context, association and composite sense converge on the evocation of rasa as the 'primary meaning' (mukhy�rtha). There are also other
possibilities: the suggested meanings may be subordinated (guN�-bh�ta-vyangya) to the directly
expressed sense to enrich and beautify the latter; there might be an interplay
of figures of speech, some literal and others merely suggested so that they
resonate together with tantalizing hints of unexpressed thoughts; the emotion
itself may serve only to provide texture to a strikingly apt description or
idea - there are no bounds to language! What is more, the sparing yet strategic
deployment of (often carefully half-defined) poetic speech can capture,
highlight and immortalize fleeting and otherwise ineffable moods, as
exemplified by the erotic verses of Amaru that Abhinava delights in
dissecting to make his theoretical points. Though the theory of suggestion (dhvani) as an additional third power
of language, over and above direct and figurative meaning, was propounded
only in the 10th century, the illustrations cataloguing its diverse
possibilities were largely drawn from the classical poets (like K�lid�sa). Though this 'theorizing' of prior implicit
criteria and techniques was largely to counter the inordinate (and often
flamboyant) resort to the mechanical aspects of the poet's craft such as
figures of speech to the detriment of good taste, it has thereby enabled the
explicit articulation and application of such hitherto 'tacit' principles
to practical literary criticism.
Though aesthetic relish is intrinsically amoral, the
objective configurations that evoke rasa
must be grounded in our shared experiences and memories of the real world.
Since our pursuit of various life goals (puruS�rtha)--(sexual) pleasure (k�ma), wealth-security-power (artha), socio-religious obligations (dharma) and salvation (mokSa)--are translations of our
basic emotional dispositions into rationalized personal and cultural values,
the various opportunities, challenges and circumstances that are presented on
the stage to evoke rasa
inevitably bring into play the questions of ethics. Powerful emotions are
engendered through the conflict of values and their resolution; the personal
values of the spectator unavoidably color one's perception, impeding or
facilitating identification with the protagonists so crucial to the evocation
of the intended rasa. Hence
Indian dramaturgy aligns the four basic emotions of love (rati --> zrng�ra),
aggression (krodha --> raudra), enterprise (uts�ha --> v�ra) and quiescence (zama --> z�nta) with the ascending
cultural hierarchy of the life-goals. Though in itself transcending all
(purposivity and hence) value-judgments, rasa is
sustained by a dramatic representation that embraces the whole spectrum of
cultural values. Abhinava hence enjoins that these primary emotions should be
depicted on stage so as to inculcate the proper pursuit of their corresponding
life-goals. Even the subsidiary emotions indirectly contribute to this
schema: for example, humor (h�sya),
though enhancing especially the enjoyment of the erotic sentiment, can
also be employed to depict and censure the improper pursuit of any of these
legitimate life-goals. Since we are able to enjoy the rasa only by participating in the
values projected by the (idealized) protagonists, the underlying moral
injunctions are subliminally implanted and reinforced as through the tender
ministrations of a loving wife. Classical Sanskrit theater thus reflects a
convergence of aesthetics and ethics, a traditional Indian exposed to such
cultural pedagogy would often act appropriately because this was not just
morally right but also a matter of good taste.
The enjoyment of rasa is not a 'spiritual' experience in the regular sense, for some of its choice expressions are in love-poetry with absolutely no religious overtones, so much so that it's been possible to claim (with king Bhoja) that the erotic sentiment (zrng�ra) is indeed the rasa par excellence permeating all the other emotions. At the same time, the ability to discriminate the nuances merely suggested by the poem and to identify aesthetically with its emotional 'texture' presupposes not just an inner detachment on the part of the connoisseur (sa-hrdaya) but also a certain 'purity' of heart (hrdaya), so much so that for Abhinava the fundamental rasa is that of tranquility (z�nta) which all the other rasas emerge from and disappear into, just as the phenomenal world itself may be understood as waves 'ruffling' the calm mirror of the enlightened state. Rasa is thus characterized by a peculiar state of awareness that simultaneously 'transcends' (lokottara) both the 'objective' configuration and also the corresponding 'subjective' emotion, but is nevertheless, unlike the introversion of a yogin, receptive to and intent on enjoying the sensory impressions. In this respect, it is both a fore-taste and after-taste of the sort of 'mystical' experience privileged by Abhinavagupta that dissolves the distinction between the sacred and the profane. When rooted in and illuminated by spiritual insight (bolstered by intellectual discrimination), this 'aesthetic stance' may be generalized to the world at large, such that the experience of rasa is no longer (evoked and) conditioned by a specifically 'artistic' artifact but is also revealed even in biological pleasures (such as eating, drinking and sex) or ritual activities (such as the religious devotion of an Utpaladeva) as an inherent and inalienable property of reflexivity (vimarza) within consciousness. Such 'aesthetic rapture' (camatk�ra), even independently of the play of emotions in the mirror of art, is the original referent of the term 'rasa' in the UpaniSads (raso vai sah).
Historically, the emergence and consolidation of Indian aesthetics may be replaced within the larger matrix of the parallel evolution of other semi-autonomous domains such as philosophy, law, 'sectarian' religion and so on, from the mythico-ritual roots of the Vedic tradition, wherein these disciplines are not clearly distinguished. Neither the Rig-Vedic 'poems' nor even classical epic poetry, with its long stretches of descriptive verse and didactic intent, can be satisfactorily accounted for in terms of rasa-theory, whereas one discovers abundant use of figures of speech and sound-effects. Of the ten forms of drama (daza-r�paka) enunciated by Bharata, many seem to have been of ritual orientation and have as such been lost (so that we may only guess their nature), whereas others seem to have survived only at the cost of profound transformations that reflected socio-cultural change. Thus the v�th� appears, in the light of the definitions of its various elements, to have been a riddle-play, drawing inspiration from the verbal jousts of the assembly hall (sabh�) and eventually going back to the Vedic enigma-contests (brahmodya). The only way Abhinava is able to vindicate this category is to 'aestheticize' our understanding of these elements by finding illustrations of such verbal wit and linguistic ambiguity in the sentimental (often humorous) repartees of the love-dramas (n�tik�). An earlier commentator had surmised that Bharata had more or less synthesized two pre-existing schools of drama, namely the brahmanical and the Shaiva, a thesis that Abhinava refutes not so much on historical grounds but because such composite origins with undermine the authority of the N�tya Sh�stra. It seems wholly plausible that the brahmanical genres and practice would have been highly ritualistic and modeled on the Vedic sacrifice (as exemplified by the theatrical preliminaries), whereas the Shaiva current would have remained closely linked to the 'shamanistic' possibilities of dance and the tantric transmutation of the emotions. The transgressive P�shupata ascetics not only worshipped Shiva-Rudra as the Lord of Dance but were also expected to be familiar with the theatrical art. Bharata's school might have recast the interiority of rasa within the authoritative Vedic framework but with the focus now on entertaining a much larger 'lay' public through epic. legendary, and profane themes. Restoring the authority of tradition for the contemporary mind would consist rather in demonstrating the coherence of the synthesis around a unified vision that in the past was affirmed through (the fiction of) single (often 'eponymous') authorship (whether to Bharata, Vy�sa or other 'compiler').
Significantly, the earliest surviving fragments of Indian drama date (1st C. A.D.) from the brahmin AzvaghoSa, the prodigious Buddhist critic of Vedic tradition. Having long resisted theater for being an even more evanescent replica of the ephemeral world, the 'heterodox' faith gradually came around to appropriating its powers for the propagation among laymen of the Buddha's world-negating message. The original N�tya Sh�stra seems to have espoused only the eight 'worldly' rasas, and Abhinava devotes much energy not only to vindicating 'tranquility' (z�nta-rasa), interpolated into some Kashmiri recensions in response to Buddhist dramaturgic practice, but establishing it as the rasa par excellence. Paradoxically, this resulted in the 'secularization' of the Sanskrit theater that we may recognize even in the surviving 'Hindu' plays with a 'worldly' (prakarana), legendary (n�Taka) or erotic (n�tik�) theme. The rasa-problematic presupposes this opposition between the world and its transcendence, that Abhinava has simply inherited and attempts to resolve at various levels.
Partaking in both the spiritual and the sensuous poles of human experience, the enjoyment of art is something less than either pole though potentially capable of embracing and surpassing both. Not only may any transcendental underpinnings be denied by the modern artistic sensibility, the overflowing experience of rasa that sometimes spontaneously emerges in the course of the 'ascending' modes of Indian spirituality, such as the wholly introspective yogic discipline, is canonically recognized as much, if not more, as an obstacle to full illumination than as a sure sign of progress. Both the Vedic brahmin intent on sacrifice and the early Buddhist monks intent on liberation were averse to the temptations of the senses even, and perhaps especially, when they were disguised as art. On the other hand, the aesthetic experience may be said to be derivative in the sense that this imaginative 're-creation' presupposes and depends on (our prior experience of) the real world of practical pursuits. Whereas the modern artist may trespass on the territory of the philosopher, mystic, politician, linguist, etc., in seeking to create his/her own values, the traditional kavi (poet) simply endorsed, illustrated, propagated and humanized the existing order of things and inherited value system that had required a long period of apprenticeship to assimilate and master. Aesthetics comes into its own particularly in those domains of endeavor where the spirit casts its shadow upon the world of the senses that in turn reach out towards their own hidden unifying principle. Here's where cultural 'choices' have been made: where ethical imperatives have been articulated around the life of the emotions, where the details of human scientia are transmitted in context, where an experiential feel of proportion and balance is shared with a younger generation that's been exposed only to the theory, where creative energies are awakened, challenged and offered models worthy of emulation. The aesthetics of rasa has flowered in the thought of Abhinavagupta, precisely because his philosophical endeavor has been to conceptualize a (for him) supreme mode of 'mystical' experience that dissolves the opposition between transcendence and immanence, sacred and profane, the spiritual and the sensuous.
Abhinava stretches the transcendental possibilities of the
aesthetic experience in two ways. Firstly, the rasa of tranquility (z�nta)
is given the supreme place as corresponding to the pursuit of the highest human
goal of spiritual emancipation and presided over as such by the Buddha. His
defense of z�nta consists
largely of demonstrating the possibility of its practical implementation on the
stage in terms of motivation, plot, recognition, identification, etc. Why would
a liberated soul pursue a consistent course of action? By what external
consequents would we recognize his inner peace? How could worldly spectators
empathize with his (lack of) behavior? Secondly, z�nta is shown to underlie the other eight 'orthodox' rasas constituting as it were the
indispensable 'rasa-ness' of
what would otherwise be merely mundane emotions. So much so that he is now
obliged to turn around and clarify that the canonical distinction between the
basic emotion (sth�yin) and
its corresponding rasa still
holds good even for the 'cessation' (zama)
/ 'tranquility' (z�nta) pair.
Yet, Abhinava's own privileged (Tantric) mode of spiritual experience was one
where the barrier between the transcendent and the immanent was completely
dissolved such that the world of the senses was not just reflected within but a
mere phenomenal projection (�bh�sa)
of the supreme Consciousness. He also affirms that any of the emotions, not
just z�nta, could serve
as the springboard for emancipation: for example, a consistent attitude of
laughing at the whole world as incongruous! Such dispassionate ubiquitous
laughter did characterize the P�zupata ascetic.
Emotion binds only because it is directed at particular objects as opposed
to others, when universalized, love, for example, liberates rather than
enslaves us to the object of attachment. This latter possibility was developed
in subsequent centuries, particularly in
Like aesthetics, bhakti
may be approached in two ways: as hovering between the transcendental and the
immanent, as seems to be the stance of the (qualified) dualism of some,
especially VaiSnava,
philosophical schools; or fully embracing the opposing poles, as with the
Trika, which claims to be an inclusive supreme non-dualism (par�dvaita) that integrates the
dualist perspective. Though a valid and desirable emotion, Abhinava himself
rejects bhakti as a separate rasa for the same reason that he refuses other propositions such
as 'affection for a child' (v�tsalya),
etc., that they would result in an uncontrollable multiplication of entities
whereas Bharata offered a still workable scheme of eight rasas. Instead, he treats bhakti (etc.) as a particular mode of 'love' (rati) that is best known and
universally enjoyed in its expression as the erotic sentiment (zrng�ra). His tantric writings, as
opposed to those on aesthetics proper, would rather suggest that zrng�ra might be the ultimate rasa. The spiritualization of the
'libido' (k�ma) in the (often
transgressive) context of sexual enjoyment is indeed the occasion for the most
exuberant and even 'somatic' descriptions of the effervescence of rasa, for example, as an
'interiorized emission' (v�rya-vikSobha)
that powerfully vitalizes the 'heart' overflowing with indescribable emotions. Through
the 'primordial sacrifice' (kula-y�ga),
'physiological' pleasure and even objects of disgust become transmuted into an
'aesthetic' experience that reveals the ultimate (anuttara) nature of Reality. The independence of the
aesthetic domain, vis-�-vis the moral, the religious, the profane, is
brought into relief when these 'underground' writings are juxtaposed to his
public commentaries on formal art. After all, Amaru's love-poems celebrate the
erotic as such without moral edification nor religious
intent. Some of the persistent motifs of Indian poetry, such as the celebration
of the adulterous woman (abhis�rik�),
would be even construed as 'immoral' were they to spill over into real
life as worthy of enactment, as they do in certain 'tantricized' modes
of (even VaiSnava)
devotion (such as the Sahaj�ya). While
exploring 'devotion' in all its human possibilities (between friends,
towards child, husband, parents, king, suicide, etc.), bhakti too has not just countenanced
such transgressive attitudes but even encouraged them as the supreme
manifestation of surrender.
With the right mix of cultural orientations, aesthetic
sensibility can permeate the 'ordinary' life of the masses well beyond those
restricted circles where it is nourished, cultivated and refined through the
formal techniques of the fine arts. The day-to-day ethos (banarasi-pan) of Banaras, the
holy city of the Hindus, had long been characterized by a feeling of gentle
'intoxication' (mauj, masti)
that takes an eccentric delight in simple pleasures such as the chewing of
betel-leaves (pan), bathing in
the Gang�, going on an outing (bahr� alang)
on an unpredictable whim, consumption of marijuana (bhang), etc., that extended to all age groups, castes and
religious denominations. The cultural justification for such carefree behavior
in this center of Hindu orthodoxy, was that such a
life-style was modeled on the patron deity of the city, namely the ascetic
Shiva. Spirituality is not confined to places of worship but permeates
the entire public space as calls to prayer, devotional songs, murmuring of
pilgrims thronging the streets. Inner detachment was also fostered by the
omni-presence of death that constantly walks the alleys with piercing cries of
"Ram's name (alone) Is!" Moreover, under the
watchful eyes of Bhairava,
In Abhinava's aesthetics, we thus discover a supple
conceptual and experiential synthesis that exhibits apparent 'inconsistencies'
only because it pushes the envelope of human possibilities simultaneously in
several contrary directions. Such a unifying framework was possible largely
because the surrounding traditional culture shared a common discourse whatever
one's particular position or choices within its available range of values.
Contemporary ('western') culture is defined instead by a fragmentation of
not just theory but also of the corresponding practice and the resulting
experience. Unlike the carefully delimited 'transgressive sacrality' that hid
behind and inspired Abhinava's experience of aesthetic rapture, artistic
expression today seems to leap forward through a perpetual movement of
trespassing its own unstable norms. What has been problematized is not
just the content and technique of art but also the boundaries between
aesthetics and everything else. Not only does the artist express his 'personal'
(as opposed to received social) values but the medium also becomes the vehicle
of contestation and subserves non-aesthetic purposes. Conversely, other modes
of life, like the religious or
the commercial, likewise cultivate, in good
taste or bad, only specific possibilities of art to further their own
agendas. Artists have also responded by barricading themselves into an
'aestheticism' that's supposedly immune to all other considerations, whether
moral, political, religious, pedagogic, or even that of simply affording
delight. New media have emerged such as cinema, television, (multimedia
on) the Internet, which challenge some of the basic presuppositions of
traditional art (for example, that of a localized as opposed to virtual
community) and offer tantalizing (for example, remote interactive)
possibilities yet to be adequately explored. Fuelling all these cross-currents
of innovation are large doses of theory and practice being injected through the
exposure to non-Western cultures, with their own indigenous forms of aesthetic
sensibility, which likewise cannot be reduced to rasa or even dhvani in
its canonical formulations. While various classical Indian art-forms, such as
music and dance, find an increasingly receptive audience world-wide, they are
also being rethought, extended and transformed even in India itself through the
experiments of (some of the foremost) indigenous artists often in
collaboration with representatives of such contemporary trends. So long as the language of art depends on the powers of signification and
especially in their ability evoke and fathom human emotions, the Indian
legacy remains an incomparable resource for the aesthetics of the future.
Abhinavagupta himself lives in our consciousness not so much as an artist stricto sensu but as a discriminating commentator and
connoisseur. The deepening crisis of values further exacerbated by the 'clash of civilizations'
is perhaps in need not so much of even more art-forms with their
conflicting rules, theories and subjectivities, but of a shared aesthetic
sensibility that extends to the whole of life. Here, it seems to me, is
Abhinava's greatest contribution.