

# VĀK AS PRATYAVAMARŚA: Bhartṛhari from Abhinavan Perspective\*

- Navjivan Rastogi

Though the roots of the philosophy of word or speech, more popular as philosophy of language in contemporary parlance, go far deeper into the antiquity of Indian thinking, Bhartṛhari confronts as a philosopher par excellence whose contribution to the understanding of language, both at its factual and metaphysical levels, is immense. In word or Vāk he finds primary essence of the ultimate reality, which permeates through all manifested phenomena. He, to borrow words from Padoux, “evolved an epistemology of speech, a philosophy of knowledge as relating to language and a metaphysics of language or sound.”<sup>1</sup> Central to it is Bhartṛhari’s famous assertion: “There is no cognition in the world in which the word does not figure. All knowledge, as it were, intertwined with the word. If this eternal identity of knowledge and the word were to disappear, knowledge would cease to be knowledge; it is this identity which makes identification possible.”<sup>2</sup> The nature of this word consists in *pratyavamarśa* which is considered necessary to the very structure of our linguistic experience and thought and constitutes the rock foundation of our day to day transactions. Bhartṛhari develops a sort of transcendentalism grounded in the Word-Absolute (*Śabdātattva* or *Śabdabrahman*).<sup>3</sup> Iyer in his celebrated work, *Bhartṛhari*,<sup>4</sup> points out to some obscurity with regard to the precise connotation of the term *pratyavamarśa* as understood and explained in the Grammatical school and suggests exploring the same with the help from the Kashmir Śaiva monistic sources which shall, hence forward, be referred to as Kashmir Śaivism.<sup>5</sup>

Contextually our reference point happens to be *Vāk* 1.115 (123), 116 (124),<sup>6</sup> 118 (126)<sup>7</sup> and also

---

\* Abhinavagupta here represents the whole tradition of monistic Śaivism of Kashmir. As such, a reference to him covers his teachers, specially Utpaladeva, also unless otherwise specified.

<sup>1</sup> *Vāk, The Concept of the Word in Selected Hindu Tantras (Vāc.)*, Andre' Padoux, tr. by J. Gontier, in the SUNY series in the Śaiva Traditions of Kashmir, Albany, 1990

<sup>2</sup> न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते ।

अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन भासते ।

वाग्मूपता चेदुल्लामेदवबोधस्य शाश्वती ।

न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत सा हि प्रत्यवमर्शिनी । – *Vākyapadīya (Vāk.)* of Bhartṛhari with the commentaries *Vṛtti* and *Paddhati* of Vṛṣabhadeva, Kāṇḍa I, ed. KA Subramania Iyer, Poona, 1966, 1.115-116 (tr. Iyer's)

<sup>3</sup> अभेदपूर्वको भेदः – BH as quoted by Murti, “The Philosophy of Language in the Indian Context,” T.R.V. Murti, *Proceedings of the 37<sup>th</sup> session*, Indian Philosophical Congress, 1963, p. 369

<sup>4</sup> *Bhartṛhari, A study of the Vākyapadīya in the light of the Ancient Commentaries (Bhartṛhari)*, K.A. Subramania Iyer, Poona, 1969

<sup>5</sup> In fact, this connectivity between BH and KS was first noticed by Gopinath Kaviraj, and later by G N Shastri. Taking cue from Iyer quite a few recent studies have come up with several insights on the subject notably by Bishnupada Bhattacharya, Padoux, Matilal, Coward, Torella – to name a few. This paper seeks to continue the effort further.

<sup>6</sup> We refer to Iyer's edition throughout unless otherwise indicated. For first two kārikās see note 2 above.

<sup>7</sup> सैषा संसारिणां संज्ञा बहिरन्तश्च वर्तते ।

तन्मात्रामव्यतिक्रान्तं चैतन्यं सर्वजातिषु ॥

a kārikā<sup>8</sup> forming part of the *Vṛtti* on *Vāk* 1.118 (126) and treated by tradition, at least KS tradition, as forming part of the primary corpus of the *Vākyapadīya*. These are some of those rare verses or philosophical statements that have cast their spell on the whole spectrum of Indian thought and literature and have been profusely quoted. Even within the Grammatical tradition these kārikās have met with different treatment. Whatever the tradition, these kārikās – either jointly or singly, either in full or in part– have always generated serious intellectual excitement, whether by way of inspiration or by way of denunciation. However, the honour accorded to BH in the KS circles is somewhat extraordinary (barring one exception of which we will talk later) for a person from another tradition. He is always cited – when he is not being invoked directly– just next to the āgamas or as an āgama itself and invariably with an epithet exclusively reserved for him, i.e. *tatrabhavān* (“esteemed”). It is therefore not surprising when one sees foundational structure of Utpala’s and Abhinavagupta’s thought as emerging from the philosophical premises of BH.

These kārikās, including *Vāk* 1.116 (124) in particular, which form a cluster, are seminal to our understanding of the notion of *pratyavamarśa* in BH. The roadmap we propose to pursue here is first to arrive at the notion of *pratyavamarśa* that crystalizes in these kārikās and its ensuing implications. We then try to see how this notion and its logical corollaries are subjected to the microscopic analysis from the opposite end of the Buddhist logicians and Indian realists operating within the pre-set limits of these kārikās around the notion of *pratyavamarśa*. As a third step, how the ground is partly retrieved by the Śaiva Siddhāntins in developing their notion of *pratyavamarśa* pushing us to the final leg of our enquiry. Here our effort would be to understand how Bh’s basic approach of affirming identity of word and thought via *pratyavamarśa* is brought to near perfection with highly incisive analysis by the KS metaphysicians who share a good deal the āgamic and ritualistic background with the Siddhāntin.<sup>9</sup>

The word *pratyamarśa* is ordinarily used in the sense of ‘referring’, ‘reflecting’ ‘deliberating’, or ‘understanding’ and the like. For instance ‘*saṁsargarūpameva pratyavamarśati*’ occurring in the

<sup>8</sup> अर्थक्रियासु वाक् सर्वान् समीहयति देहिनः।  
तदुल्लान्तौ विसंज्ञोऽयं दृश्यते काष्ठकुड्यवत्॥

The kārikā is numbered 1.127 in the Poona edition, of the *Vākyapadīya* ed. K.V. Abhyankar and V.P. Limaye, Poona, 1965, p. 12

<sup>9</sup> The term *pratyavamarśa* or its cognate *parāmarśa* and *vimarśa* are widely used in Indian philosophy with varying connotations. For Example, “In Nyāya, *parāmarśa* (लिङ्गपरामर्शोऽनुमानम्) is the mental act through which one goes from the premises to the conclusion. This term, sometimes translated as “subsumptive reflection”, describes a logical process of inferential judgment implying a reflective act of synthesis bringing together two elements.” - *Vāc*, p. 228, note 10. Padoux’ views are taken from S. Kuppuswami, *A Primer of Indian Logic*, Madras, 1951, pp. 188. It is however beyond our present scope to embark upon hermeneutical study of *pratyavamarśa*, with cognate words such as *parāmarśa*, *āmarśa* etc. in Indian philosophy which, otherwise, offers a very exciting area of research.

*Vṛtti*<sup>10</sup> means “understands the connected form.” Vṛṣabha though does not gloss the word, his explanation of his own usage *pratyavamarśati* by *pratipadyate* more or less carries the same sense, i.e. “grasps/understands.”<sup>11</sup> Pratyavamarśa is derived from *mṛś* “to touch, handle.”<sup>12</sup> It is interesting that the *Vṛtti* uses the expression “*saṁsprśanniva*<sup>13</sup> (“as if touching”) which, going by the explanation of Vṛṣabha<sup>14</sup> converges on pratyavamarśa. 'Touch' here means rendering the form of the word as an object of grasping which is not possible in the absence of the word. Bhartṛhari is analysing the process behind the picking up of a specific word in a particular sense and listener’s understanding it in that intended sense. When a user wants to utter a word he has to know its form clearly and for this his mind concentrates on it by isolating it from the existing mass of other words. He tries to touch all of them, though he cannot. Similarly the listener too grasps the form of word because of his habitual concentration on the understanding of meaning. Vṛṣabha underscores the fact that the word-form is not grasped as something separate because it is constitutive of the listener’s cognitive judgment<sup>15</sup> (*pratyavamarśapratyaya*). We come across with one more usage of pratyavamarśa in the sense of determinate or definitive comprehension. In *Vāk* 1.86 BH tells us that though our knowledge is undifferentiated and devoid of forms it appears having forms because of its conditioning by the things it comes to know, like when one says ‘five trees’, ‘twenty cows’. Vṛṣabha joins to say that it is because of five or twenty items, though different in forms, are delimited by one single comprehension. In the comprehension relating to each of the objects to be known singly, we would have five judgments. Because our intellect does not have collective perception, there is no scope for taking them as forest etc. either. Vṛṣabha attributes it to the lack of *pracita* (“accumulative”) *pratyavamarśa*.<sup>16</sup>

The kārikās 1.111, 1.113 and 1.114, specially the *Vṛtti* on them, seek to provide the requisite background and offer a pre-explanation for the core issues raised in the following kārikās. The main thrust of kārikā 1.111 lies in its demonstrating that difference between objects is perceived only when it is communicated through words. The other point that is emphasized by the kārikā is that a thing

<sup>10</sup> प्रविभक्तस्यापि चानुसंधानमन्तरेण अर्थक्रियाविषया प्रतिभा नोत्पद्यत इति पुनः संसर्गरूपमेव प्रत्यवमृशति। – *Vṛtti* on *Vāk* 1-26; p. 75: ‘But since an intuition leading to purposeful activity cannot take place without the reunification of what has been divided, one again understands the connected form’ (tr. Iyer *op cit*, p. 35).

<sup>11</sup> यदाह संसर्गरूपमेव इति। ....प्रतिपत्तौ च योऽसमर्थः तमभिन्नं शब्दार्थमवगन्तुं स क्रमं प्रत्यवमृशति। यथाभिन्नपदार्थग्रहणासमर्थः प्रकृत्यादिविभागेनार्थं प्रतिपद्यते वाक्यार्थमपि कश्चित् पदार्थानुगमेन। – *Paddhati*, *ibid.*, p. 76

<sup>12</sup> मृशं आमर्शने। आमर्शनं स्पर्शः। – *Dhātupāṭha*.

<sup>13</sup> यथैव प्रयोक्ता शब्दविशेषविषयं प्रयत्नमभिपद्यमानः प्रतिशब्दं परितः परिच्छिन्नान् शब्दात्मनः संस्पृशन्निव मनः प्रणिधत्ते। – *Vṛtti* on *Vāk* 1.53, p. 113.

<sup>14</sup> संस्पृशन्निव इति। ...संस्पर्शो हि विषयभावगमनम्। यदा तु परितः परिच्छिन्नान् इति बुद्धेर्विभक्तान् संस्पृशन्निव इत्यर्थः तथा वाक्यार्थ उपमीयते। यतो न तत्र शब्दः कुतः परिच्छेदः संस्पर्शो वेति। – *Paddhati*, *ibid.*

<sup>15</sup> यतः प्रत्यवमर्शप्रत्ययोऽयं तत्र निमित्तीकरणम्। स त्वर्थक्रियाभ्यासात्तु व्याक्षिप्तः परिच्छिन्ननिव प्रत्यवमृशति। – *Paddhati*, p. 113

<sup>16</sup> ततश्च प्रचितवस्तुप्रत्यवमर्शाभावः। अथैकबुद्धिस्तानेकतया गृह्णाति, वनादिविभागाप्रतिपत्तिः। – *Paddhati* on *Vāk* 1.86, p. 152

cognized by us becomes part of the worldly usage only when it is expressed by words. The cognition, as propounded by the *Vṛtti*<sup>17</sup> and expounded by the *Paddhati*,<sup>18</sup> involves three stages: “(1) to see a thing and to remember it as intertwined with its word (*smṛtinirūpaṇā*), (2) to cognise the identity between word and meaning (*abhijalpanirūpaṇā*), (3) to see it as connected with some action (*ākāranirūpaṇā*).”<sup>19</sup>

In order to highlight the close relationship that subsists between word and meaning figuring in a cognition the *Vṛtti* evolved a highly dense vocabulary conveying distinctive nature of each of the several aspects involved.<sup>20</sup> Thus the three aspects, which successively explain each other, relating to the word are: *saṁsarga* (“connection/union”), *anuvēdha* (“penetration/intertwining/impregnation”) and *ātmatā* (“identification”) and those relating to the meaning, similarly, are: *prakāśana* (“illumination”), *upagraha* (“determination”) and *svīkāra* (“integration/acceptance”). Thus the *Vṛtti* concludes that the meaning is illuminated, determined and integrated with the cognition which is intimately connected with the power of the word, intertwined with the word and has the form of the word. Thus, concludes Vṛṣabha: The cognition is of the form of word and word is of the form of meaning.<sup>21</sup> As a major pivot of linguistic absolutism the next *kārikā*, i.e. 1.113, proclaims that all knowledge of purposeful activity takes its root in the word. Even the newborn infant, with no access to the linguistic usage, has such a knowledge due to residual tendencies from the former birth.<sup>22</sup> The *Vṛtti* adds that the word performs two important functions. In the first place, it renders even the existent appear as non-existent if it were not covered by the linguistic usage and even the absolutely non-existent (that is, fictitious) appear as actually existent, endowed with the primary existence as it were, if they are conveyed by the linguistic usage. By implication BH brings in his notion of the secondary existence, *upacāra sattā*, which he considers the real domain of language as against the primary existence, *mukhya sattā*, enjoyed by the things in our daily activities.<sup>23</sup> This explains why we have no difficulty in using the expression and grasping its meaning such as “barren woman’s son” or “hare’s horn”. In the second place, the *Vṛtti* explains the reason behind this innate capacity of language which enables one to cognize even the vague words in the course of pursuing

<sup>17</sup> संविज्ञानपदनिबन्धनो हि सर्वोऽर्थः स्मृतिनिरूपणयाऽभिजल्पनिरूपणयाऽऽकारनिरूपणया च निरूप्यमाणो व्यवहारपदमवतरति। – *Vṛtti* on 1.111,p.182

<sup>18</sup> सर्व एते शब्दानुविद्धा व्यवहाराङ्गं न स्वलक्षणरूपेण इति। एतावान् हि सर्वोऽर्थः सदैव निरूपितो व्यवहाराङ्गमिति। – *Padhati*, ibid.

<sup>19</sup> *Vāk.*, Chap. 1, Eng. tr. by Iyer, p. 107, note (printed under *kārikā* 1.119)

<sup>20</sup> भेदवानर्थः शब्दशक्तिसंसृष्टया शब्दानुविद्धया शब्दात्मिकया बुद्ध्यया प्रकाश्यत उपगृह्यत स्वीक्रियते। – *Vṛtti* on 1.111, p. 183

<sup>21</sup> यत उपगृहीतार्थाकारशब्दरूपा सा बुद्धिः। – *Paddhati* on *Vāk* 1.111, p. 183

<sup>22</sup> इतिकर्तव्यता लोके सर्वा शब्दव्यपाश्रया।

यां पूर्वाहितसंस्कारो बालोऽपि प्रतिपद्यते। – *Vāk* 1.113

<sup>23</sup> सदपि वाग्व्यवहारेणानुपगृहीतमर्थरूपमसता तुल्यम्। अत्यन्तासच्च.....वाचा समुत्थायमानं मुख्यसत्तायुक्तमिव तेषु तेषु कार्येषु प्रत्यवभासेत। – *Vṛtti* on the above, p. 186.

respective purposeful activities. It is due to the latent tendencies one carries from the previous births, where the definitive cognition “enters” or “penetrates” the very being of the word whose recurrent usage generates a linguistic trace. Attention needs be drawn to the very significant use of the term *āveśa*, “penetration”, implying an extremely fine linguistic infusion of the cognition.<sup>24</sup> The whole thrust, as summed up by Vṛṣabha, is that in our worldly life we exclusively deal with the forms of the object as presented or constructed by the word, factual existence or non-existence of a thing being simply inconsequential.<sup>25</sup>

Kārika 1.114 and the *Vṛtti* thereon technically designated this beginningless residual linguistic trace as *śabdabhāvanā* which is found in every living individual as a mental seed and does not require any human effort to produce it. It serves to awaken the intuitive grasp of the word-meaning and to provoke the spontaneous response in the wake of such an intuitive understanding. Thus speaker and listener both have intuitive grasp.<sup>26</sup>

One is fairly equipped now to appreciate *śabdānuvedha* doctrine so powerfully enunciated in kārikā 1.115.<sup>27</sup> Here BH rules out possibility of cognition, at empirical level,<sup>28</sup> without penetration by or intertwining with the word. Apparently both the lines would seem to be tautologous, but reading with Vṛṣabha they actually indicate two distinct cognitive situations,<sup>29</sup> namely the indeterminate and the determinate. In the former, for the absence of any expressive word as circumscribing the meaning, the verbal element only inheres (*anugama* glossed as *anuvṛtti*), whereas in the latter i.e. determinate cognition, which has reached the level of practical verbal use, is pierced by the word, i.e. virtually becomes one with the word. These are the two stages of the “word-association” (*śabdānuṣaṅga*). Vṛṣabha derives his formulation from the *Vṛtti*.<sup>30</sup> As BH posits the invariable

<sup>24</sup> समाविष्टवाचां च स्वजातिषु बालानामपि पूर्वशब्दावेशभावनासंस्काराधानात्। –*Vṛtti* on 1.113, pp. 186-187; cf. *Paddhati*: समावेशः सूक्ष्मवाग्रूपानुषङ्गः। पूर्वशब्दावेश इति। शब्दपरिच्छेदी प्रत्ययः अनुप्रविष्ट इव शब्दम्। –*Paddhati*, ibid.

Slightly digressing from the main theme it may be hypothesized that this notion of linguistic *samāveśa* could have been one of the potent sources of later KS soteriological notion of *samāveśa*.

<sup>25</sup> The grammarian calls it *vyavasthānityatā*, *pravṛttinīyātā* or *vyavahāranīyātā*:

नित्यत्वे कृतकत्वे वा तेषामादिर्न विद्यते।

प्राणिनामिव चैषा व्यवस्थानित्यतोच्यते ॥ – *Vāk* 1.28;

सा चैयमनादिरविच्छिन्ना प्रवृत्तिनित्यता। –*Vṛtti* on the above, p. 84; तथा शब्दव्यवहारशून्यो न लोकोऽस्ति। सर्वथा च व्यवहारस्य अविच्छेदात्तदध्यवसायानुवृत्तेर्व्यवहारनित्यतेत्याह। – *Paddhati*, ibid. BH and Vṛṣabha derive this view from the *Mahābhāṣya*, see *M.BH* on *Vā.* 1 in *Paspaśānhika*.

<sup>26</sup> अनादिशैषा शब्दभावना प्रतिपुरुषमवस्थितज्ञानबीजपरिग्रहा। –*Vṛtti*, on 1.114, I, p. 186; cf. प्रतिभोद्घाटनमात्रमेव शब्दाः कुर्वन्ति। ...उपदेष्टापि प्रतिभोद्घट्टनेन तामेवानुगच्छति। – *Paddhati*, ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Cf. note 2 above.

<sup>28</sup> At the metaphysical level there is no scope for piercing or penetration by the word (*śabdānuvedha*), because at that stage it is only the Word-Absolute that subsists, rest of the creation having merged back into it. Mark the word “*loke*” in the kārikā.

<sup>29</sup> सर्वस्मिन् ज्ञाने शब्दानुगमः, केवलमनुवृत्तिः क्वचिद् यथा निमित्तशून्यवस्तुग्राहिणि ज्ञाने, लब्धवृत्तिः क्वचिद् यथा तदुक्तम(?) भाविषु। तमेवानुषङ्गमाह। –*Paddhati*, p. 188

<sup>30</sup> यथास्य संहतरूपा शब्दभावना तथा ज्ञेयैष्वर्थेषु उत्पन्नेनाप्यविकल्पेन ज्ञानेन कार्यं न क्रियते। – *Vṛtti*, ibid.

presence of word in every cognition, he is supposed to explain verbality of the indeterminate percept because there is hardly any scope for the presence of word. According to BH the contracted word-potentiality (*śabdabhāvanā*) is very much there, but because everything stands merged back into it no verbal usage can take place in regard to the object figuring in the indeterminate knowledge. For instance, when some one, in a hurry to reach one's destination, walks quickly without noticing grass, clods of earth etc. on the route it cannot be said that there has been no knowledge because no usage has taken place. That such a cognition has undoubtedly taken place is proved at the time of recurrence of this knowledge when the latent word-seed is aroused and (the denotative) powers of word, which are restricted to their specific meanings, become manifested. It is only then the object is formulated in a form of its own and embraced by the knowledge which is intertwined with the word. Vṛṣabha says the formulation of a clear objective form (*ākriyamāṇaḥ*) is the direct outcome of word-piercing (*śabdānuviddhena*) which is as good as saying that object is accepted or affirmed by the knowledge (*upagr̥hyamāṇaḥ*).<sup>31</sup> Following the powers of the word,<sup>32</sup> when the object "comes within the range of clear cognition" (*jñānānugataḥ*: Iyer) it is only then the object, whose clear image is now cast on the cognition, is accorded designation such as, such as and is stated to be cognized.<sup>33</sup> What is to be noted here is that the word cognition or knowledge, as per Vṛṣabha, stands for

<sup>31</sup> Vṛṣabha interprets *śabdānuviddhena* as *śabdoparaktena*, that is, penetration by the word is total in the sense that the cognition takes on the colour of the object suppressing its own. That is why the knowledge toes the dictates of the power of the word "*śabdaśaktyanupātīnā*". – *Paddhati*, p. 188.

<sup>32</sup> '*śabdaśakti*' is used twice (in *śabdānām śaktiṣu* and *śaktyanupātīnā*). In the first place it means "fitness or capacity to yield meaning" (*arthanirūpaṇayogyatā*) and in the second it means "propounding or conveying the meaning" (*arthapratipādana*). The idea is: In the first instance, the power of word, when manifested, becomes instrument through which knowledge describes (*nirūpayati*) the object in its universal mode. This description accordingly takes the form "this". Whereas in the second instance, once this power has been exercised it, confined as it is to the particular word, grasps the object in more concrete terms capable of usage at the practical plane by describing it as 'This is cow', 'This is horse': ज्ञानविशिष्टाः शब्दभावनाशक्त्यः इदन्तया अर्थानामुपग्रहे भानस्य निमित्तं भवन्ति। ...अर्थनिरूपणयोग्यता शब्दस्य शक्तिरित्युक्ता। ..शब्दस्य शक्तिरर्थप्रतिपादनम्, तदुपदर्शनेऽर्थरूपप्रतिपत्तेः, गौरयमश्वोऽयमिति। – *Paddhati*, *ibid*.

<sup>33</sup> शब्दानां प्रत्यर्थनियतासु शक्तिषु शब्दानुविद्धेन शक्त्यनुपातिना ज्ञानेनाक्रियमाण उपगृह्यमाणो वस्त्वात्मा ज्ञानानुगतो व्यक्तरूपप्रत्यवभासो ज्ञायत इत्यभिधीयते। – *Vṛtti* on Vāk 1.115, p. 189

Matilal does not find Iyer's translation of this portion very clear and interprets in somewhat different manner pronouncing this sentence of the *Vṛtti* as 'most baffling'. He divides it into five parts:

"(a) For example, when one walks quickly and touches grass and pebbles, a (tactile) awareness arises. (b) But even though such an awareness arises (*saty api jñāne*) that is indeed a unique or a vague (*kācid eva*) state of cognition in which (*yasyām*) an object's nature (*vastvātmā*) is said to be cognized (*jñāyate ity abhidhīyate*) provided the object is tinged with awareness (*jñānānugata*) and its explicit form shines forth (*vyaktarūpapratyāvabhāsa*). (c) This state (of cognition) contains the ready or about-to-sprout (*abhimukhībhūta*) seed of the residual traces of Language (*śabdabhāvanābīja*). (d) There are two types of words, articulate words that are speakable and the non-articulate that are unspeakable (*ākhyeyarūpāṇām anākhyeyarūpāṇām ca śabdānām*). (e) And there arises denotative power of the words regulated by each denotatum (*pratyarthaniyatāsu śaktiṣu*) while the object is picked out (*upagr̥hyamāṇa*) and given a form (*ākriyamāṇa*) by that cognition which is impregnated with words (*śabdānuviddhena*) and empowered with that denotative power (common to the words) (*śaktyanupātīnā*). - "On Bhartṛhari's Linguistic Insight", in *Sanskrit and Related Studies*, eds. B.k. Matilal and Purusottama Bilimoria, Delhi, 1990, p. 4-5.

pratyavamarśa.<sup>34</sup> According to a section of the grammarians, even sleep is marked by the flow of such cognitions which one experiences in the waking state – the only difference is that the seeds of linguistic residual traces have a very subtle functioning in that state.<sup>35</sup> Thus the consciousness always remains mixed up with the word and constitutes both the cause and effect of the manifested word.<sup>36</sup>

Helārāja adds another dimension to our understanding of the kārikā, employing it to explain the notion of superimposition (*adhyāsa*). He notes that there is superimposition of the word upon the meaning not only in the case of the hearer but also in the case of the speaker. Even the knowledge too is conveyed by *adhyāsa*. Thus when one utters the word *ghaṭa*, there is fusion of all the three things – the word, the meaning and the speaker’s intention – in our understanding.<sup>37</sup> Helārāja refers to the *Mahābhāṣya* where the question ‘*gaurityatra kaḥ śabdaḥ*’ is asked to isolate the own form of the word from this complex knowledge. Even the cognition of the new-born baby (cf. *Vāk*. 1.113) is found mixed up with the word because of its innate proneness for convention.<sup>38</sup> Thus whether there obtains relation of fitness or causality, it boils down to superimposition in either case. Hence superimposition alone is primary.<sup>39</sup>

The later commentators suggest that the idea of inalienable relation between word and meaning was first formulated by Pāṇini and there has been continuing discussion over the issue. Pāṇini’s famous aphorism "*svaṃ rūpaṃ śabdasya aśabdasaṃjñā*" (Pā.1.1.68) and several *vārtikās* of Kātyāyana aided by the *Mahābhāṣya* squarely propound that it is through conveying the own form first, the word conveys its meaning, except the words that are designated as *sañjñā* (technical names). It is outside the scope of the present paper to dwell on this debate,<sup>40</sup> yet it may be of interest to refer to some pertinent observations. Helārāja suggests that the worldly usage is of the nature of reflective mutuality between the cognitions of the speaker and the listener. For instance when one utters “bring the cow,” speaker’s intention “I am deputing you to bring the cow” is also conveyed over and above

<sup>34</sup> ज्ञानानुगतः इति। प्रत्यवमर्शज्ञानेन। व्यक्तरूप इति। व्यक्तरूपः प्रत्यवभासोऽस्मिन्। इदं तदिति व्यपदेश्यत्वात्। – *Paddhati*, p. 189.

<sup>35</sup> *Vṛtti.*, *ibid.*

<sup>36</sup> तदेतत् संज्ञानं शब्दप्रकृतिविकारभावेन आविर्भावतिरोभावावजस्रं प्रत्यनुभवति। – *ibid.*

<sup>37</sup> तथा च ज्ञानमप्यध्यासेनैव शब्दः प्रतिपादयति वक्त्रवगतमिति तत्रापि परमार्थदृशाध्यास एव संबंधः। लोलीभूतानि शब्दार्थज्ञानानि घट इत्येवमवगम्यन्ते। यथोक्तं ‘न सोऽस्ति प्रत्यय ....’ इत्यादि। – *Prakīrṇaprakāśa* on *Vāk*, III. 3.1, p. 126 (*Vākyapadīya* of Bhartṛhari, Kāṇḍa III, pt. 1, ed. KAS Iyer, Poona, 1963)

<sup>38</sup> अत एव ‘गौरित्यत्र कः शब्दः’ इति प्रश्नः। तदर्हजातस्याप्ययमेव शब्दसंभेदः। – *loc. cit.*

<sup>39</sup> तदहर्जातस्याप्ययमेव शब्दसंभेदः। सङ्केतसहत्वात्। एवं च कृत्वा तात्पर्यदृशाध्यास एव योग्यतायां कार्यकारणभावे च फलतः संबंधोऽवतिष्ठत इति स एव मुख्यः। ज्ञानरथैव च परस्परसङ्क्रान्तिर्व्यवहार इति शब्देन स्वरूपाध्यस्तं ज्ञानमपि....शब्दपूर्वकमेव प्रतिपद्यते। – *Prakīraṇa.*, *loc. cit.*

It may be hypothetically suggested that Helārāja represented the new generation grammarian who under the impact of Kashmir Śaivism introduced and nurtured the doctrine of superimposition. However, this is an issue for the investigations by the future scholarship.

<sup>40</sup> For instance see *Uddyota* on *M. BH*, I, p. 549 on Pā 1.1.68; *Śabdakaustubha*, Bhaṭṭoji, Varanasi, 3 Vos., p. 4; *Vaiyākaraṇasiddhāntalaghumañjūṣā*, Nāgeśa, Vol. 1, ed. R.P. Tripathi, Varanasi, 1990, p. 520, p. 653; *Padavākyaratnākara*, Gokulanātha, MS under verse 23. The last three citations are pointed out by Abhyankara and Limaye, *Poona edition*, p. 210.

the word-meaning. Similarly the hearer understands “I am being asked to bring the cow, so I should bring it” again over and above the word-meaning. But both these sentence-meanings are communicated through words alone. In this context he refers to the *Vārtika* “*na śabdapūrvako hyarthe sampratyayaḥ*”.<sup>41</sup> While explaining this *Vārtika*, Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa cites this kārikā and says that in our cognition the word figures as the attribute, while the meaning as the substantive. Likewise while commenting upon the *Vārtika* “*mantrādyarthamiti cecchāstrasāmarthyādarthagateḥ siddham,*” Bhāṣyakāra raises a doubt : If *mantra* is at par with *śabdasaṃjñā*, *mantra* will not convey its own form and as such it will be difficult to get at the meaning of *mantra*. Elaborating his explanation in order to dispel this fear Bhāṣyakāra says that he sees no difficulty in understanding the meaning of the *mantra* which is available due to its concomitance with the ritual activities prescribed by the scripture as accompanying the *mantra*.<sup>42</sup> During the course of his commentary on it Kaiyaṭa invokes the word-penetration doctrine of BH,<sup>43</sup> extending the scope of the kārikā by pointing out to its translinguistic religious dimension.

In his celebrated article on *Pratibhā*, Gopinath Kavirāj<sup>44</sup> interprets *pratyaya* (“cognition”) in the sense of knowledge as a mode which is never free from verbal associations (*śabdānugama*) for the simple reason that it has its genesis in the word. He is describing knowledge as a mode only to exclude eternal knowledge, which is the Supreme Word. Hence a thing which is knowable is also nameable. Both are bound by an eternal relation (*anādiyogyatā*). To him *loke* (“worldly usage”) implies modal consciousness. This consciousness is discursive and relative.<sup>45</sup> Thinking is the same as object. Naming and thinking are identical. Thinking constitutes the internal whereas object the external aspect.<sup>46</sup>

Iyer sees a lot of value in the kārikā. To him this kārikā offers *raison detre* for BH’s linguistic monism. The form this reasoning assumes is “all the manifestations of Brahman (every thing that we know of in the cosmos<sup>47</sup>) are intertwined with the word and so it is concluded that their root cause, Brahman, must be of the nature of word.”<sup>48</sup> The kārika also provides two arguments in support of its

<sup>41</sup> Vide *Prakīrṇa.*, p. 126

<sup>42</sup> शास्त्रस्य सामर्थ्यादर्थस्य गतिर्भविष्यति...मन्त्रादिसहचरितो योऽर्थस्य गतिर्भविष्यति, साहचर्यात्। – *M. BH.*, I, p. 550, (NS edition).

<sup>43</sup> साहचर्यं च शब्दानुविद्धस्यैव अर्थस्य अवगमकम्। – *Pradīpa* clarifies *Uddyota*’s comment: शब्दानुविद्धस्यैवेति। ‘न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृत’ इति हर्युक्तेरिति भावः। – *ibid.*

<sup>44</sup> Cf. “The Doctrine of Pratibhā In Indian Philosophy”, *Aspects of Indian Thought*, Gopinath Kaviraj, The University of Burdwan, 1984, pp 14-15.

<sup>45</sup> Kaviraj insists that Grammarians do not admit what is ordinarily known as *nirvikalpa vṛttijñāna*, though they do admit indeterminate consciousness but not as indeterminate psychosis which distinguishes them from Vedāntins.

<sup>46</sup> Cf. *op. cit.*

<sup>47</sup> “*Loke*” is understood to mean both “worldly transactions” as well as “cosmos”.

<sup>48</sup> *Bharṭhari*, p. 100

main premise as to why this cosmos should be of the nature of word. The argument may be worded as under:

- (i) One cannot know an object through a word without knowing the word itself first.
- (ii) One's verbal cognition of a jar takes the form of an identity. This leads one to conclude that object is not really different from the word.<sup>49</sup>

The next *kārika*, i.e. 1.118, sees transfiguration of “word-intertwining” into *pratyamarśa*. It is what that makes this *kārikā* extremely important. BH lays down four premises – (i) identity with word (*vāgrūpatā* “being of the nature of word”) is the eternal essence of knowledge, (ii) the nature of word consists in its capacity to reflect, to be aware of or to identify (*pratyavarmarśinī*), (iii) illumination (*prakāśa*) and cognition (*avabodha*) are one, and (iv) the illumination-episode itself derives from word's capacity to identify. The obvious corollary has also been stated: In the absence of word as its essence, knowledge would lose its very signification.

“Identity with word” (*vāgrūpatā*) is understood by Vṛṣabha as “presence/inherence of the form of the word” (*śabdākārānugama*)<sup>50</sup>. The *Vṛtti* in the opening sentence itself distinguishes *prakāśa* from consciousness and identifies it with knowledge. *Prakāśa* has two dimensions. One, it manifests itself,<sup>51</sup> as pointed out by Vṛṣabha, and two, it illumines others,<sup>52</sup> as noted by the *Vṛtti*, although in a negative formulation. In order to explain what he understands by *pratyavarmarśinī* in his delineation of *vāgrūpatā*, BH offers two sets of illustrations, one concerning the indeterminate experience and other the determinate. The first set relates to the instances of deep sleep,<sup>53</sup> indeterminate perception and remembrance respectively and the second to the determinate comprehension of a sentence-meaning from a set of words. Even in deep sleep the association with the word (now described as *vāgdharma*, “word-property”) persists in a subtle form, that is, *śabda-bhāvanā* remains unmanifest (*alabdhavṛtti-VR*). In the indeterminate cognition or first ever cognition of a thing, for that matter, the external object is apprehended very vaguely because the special characteristics of an external object are not apprehended. As such the first cognition presents (‘illuminates’ – *VR*) the object as a mere thing by referring to it in non-specific generalized terms as this or that. At this stage, in the words of Vṛṣabha, *śabda-bhāvanā* though present remains unmanifest, since it is practically non-functional. In remembrance the situation almost remains the same. When the seeds of such a cognition are rekindled, the previous indistinct cognition figures as a

<sup>49</sup> *Loc. cit.*

<sup>50</sup> Cf. *Paddhati*, p. 190

<sup>51</sup> प्रकाशस्य स्वप्रकाशताख्या व्यापारः। – *ibid.*

<sup>52</sup> प्रकाशः पररूपमनङ्गीकुर्वन्...न व्यवतिष्ठते। – *Vṛtti* on the above, p. 191

<sup>53</sup> यायसञ्चेतितावस्था। – *ibid.*; Iyer takes it to refer to sleep (cf. tr., p. 111). An unconscious state may be either deep sleep or stillness (*staimitya*). For Matilal it covers “such states as lack ostensible mental activity” (*oc.cit*)

bare outline taking the form “this is a verse or a piece of song which I heard earlier”. Here Vṛṣabha’s remark is very pertinent. He says that what is revived *is* only a sensation and not its indistinct objective counterpart.<sup>54</sup> BH seems to bring it to our notice that knowledge always relates to an episode, which necessarily has an objective reference irrespective of the fact whether it is capable of being perceived distinctly or vaguely. The other point he insists is that even situations of faint or vague cognitions such as these are never free from word-association, howsoever subtle, otherwise knowledge would fail to discharge its essential function, i.e. to reveal the nature or form of the other<sup>55</sup>, that is, the referent, which is grasped or received exactly the way it is expressed or conveyed by the word. Had it not been for identity with the word, Vṛṣabha goes to the extent of saying, the very usage such as ‘reveals’ or ‘illuminates’ as being the activity of prakāśa will be impossible<sup>56</sup>. The concept of pratyavamarśa comes for a detailed treatment at this point<sup>57</sup> when BH proceeds to illustrate determinate cognition. The point at issue is the analysis of the process that is involved in one’s comprehending the meaning of a statement or sentence from the group of words spoken to him.<sup>58</sup> At first one hears a series of words (forming a sentence). This leads to the cognition of meanings of words which are exclusive, non-cooperative and mutually uninvolved (*ātmāntarānātmanām*) as mere things (*vastumātrājñāne pratyavabhāsamāne*).<sup>59</sup> What follows next,<sup>60</sup> according to the *Vṛtti*, is (i)

<sup>54</sup> न विषयरूपस्य स्फुटस्य तदा स्फुरन्ति किन्तु संवेदनमात्रस्येति । – *Paddhati*, p. 191

<sup>55</sup> वाग्रूपतायां चासत्यायामुत्पन्नोऽपि प्रकाशः पररूपमनङ्गीकुर्वन् प्रकाशनक्रियासाधनरूपतायां न व्यवतिष्ठते । – *Vṛtti*, op. cit, p. 191

<sup>56</sup> विषयस्य विशिष्टं व्यपदेश्यानुसृतं, वाग्रूपतायामसत्यां च (ज्ञा?नेन) न परिच्छिद्यते । वाग्रूपतानुषक्तस्य तद्रूपोपग्रहणसामर्थ्यात् । ततश्च प्रकाशयतीति व्यवहारो न स्यात् । क्रियानिबन्धनभावो न स्यात् । – *Paddhati*, op. cit.

<sup>57</sup> A word of caution seems called for. The text of *Paddhati* on the kārikās in question, specially the present one, is unintelligible and corrupt at times despite Iyer’s best possible critical edition available under the circumstances. There seems to be ambiguity and difference of approach, aided by dearth of supportive material, between BH and VṚ and also other exponents alluded to, which makes the clearcut formulation difficult.

<sup>58</sup> वाक्यार्थविषयस्य पदार्थप्रत्यवमर्शस्य प्रत्यववाग्रूपानुषङ्गं दर्शयति । – *Paddhati*, p. 191

<sup>59</sup> भिन्नरूपाणां चानुपकारिणामात्मान्तरानात्मनामितरेतरस्य वस्तुमात्राज्ञाने प्रतिभासमाने । – *Vṛtti* on *Vāk* 1.118, p. 191

<sup>60</sup> Presentation of next steps depends on how we understand the text and whose analysis – BH’s or VṚ’s – we follow. It is clear, despite the text not being ideal and unambiguous, that BH and VṚ had different approach altogether as to the precise order involved in the various stages marking the post-indeterminate comprehension of the sentence-meaning from the words that form the sentence. The word *uttarakālaṃ* in the *Vṛtti* seems to hold the key of both, confusion as well as resolution. BH seems to connect *uttarakālaṃ* with the whole lot that follows that is, *anusandhāna*, *pratyavamarśa* and *ekārthakāritva* in that order. In the following sentence, which repeats the whole process he re-endorses the stated order (*sā hyanusandadhānā pratyavamarśanti ca sarvaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭe pyarthakriyākāriṇi*). By this logic, although unstated in words (such as *pūrvakālam*), BH takes *bhinnarūpāṇām.....pratyavabhāsāmāne* as marking the prior phase (i.e. preceding the determinate).

On the other hand VṚ is at pains to assert his difference from his master. Between *anusandhāna* and *pratyavamarśa*, he reverses the order treating *pratyavamarśa* as ‘preceding’ (*pūrvakālabhāvinī ceyam avasthā*) and *anusandhāna* as ‘following’ or ‘subsequent one’ (*yaduttarakālamiti/ abhinna padārtha-paricchedād uttarakālam/ anusandhānam iti*). VṚ seems so obsessed with his departure from his master as he leaves no occasion to underline this difference. During the course of his commentary on the present kārikā, he does so four times:

- (a) ततः तत्पूर्वकमनुसन्धानं भवति ।
- (b) प्रत्यवमर्शादिभेदमात्रानुसन्धानसंसर्गमात्रां न जहाति इति ।
- (c) ततो भेदेन प्रत्यवमृश्यानुसंधत्त इति ।

mutual delimitation of word-meanings as understood from words (*anusandhāna*, “unification”),<sup>61</sup> (ii) definite identification of meanings sensed from words by giving a shape as such and such (*pratyavamarśa*, “judgment”),<sup>62</sup> (iii) their cooperation to accomplish one purpose namely production of a single unified meaning (*ekārthakāritvaṃ*) and finally, (iv) realization of the indivisible unity of the individual sentence-meanings with the powers of the words (*avibhāgena śaktisamsargayogopagrahaḥ*). All this is rooted in the word (*vāk*) which constitutes its essence.

According to *VR* there is transposition between the first two steps. Thus “the stages in the process, as understood by *VR*, are: (i) the understanding of the word-meanings from the words, (ii) the identification of the meanings in a cognition intertwined with the word, (iii) the unification of these meanings by their mutual delimitation.”<sup>63</sup> However, *VR* is in total agreement with the *Vṛtti* in holding that the whole process of understanding sentence-meaning from the word-meanings is based on the fact that all knowledge has word as its nature.<sup>64</sup>

The detailed treatment of the *kārikā* has been necessitated by the reason that the *kārikā* itself is devised to be BH’s exegesis of *pratyavamarśa*. The tone of the *kārikā* sets the whole agenda for the *Vṛtti*. It is why, even when in the earlier portion relating to the various instances of indeterminate perception no mention of *pratyavamarśa* is made by the *Vṛtti* or in the latter portion when a distinction of the sort is sought to be made out between various stages in broader terms, entire cognitive activity seems to consist of *pratyavamarśa* by virtue of its being of the nature of the word.

The divergence of approach seen between BH and *VR* is indicative of the ambiguity that prevailed in the rank and file of the grammarians as to the precise definition of terms like *pratyavamarśa*, *anusandhāna* etc. which prompted Iyer to underline this obscurity. However, the *Vṛtti* and the *Paddhati* have seriously taken up this challenge. *VR*’s treatment offers a few insights

(d) कथं प्रत्यवमर्शः कथं तत्पूर्वकमनुसन्धानमित्याह....।

Besides, *VR* also underscores the divergent approaches as to whether these constituted a unitary state of cognition or the cognition stratified into several stages. Again we are confronted with the *Paddhati*’s far from happy condition. *VR*’s text reads as under: ततोऽप्रतिसन्धानवाक्याप्रत्ययादेकामितिकर्तव्यतां जनः। अन्ये त्वेकपरतां समीहन्ते। अन्येत्वेतत्पदत्रयम् उत्तरोत्तरव्याख्यया व्याचक्षते।

The first alternative is not intelligible. The second view seems to take it as one composite cognition. The third view takes the three terms as successive clarifications, implying an integrated cognition consisting of three stages marked by successively greater clarity. *VR* is silent on his or his master’s preference. However from the construction of the *Vṛtti* where *uttarakālam* (i.e., afterwards) covers all the three stages (also mark *hyanusandadhānā pratyavamarśantī ca* where the present participles formed with *Kṛt* affixes *śatṛ* and *śānc* in the sense of ‘the agent of the present time’ underline continuity) one is led to deduce that BH takes it as an integrated state of cognition consisting of three stages in a figurative sense because the progressively increasing clarity does not mean real division. In *VR*’s case it has to be an ordered/stratified cognition because he clearly identifies *pratyavamarśa* as “prior” and *anusandhāna* (“coordination”, “unification”) as “posterior” states.

<sup>61</sup> पदेभ्योऽवगतानामर्थानां परस्परवच्छेदेन अवधारणम् अनुसंधानम् देवदत्तकर्तृकं गोकर्मकम्, देवदत्तः कर्तृत्वादि। –*Paddhati*, p. 191

<sup>62</sup> पदेभ्योऽनुभूतानाम् अर्थानाम् आकारनिरूपणा। – *ibid*.

<sup>63</sup> *Vāk.*, Chap. 1, p. 112, note 2

<sup>64</sup> वाक्यार्थविषयस्य पदार्थप्रत्यवमर्शस्य प्रत्ययवाग्रूपानुषङ्गं दर्शयति। – *Paddhati*, p. 191

into the nature of *pratyavamarśa*. His first comment is, as we understand, that *pratyavamarśa* is *nirūpaṇa*<sup>65</sup> in its literal sense, i.e. giving a form or shape such as 'this' or 'that,' which is akin to *ākriyamāṇa* occurring in the *Vṛtti* on the previous *kārikā*. This is corroborated by his exegesis a little while later, where he says “*pratyavamarśa* consists in giving a shape to the meanings grasped from the words.”<sup>66</sup> The second comment he makes relates to the ontological chronology of *pratyavamarśa* *viś-a-viś anusandhāna* (“coordination”/ “unification”). He is of the considered view that it must take place before *anusandhāna*.<sup>67</sup> A little later, he uses another term for *pratyavamarśa*, evidenced by the context, that is *vāgrūpānuviddhapratyaya* (“cognition intertwined with/penetrated by word”) which again is presented in terms of *nirūpaṇa* expressed as ‘this’ or ‘that’ and also refers to its ontic positioning.<sup>68</sup> VR’s third comment relates to the reasoning behind his stand. It relates to the distinctive feature of the two notions. He relates *pratyavamarśa* with the consciousness of duality (*bheda*) and *anusandhāna* with that of unity (*saṁsarga*).<sup>69</sup> According to him unification takes place only after differentiation. Once again he poses a question if purposeful activity is indivisible what is the point in sequencing between *pratyavamarśa* and *anusandhāna* on the basis of differentiation and unification respectively.<sup>70</sup> He explains diversification, dualizing, means “abstraction due to the power of the word” and *saṁsarga* “connection”, “unification”.<sup>71</sup> Thus *pratyavamarśa*, as understood in the light of VR, has two dimensions. As *vāgrūpatā* it has broader perspective and subsumes all stages<sup>72</sup> and as the unified cognition characterized by difference-consciousness it has concept-specific dimension.<sup>73</sup>

<sup>65</sup> प्रत्यवमर्शिणी इति । या निरूप्यते तया । यतः शब्दानुगममन्तरेण न प्रत्यवमर्शः । – *Paddhati*, p. 190. There seems to be some ambiguity with regard to the phrase या निरूप्यते तया. Perhaps यया निरूप्यते सा world be better.

<sup>66</sup> प्रत्यवमर्शः इति । पदेभ्योऽनुभूतानामर्थानामाकारनिरूपणा । – *ibid.*, p. 191

<sup>67</sup> पूर्वकालभाविनी चेत्यवस्था । ततो ह्यनुसन्धानमिति अनुसन्धानकालमाह । – *ibid.*

<sup>68</sup> पदेभ्योऽवसितानर्थान् यदेदं तदिति वाग्रूपानुविद्धेन प्रत्ययेन निरूपयति ततः पूर्वकम् अनुसन्धानं भवति । – *ibid.*, p. 192

There is some doubt as to the interpretation of यदेदं तदिति. Is it यदा इदं तद् इति or is it यदा इदम् (इति) तद् इति? Iyer seems to prefer second interpretation. We have followed him.

<sup>69</sup> प्रत्यवमर्शादिभेदमात्रानुसन्धानसंसर्गमात्रां न जहाति । इति । ततो भेदेन प्रत्यवमृश्य अनुसन्धत्ते – *Paddhati*, p. 192

<sup>70</sup> ननु तस्याभिन्नत्वात् कथं प्रत्यवमर्शः कथं तत्पूर्वकमनुसन्धानमित्याह भेदशक्त्यपोद्धारकल्पनया । – *ibid.*

<sup>71</sup> भेदः शक्त्यपोद्धारः । संसर्गोऽप्यनुसन्धतिरूपता । – *ibid.*

<sup>72</sup> सा ह्यनुसन्धाना प्रत्यवमृशन्ती च सर्वविशेषणविशिष्टेऽप्यर्थक्रियाकारिणि प्रत्यये शक्त्यपोद्धारकल्पनया भेदसंसर्गमात्रां न विजहाति । – *Vṛtti*, p. 192.

<sup>73</sup> We may just make a passing reference to the following *kārika*, or the intervening *kārikā* (i.e. 1.117 (125) between 1.116 (124) and 1.118 (126) as it does not make part of the famous cluster we are dealing with it. The *kārikā* reads:

सा सर्वविद्याशिल्पानां कलानां चोपनिबन्धनी ।

तद्वशादभिनिष्पन्नं सर्वं वस्तु प्रविभज्यते ।

[It is this which is the basis of all the sciences, crafts and arts. Whatever is created due to this can be analysed and communicated. – tr. Iyer’s p. 112.] VR makes three points. One, all creative human and sub-human activity is traced to word as its essence. *Vāgrūpatā* is here equated with intellect (*vidyādayaśca vāgrūpāyām buddhau nibaddhāḥ*). Two, word-essence as source of the intellectual activity and creative arts is transconventional which is evident from the element of will that is generated in the wake of the prompter’s urging and the prompted’s readiness to execute in situations such as making of a jar: घटादीनां चाभिनिष्पादने प्रयोज्यप्रयोजकानामुपदेशसमीहादि सर्वं वाग्रूपतानुसारेण प्रकल्पते । – *Vṛtti*, p. 192. Three (as explained by VR.), all creative activity is externalization of the internal whether one holds the internal as already subsisting or

The next *kārikā* 1.118 (126) (or should we say the two *kārikās*, including the one cited in the *Vṛtti*) makes a radical departure from *kārikā* 1.116 (124) which distinguished consciousness from knowledge. Now this *kārikā* makes strong assertion of oneness of ‘consciousness’<sup>74</sup> with ‘being of the nature of word.’ This being so, the fact of ‘having the nature of Vāk’ constitutes the differentium between<sup>75</sup> the sentient and the insentient. *VṚ* utilizes this opportunity to exegete “persistence of identity with Vāk” (*vāgrūpatānugamaḥ*) in term of *pratyavamarśa*. There are no new elements in the definition except a little more emphasis that *pratyavamarśa* is nothing but the intrinsic association with the word-being which is responsible for the identification or delimitation of the individual meanings.<sup>76</sup> This is what, *VṚ* says, provides the basis for designating one as sentient and other as insentient, as alive or as dead. In fact, *VṚ* points out that *pratyavamarśa* causes cognition which is another name for worldly discourse. *Vyavahāra*, really speaking, is interaction between two or more, which is based on communication which in turn stems from our precise formulation of word-meanings. Thus, BH goes to the extent of seeing the word as pervading even our internal space of psychic experiences as well as outer space of day to day purposeful activities.<sup>77</sup> Another point of importance to which BH’s *Vṛtti* draws attention happens to be that the mark of consciousness lies in the sentient being’s capacity to know (*sambodha*).<sup>78</sup> An insentient being is incapable of knowing. All the living or sentient beings fall under two categories– the stationary (*sathāvara*) who are able to know themselves alone and the human beings (this includes all living species capable of moving – *jaṅgama*)<sup>79</sup> are endowed with the capacity to know both, themselves as well as others. The latter capacity means both, as Iyer would have it, knowing others as well as making others know.

Since the word and consciousness are regarded as homologous concepts, the *Vṛtti* allows some insight into the nature of consciousness. It appears that in BH’s school consciousness is considered to be a dynamic principle, hence consciousness is always referred to as ‘activity of consciousness’ (*citikriyā*) or ‘activity in the nature of consciousness’ to be more precise. But there is no unanimity with regard to the nature and extent of closeness between the word and the consciousness.<sup>80</sup> One view regards them quite close, maintaining that the activity of consciousness is

---

instantly created: अभिनिष्पन्नाम् इति । वाग्रूपतावशादन्तस्तन्निष्पन्नं वस्तु, पश्चाद् विभज्यते बहीरूपेण क्रियते । यद्वा निष्पन्नमपि वस्तु । – *Paddhati* on 1.117, p. 192

That is, all creation – as in the case of word – is expression, that is, communication.

<sup>74</sup> तन्मात्राव्यतिक्रान्तं चैतन्यं सर्वजातिषु ॥ – *Vāk*. 1.118 (126) cd.

<sup>75</sup> योऽयं चैतन्ये वाग्रूपतानुगमस्तेन लोके ससंज्ञो विसंज्ञ इति व्यपदेशः क्रियते । – *Vṛtti*, p. 193

<sup>76</sup> यो विशिष्टाकारपरिच्छेदकेन वाग्रूपानुषङ्गेण प्रत्यवमर्शेण प्रत्ययो व्यवहारः । तेन अतः । ससंज्ञः तदभावात् विसंज्ञः । – *Paddhati*, p. 193

<sup>77</sup> वाग्रूपानुषङ्ग एव पदार्थानां समीहनं चेष्टनं भवति इति वाचैव युक्ताः प्राणिनः चेष्टन्ते । – *ibid*.

<sup>78</sup> नहि सा चैतन्येन अनाविष्टा जातिरस्ति यस्यां स्वपरसंबोधो यो वाचा नानुगम्यते । – *Vṛtti*, p. 193

<sup>79</sup> स्वसंबोधानुगम एव स्थावरेषु, उभयानुगमो जङ्गमेषु मनुष्यादिषु इति । – *Paddhati*, p. 193

<sup>80</sup> तस्माच्चित्तिक्रियारूपम् अलब्धवाक्शक्तिपरिग्रहं न विद्यते । वाक्तत्वरूपमेव चित्तिक्रियारूपमित्यन्ये । – *Vṛtti*, p. 193

intimately linked with the powers of the word. But, points out VṚ, that this closeness is not close enough to culminate into identity. Hence, on this view, consciousness lacks the word as its defining essence.<sup>81</sup> The contrarian view, on the other hand, reduces the activity of consciousness to the Word-Principle, which according to VṚ is the Supreme Word itself. The latter view is the upholder of non-dualism and, it appears, that this was BH's natural preference.<sup>82</sup> Perhaps this consciousness-word equation was overcoded by the later grammarians such as Helārāja to identify *parāmarśa* (i.e. *pratyavamarśa*) with the *Parā Vāk* endowed with agential functionality.<sup>83</sup>

BH's foundational concept of word as *pratyamarśa* has elicited square refutation from the other end of Indian philosophy namely the Buddhist logicians. Incidentally for Buddhists too it is a premium notion but with altogether different formulation leading to the opposite conclusion. For Buddhist reality consists of unique particulars, point instants, which have no synthesis and no word-element, whereas our day-to-day empirical world is a constructed reality inhabited by the stream of particulars, logically synthesized. These unique particulars are directly perceived by pure sensation, that is, indeterminate perception, as bare mental reflex (*pratibhāsa*). The mentally constructed reality is apprehended by *adhyavasāya*, i.e. judgement, which is synthetic and is capable of coalescing with the word or designation. Thus, it is through indeterminate perception that we apprehend reality whereas our determinate knowledge lands us into a kind of illusion.

Now it is the infusion of word or designation, *abhilāpa* in the Buddhist parlance, that converts pure sensation into the determinately constructed knowledge. Perception (or the indeterminate knowledge) is defined by Dharmakīrti as knowledge bereft of construction (*kalpanā*)<sup>84</sup>, and *kalpanā*<sup>85</sup> is defined as “distinct cognition of a mental reflex which is capable of coalescing with a verbal designation.”<sup>86</sup> This coalescing of mental reflex with the corresponding words (*abhilāpasamsarga*) is what is generally understood by word-meaning convention (*vācyavācakabhāva*). According to Dharmakīrti's formulation, as interpreted by Dharmottara, not only those mental reflexes that are accompanied by their designating words but also those that are capable of being so accompanied are

<sup>81</sup> अलब्ध इति। वाग्वृत्तानुषङ्गोपलम्भराहित्यम्। तदेव भेदः चैतन्यवाचोः। – *Paddhati*, p. 193

This is interesting to note that VṚ reads (चिति ?) क्रियानुरूपम् इति for चितिक्रियारूपम् in the Vṛtti and glosses the same as चैतन्यक्रियानुरूपम्. This reading supports the duality-doctrine as *anurūpa* means ‘similar’ or ‘like’. We may also add that this view, in all probability, is precursor of the Śaiva Dualist's theory of speech.

<sup>82</sup> अन्ये त्वभेदमेव मन्यन्ते इत्याह वाक्तृत्वम् इति। परं शब्दं ब्रूमः। – *Paddhati*, pp. 193-194

<sup>83</sup> परामर्शस्य परवागात्मनः कर्तृभूम्युपाख्यस्य....। – *Prakīrṇa.*, p. 125, op.cit

<sup>84</sup> तत्र प्रत्यक्षं कल्पनापोढमभ्रान्तम्॥ – *Nyāya-bindu*, 1.4 in *Dharmottarapradīpa* on Dharmottara's *Nyāya-binduṭīkā*, Durveka Miśra, ed. D. Malvania, Patna, 1955

<sup>85</sup> अभिलापसंसर्गयोग्यप्रतिभासा प्रतीतिः कल्पना। – *ibid.*, 1.5

<sup>86</sup> *Buddhist Logic*, Th. Stcherbatsky, vol. II, New york, 1962, p. 19

all included by *kalpanā*. This will include the mental construction of even a newly born baby.<sup>87</sup> We may ask how is it that we ascertain that this is a mental fabrication? Buddhist says because it is not produced by the object (point instant) actually apprehended. It is at this point the notion of *pratyavamarśa*, “synthetic judgement”, is brought in: A new-born stops crying and sucks his mother’s breast only when a synthesis is generated that this breast is the one which he fed upon during his former birth.<sup>88</sup> Dharmottara, as per Durveka’s explanation, emphasizes that baby’s determinate judgement and, for that matter, all judgements involve some kind of rudimentary synthesis, because whenever a cognition which unifies the two experiences, former with the latter, will never have its object present since the former experience is no longer there.<sup>89</sup>

Śāntarakṣita incorporates BH’s “*anuviddhamiva*” kārikā as part of verse 1216 and says that the verbal intertwining of knowledge rather vindicates the Buddhist stand of envisaging mental construction (*kalpanā*) in infant’s perception and also in the moments of acute anxiety and flight of imagination.<sup>90</sup> Drawing inspiration from Śāntarakṣita, Vidyākaraśānti turns BH’s argument against BH himself. Objects our author, if all thoughts are characterized by the word as their essence no form of knowledge will be able to directly apprehend the object, as there will always be an element of construction involved in it.<sup>91</sup> Commenting upon Dharmakīrti’s famous kārikā<sup>92</sup>, which AG is also very fond of referring to, Manorathanandin defines *parāmarśa* in terms of constructed synthesis between object (meaning) and its designation where the designation relates to memory of the past experience and the object to the perceptual experience. And then he raises a doubt as to how this

<sup>87</sup> Cf. *ibid.*, p. 20

<sup>88</sup> कुतः पुनरेतद्विकल्पोऽर्थात्रोत्पद्यत इति? अर्थसंनिधिनिरपेक्षत्वात्। बालोऽपि हि यावद् दृश्यमानं स्तनं स एवायम् इति पूर्वदृष्टत्वेन न प्रत्यवमृशति तावन्नोपरतरुदितो मुखमर्पयति स्तने। – *Nyāyabinduṭīkā*, pp. 50-51

<sup>89</sup> पूर्वदृष्टत्वं पूर्वदर्शनविषयत्वम्। तेन यो मया पूर्वं क्षुत्प्रतिघातहेतुत्वेन प्रतिपन्नः स एवाऽयमिति प्रत्यवमर्शस्य रूपमाचष्टे। न प्रत्यवमृशति न प्रत्यभिजानाति।... *Pradīpa*, p. 51; also cf. *Buddhist Logic*, II, pp. 19-24

<sup>90</sup> चिन्तोत्प्रेक्षादिकाले च काले विस्पष्टं या प्रवेद्यते।

अनुविद्धैव सा शब्दैरपहोतुं न शक्यते।। – *Tattva-saṅgraha* (T.S.) of Ācārya Śāntarakṣita, with *Pañjikā* by Kamalaśīla, ed. D.D. Shastri, Varanasi, vol. I, 1968, verse 1216; Kamalaśīla comments:

चिन्तेत्यादिना भूयः प्रत्यक्षतः कल्पनासिद्धिमाह। – *op cit*, p. 450; the *Vāk.*, Poona edition, reproduces this verse. – *op. cit* p. 313

<sup>91</sup> अन्यार्थं कृतमन्यार्थं भवतीति न्यायात् परविप्रतिपत्तिरपि निराकृता द्रष्टव्या। तथाहि वैयाकरणैरुक्तम् –

‘न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते।

अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन जायते।।’ इति।

सर्वप्रत्ययानां शब्दानुगतत्वरूपत्वे कस्यचिदपि ज्ञानस्य अर्थसाक्षात्करणायोगात्। –

*Tarkasopāna* of Vidyākaraśānti, in “Minor Buddhist Texts”, edited by G. Tucci, p. 279 (reproduced by *Vāk.* Poona edition, *ibid.*)

<sup>92</sup> संकेतस्मरणोपायं दृष्टसंकल्पनात्मकम्।

पूर्वापरपरामर्शशून्ये तच्चाक्षुषे कथम्।। – *Pramāṇavārttika* of Dharmakīrti (*Pra. Vā*), with *Vṛtti* of Manorathanandin, ed. D.D. Shastri, Varanasi, 1968, 2.174

verbal synthesis is at all possible in the sense-perception which by definition apprehends the bare, unmixed, real moment.<sup>93</sup>

One of the biggest challenges for the Buddhist is to account for his dealing with the external world because the reality is the constant flow of unique particulars. We do not know the external objects, rather we deal with the constructed images. To quote Stcherbatsky, “our images are not constructed by the external world, but the external world is constructed according to our images.” It is here that the notion of *ekapratyavamarśa* becomes the Buddhist’s biggest weapon to account for the seeming unity of the series of moments belonging to a particular object as different from others. By this we understand a kind of unitary synthetic judgement which causes a unitary perception of an object despite the real discreteness.<sup>94</sup> This is produced by an aggregate of the mutually cooperative causal factors, for instance the combination of sense of sight, colour, light, mental attention etc. give rise to colour perception, but not the sense of hearing<sup>95</sup>. Although all point instants are mutually exclusive yet some of them have reciprocal congeniality which others do not have. These cooperative factors combine in which the law of contradistinction (*apohana*) plays an important part in giving rise to a unitary synthetic judgement which is responsible for designating an object as 'this', as 'that' and this becomes our entry point into the empirical world of purposive activities.<sup>96</sup>

This prompts the Buddhist to assail BH’s basic presupposition. Śāntarakṣita, in the *Tattvasamgraha*, devotes a full-length section to the critique of *Śabdabrahman*.<sup>97</sup> Citing “*na sōsti pratyayo loka*” (*Vāk.* 1.115) twice, his commentator Kamalaśīla attacks BH on two counts. One, on the count of word-impregnation constituting the essence of the cognition and two, on the count of the identity of the object with the word as a logical outcome of the word-impregnation of awareness.<sup>98</sup> countering this Kamalaśīla argues that the analytical reason (*svabhāvahetu*) in the form of word-penetration is not at all supported by perception as posited by BH.

The Buddhist argument runs thus. BH has attacked the Buddhist theory of transitoriness on the ground that it is against the verdict of experience. To which the Buddhist answers that transitoriness

<sup>93</sup> तच्च पूर्वस्य संकेतकालदृष्टवाचकशब्दस्य अपरस्य दृश्यमानार्थस्य परामर्शो वाच्यवाचकतायोजनम्, तेन शून्या शब्दामिश्रवस्तुस्वरूपग्राहिणि चाक्षुषे ज्ञाने कथं सम्भाव्यते। – *Vṛtti* on the above, p. 153

<sup>94</sup> cp. एकप्रत्यवमर्शस्य हेतुत्वाद् धीरभेदिनी।

एकधीहेतुभावेन व्यक्तीनामप्यभिन्नता।। – *Pra. Vā.* 3.109

<sup>95</sup> एकप्रत्यवमर्श एकाकाराध्यवसायो.... यथा चक्षुरूपालोकमनस्कारादयः एव भेदाऽविशेषेऽपि रूपविज्ञानं जनयन्ति, न श्रोत्रशब्दादयः। – *Vṛtti* on *Pra. Vā.* 3.73, p. 282

<sup>96</sup> एकप्रत्यवमर्शाख्ये ज्ञाने भेदाविशेषेऽपि केचिदेव भावा एकाकाराध्यवसायहेतवः नेतरे। – *ibid.*, pp 294-95

<sup>97</sup> Vide T.S. 128-135

<sup>98</sup> सर्व एव प्रत्ययोऽर्थेषूपजायमानः शब्दोल्लेखानुगत एवोपजायते। यथोक्तम् –

न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते।

अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन वर्तते।।

ज्ञानाकारनिबन्धना च वस्तूनां स्वभावप्रज्ञप्तिः। अतः सिद्धमेषां शब्दाकारानुस्यूतत्वम्, तत्सिद्धौ च तन्मयत्वमपि सिद्धमेव, तन्मात्रभावित्वात्तन्मयत्वस्येति। ते वाच्या ..... – *pra. Vā. Vṛtti*, p. 86

is undoubtedly apprehended in the indeterminate perception, but because it is not definitively ascertained by the determinate cognition it leads BH to take it to be non-existent. BH overlooks the fact since these are two cognitions having existence of transitoriness as well as non-existence thereof as their separate objects, there is no inner contradiction *per se*. Yet BH denies transitoriness on the misconceived ground that the constructed judgement of the determinate perception fails to support it. But BH's position is no better. He cannot say that the word is apprehended by the indeterminate perception but not endorsed by its determinate successor, because of his known opposition to the doctrine of radical separation between the sources of our knowledge (*pramāṇa-vyavasthā*). Hence if word is affirmed by even one perception, all experiences will turn out to be determinate because of the inevitable coalescence with the verbal element. But such a scenario will not be palatable to BH himself, because he does subscribe to the existence of some kind of indeterminate apprehension, and will thus be patently against the verdict of our experience. Hence BH ought to desist from propagating the unity of cognition with the word.<sup>99</sup> Śāntarakṣita carries his onslaught to its logical conclusion. He once again castigates the Word-Absolutist's contention that although Brahman is always indivisible and undifferentiated, the differentiation is brought in by the nuisance created by nescience (*avidyā*). This also falls for the same reason invalidating word-penetration doctrine. According to BH, says the Buddhist, the consciousness-character of the ultimate reality is evidenced by the perception called *svasaṁvedana* ("self-sensation"). But, on the ground, it is not sustained by *svasaṁvedana*. Let us take the case of a person who is looking at an object, say *nīla* ("blue"), with his eyes while his mind is distracted elsewhere. In this eventuality although he does not notice, does not grasp any name it does not mean that he has no experience at all of the 'blue', he does have an experience, but it is wordless. This clearly disproves what is sought to be established by BH's *kārikā* "na sōsti" and also, as a consequence, perception fails to demonstrate the ultimate reality being of the nature of the word.<sup>100</sup>

On the other side of the spectrum are realists – the adherents of Mīmāṁsā and Nyāya both. BH was denounced in these circles too. The theory of the grammarian that all thoughts were necessarily and unexceptedly associated with words was not acceptable to Kumāṛila so far as it related to the indeterminate perception. Kumāṛila says that the indeterminate perception is like the

<sup>99</sup> न चैवं भवतां पक्षे शब्दस्य ग्रहणाग्रहणे युक्ते, सर्वज्ञानानां सविकल्पकलाभ्युपगमात् । ....अथ किंचिदविकल्पमपि ज्ञानमभ्युपगम्यते! न तर्हि वक्तव्यम् – “न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते” इति । शब्दाकारानुस्यूतत्वादिति च हेतुर्न सिद्ध्येत्, ततश्च प्रमाणाभावाच्छब्दात्मकत्वव्यवस्थापनं न निश्चीयेत । – *ibid.*, p. 89

<sup>100</sup> स्यादेतत् – स्वसंवेदनप्रत्यक्षत एव तत्सिद्धम्, ज्ञानात्मरूपत्वात्, तथा हि ज्योतिस्तदेव शब्दात्मकत्वाच्चैतन्यरूपत्वाच्चेति? तदेतत् स्वसंवेदनविरुद्धम् । तथा हि – अन्यत्र गतमानसोऽपि चक्षुषा रूपमीक्षमाणोऽनादिष्टाभिलापमेव । नीलादिप्रत्ययमनुभवति । ....एतेन यदुक्तम् “न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके” इत्यादि, तदपि प्रत्युक्तं भवति । – *ibid.*, p. 90; cf. *Vāk*, Poona edition, p. 208-209

apprehension of the child and the dumb. There is no word-element in it. It implies “that we cannot be conscious of an indeterminate perception in terms of thought.”<sup>101</sup>

D. N. Shastri refers to the views of Jayanta and Vyoma-śiva who held that in the indeterminate perception there is no word-element and therefore it is vague and indefinite.<sup>102</sup> Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, while explaining *avyapadeśya* ("ineffable") in Gotama's definition of perception, declares that BH's thesis “*na sōsti....bhāsate*” suffers from the defect called *asambhava* (“impossible”) because the object which is sought to be defined (*lakṣya*) that is, the indeterminate cognition, does not exist in reality.<sup>103</sup> This has slight affinity with Dignāga's viewpoint and also with that of Kumārila. Both of them vehemently insist that there is no word-element in the indeterminate cognition. In Vācaspati Misra (although he preceded Udayana) this theory takes a slightly more developed form. His view is that in the indeterminate perception individual as well as universal both are apprehended except that their relationship as substance and attribute is not noticed.<sup>104</sup> Thus it will be seen that while Kumārila opposes BH, Vācaspati supports the latter and for the same reason criticizes Kumārila and invokes BH in approval.<sup>105</sup>

The Śaiva Siddhāntins are very vocal critics of BH though they assimilate many insights of BH into their theory of speech. However our immediate concern is their notion of *parāmarśa*. Realists as they are, they approximate Kumārila ideologically unlike BH and KS. It may be

<sup>101</sup> *Critique of Indian Realism*; D.N. Shastri, p. 439; also see NVT, pp. 126-127

<sup>102</sup> *Critique*, p. 439, note 65

<sup>103</sup> न च शब्दानुसन्धानरहितः कश्चित् प्रत्ययो दृश्यते। अनुलिखितशब्दकेष्वपि प्रत्ययेषु अन्ततः सामान्यशब्दसमुन्मेषसम्भवात् तदुल्लेखव्यतिरेकेण प्रकाशात्मिकायाः प्रतीतेरनुत्पादात्। तथाऽऽह भर्तृहरिः –

न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते।

अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन गम्यते ॥

तस्मात्प्रत्यक्षस्य लक्ष्यस्यासद्भावात् कस्येदं लक्षणमुपक्रान्तमिति असम्भवदोषमाशंक्याह सूत्रकारः अन्यव्यपदेश्यमिति। – *Nyāya-mañjarī* of Udayana, Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series, vol. 8, part 1, p. 80

<sup>104</sup> अविद्यमानं व्यपदेश्यं यस्मिंस्तदव्यपदेश्यं जात्यादिस्वरूपावगाहि न तु जात्यादीनां मिथो विशेषणविशेष्यभावावगाहि। – *Nyāya-vārtika-tātparyaṭīkā* of Vācaspati Miśra, ed. R.S. Dravid, Benares, Ist Adhyāya, vol. 1, 1925, p. 125

<sup>105</sup> तथा च नाविकल्पं शब्दरहितमस्तीति तात्पर्यार्थः। तथा चाहः

न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते।

अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन गम्यते।

बालमूकादीनामपि विज्ञानं शब्दानुव्याधवदेव अनादिशब्दभावनावशात्। – *ibid.*, p. 127

Matilal, seems to support Vācaspati's interpretation from a different perspective and notices an indirect convergence between the views of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika on the one hand and those of BH. and KS on the other. Says he,

"All *pramāṇa* theorists agree, first and foremost but with varying degrees of emphasis, that what exists, or is really there, can be known (and is known). The domain of the knowables seems to converge, or coincide, with only a few exceptions, with the domain of 'existents'. Some (e.g. Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika) would even go further to say that what is knowable is also *eo epso* 'effable', i.e. expressible or nameable in language, for whatever satisfies the conditions for being known satisfies also the conditions for being expressed or named. Other *pramāṇa* theorists, however, part company with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and are reluctant to make knowability a sufficient condition for 'effability'. There are others, for example Bhartṛhari and possibly also the proponents of Kashmir Śaivism, who would lend an indirect support to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika position by propounding a theory of an intimate connection between language and 'structured' knowledge."

– *Perception*, Bimal Krishna Matilal, Oxford, 1986, p. 29

interesting to know that wherever Rāmakaṅṭha, in his *Vṛtti* on the *Mataṅgapārameśvara*, seizes an occasion to discuss his notion of *parāmarśa*,<sup>106</sup> he invariably quotes Kumārila's famous statement in this regard.<sup>107</sup> Like Kumārila he also holds that knowledge of the first moment,<sup>108</sup> i.e. indeterminate apprehension, is totally free from verbal association of any kind whatsoever and is comparable with the apprehension which an infant or a dumb person has. The cognition that we have is twofold – non-judgemental and judgemental, coming in succession. Rāmakaṅṭha employs four sets of terms interchangeably to designate these states – eg. *ālocanapratyaya* and *parāmarśapratyaya*, *grahaṇa* and *parāmarśa*, *anadhyavasāya* and *adhyavasāya*, as well as *anubhava* and *parāmarśa*. At the indeterminate level the object is apprehended as a bare object, without any attributes (*nirviśeṣa*) and becomes meaningful only when the judgement relating to the object is reflectively appraised by the modality of ego (*ahaṅkāravṛtṭyā ātmaparāmarśaḥ*).<sup>109</sup> It may be mentioned, for the sake of clarity, that this is not the reflectiveness of the individual self, but of the inner sense (*antaḥkaraṇa*), which takes the form 'I am fair', 'This is cow' etc. Employing the method borrowed from the Buddhist logician, he contends that *ātman* is said to be realized through perception.<sup>110</sup> In fact, *parāmarśa* when philosophically appropriated, constitutes the self's knowledge-power, which is capable of illuminating own self as well others. But as Siddhāntin is a dualist, power and its prius indeed happen to be different. Hence the indeterminate cognition, i.e. non-judgemental reflexivity (*parāmarśa*), always shines as cognizer or as 'the nature of the individual soul' but not as the 'individual soul',<sup>111</sup> whereas *adhyasāya* by virtue of being a product of intellect<sup>112</sup> cannot partake of the nature of subject otherwise it will reduce the eternal into the ephemeral.

The problem of *parāmarśa* has been handled at a much higher plane by the Śaiva dualists. According to them there are three ultimate reals – Pati, Paśu and Pāśa ("Lord", "individual souls" and

<sup>106</sup> Vide *Mataṅgapārameśvarāgama (Ma.Pā)* (Vidyāpāda), with *Vṛtti* by Rāmakaṅṭha, (*Ma.Pā.V.*), ed. N.R. Bhatt, Pondichery, 1977, 6.35: 174-175; 10.6-13<sup>ab</sup>: 312-313; 17.2 : 382

<sup>107</sup> अस्ति ह्यालोचनज्ञानं प्रथमं निर्विकल्पकम् ।

बालमूकादिविज्ञानसदृशं शुद्धवस्तुजम् ॥

ततः परं पुनर्वस्तु धर्मेर्जात्यादिभिर्यया ।

बुद्ध्यावसीयते सोऽपि प्रत्यक्षत्वेन संमता ॥ – *Ma. Pā.*, loc cit.

<sup>108</sup> The 'first moment' has a broader connotation as it includes all apprehensions where the determinate ideation is not felt as for instance in the states of sheer joy or acute anxiety. Cf.

अशिरो लक्षणे काये सेयं संविच्चितेः सदा ॥

आह्लादे वाऽप्यथवोद्रेगे । – *Ma. Pā.* 6.34<sup>cd</sup>-6.35<sup>ab</sup>

<sup>109</sup> न ह्यहंकारवृत्त्या आत्मपरामर्शं विना कश्चिदपि विषयपरामर्शं उपपद्यते । – *op. cit.*, p. 312

<sup>110</sup> ततश्च घटोऽयमितिवद् अनुभवपृष्ठपातिना निश्चयप्रत्ययेन विषयीकृतत्वाद् आत्मापि प्रत्यक्षेण निश्चित एव । .....एवं स्वपरात्मप्रकाशकतया ज्ञानशक्तिरूपेण परामर्शाच्च आत्मा प्रत्यक्ष उक्तः । – *op. cit.*, p. 175

<sup>111</sup> तत्र योऽनध्यवसायात्मकः स सर्वदा ग्राह(क)रूपेणैव भासमान आत्मस्वभाव एवेत्युक्तम् । – *op. cit.*, p. 383

<sup>112</sup> आलोचनज्ञानादनन्तरं परामर्शबुद्ध्युत्पादे मनोव्यापारः कार्यसिद्धः । – *op. cit.*, p. 313

"noose"). These constitute the three primary categories. Pati is called Paṛamaśiva from whom ensue thirtysix dependent categories beginning with Śiva or *bindu* (often designated as *para bindu* in order to separate it from *bindu*, also called *akṣara bindu*).<sup>113</sup> It is also called Mahāmāyā, the insentient material cause of pure creation and happens to be different from Paramaśiva, the primary category.

The Śiddhāntā Śaivism traces determinacy in thought to the words, but at the same time the determinate knowledge cannot be explained in terms of *buddhi*, because determinacy is found in levels beyond *māyā* (a dependent category which happens to be the material cause of the impure creation) also. It, therefore, holds that there is the subtle sound (*śabda*) which evolves out of *bindu* (or *parabindu*) agitated by the Lord. This subtle sound is called *vidyā* or *nāda*. Thus, *nāda* is the undifferentiated cause of the subtle inner speech. According to Rāmakaṇṭha, when an object is grasped in an indeterminate apprehension by a cognitive source it is *buddhi* that differentiates the indeterminate objects of the determinate judgement and relates them as the designator and the designated. This verbal activity is always addressed to an object which has been sensorily apprehended otherwise it will cause the determinate apprehension of all the objects for ever.<sup>114</sup> In his commentary on the *Sārdhatriśatīkālottarāgama*, Rāmakaṇṭhā talks of three levels of the word – gross, subtle and ultimate (*sthūla*, *sūkṣma* and *para*). The gross is what we hear, the subtle is what prompts the gross. Out of these two the subtle is of the nature of *parāmarśa*. All words and meanings exist here in an undifferentiated state of unity just as the different colours exist in the liquid of a peahen's yolk.<sup>115</sup> Although the word in this state is not an object of hearing, it is from this store house that *nāda* manifests a particular word and its corresponding meaning to be differentiated by the intellectual operation. It is reflective and judgemental, though undifferentiated. In contrast, the ultimate (i.e. *para*) word is free from all reflection and beyond the realm of thought. It happens to be the source of the subtle word (*cintāmayā*, i.e. *parāmarśa*) and is called *nāda*. Rāmakaṇṭhā equates it with *paśyantī* of BH.

What the Śaiva Śiddhāntin wants to ultimately drive at is that whereas the individual subject or self happens to be the thought-free consciousness, a thought is never without a judgement.<sup>116</sup> This judgement in the undifferentiated form consists in the subtle murmur and defines the signification

<sup>113</sup> *An Outline of History of Śaiva Philosophy (An Outline)*, K C Pandey, Delhi, 1986, p. 88-90

<sup>114</sup> बुद्धिर्हि तावद्बाह्ये चक्षुरादिना विषयीकृत एवार्थेऽध्यवसायिनी दृष्ट्या नाविषयीकृते अतिप्रसङ्गात्। ततश्चान्तरे बुद्धिः केनापि विषयीकृत एवार्थे परामर्शं करोति। अन्यथा सर्वदा सर्वार्थपरामर्शप्रसङ्गात्। ....अतः संजल्पात्मा इति। – *Vṛtti* on *Nādakārikā* 11, in *Aṣṭaprakaraṇa*, ed B.V. Dwivedi, Varanasi, 1988 p. 242. Also see *An Outline*, pp. 94, 221

<sup>115</sup> यत् तस्यापि प्रवर्तकमित्यभिप्रायवशात्.... परामर्शात्मकम् अविभक्तं तद्वाच्यतदर्थमविभागशक्तिविशेषात्मकत्वान्मायूराण्डरसबिन्दुव्यपदेश्यानेकमात्ररूपत्वतः .... अश्रोत्रग्राह्यं तत्परामर्शज्ञानरूपमेवानुभवतः सिद्धमित्यर्थः। – *Sārdhatriśatīkālottarāgama*, with *Vṛtti* of Rāmakaṇṭha, ed. N. R. Bhatt, (*Sārdh.*) Pondichery, 1979, 1.8, p. 15

<sup>116</sup> आत्मस्वरूपविदस्तु शैवाः तां सूक्ष्माख्यां बिन्दुकार्यभूतां शब्दवृत्तिमेव मन्यन्ते न तु पुरुषसमवायिनीम्। – quoted from *Ratnatrayaparīkṣā* of Śrīkaṇṭha by Pandey, *An Outline*. p. 222, note 2.

(*vācakatā*) of the word. The external objects represent the meaning part and are called “denotata” (*vācyā*).<sup>117</sup> Its characteristic feature, i.e. inner murmur (*antaḥsaṁjalpa*) is explained in terms of “inner judgemental knowledge” (*āntaravimarśātmaka jñāna*) which consists in the intellect’s role of analyzing and designating an object appearing in a sensory perception. Thus *nāda* as the undifferentiated subtle signifier covers all the meanings as its object, bringing all – existent as well as non-existent – within its ambit.<sup>118</sup> It is from this point of view that Aghoraśiva upholds the inalienable relationship between thought and word, so glorified in the grammarian school.<sup>119</sup>

The Siddhānta Śaiva dualism has appropriated BH’s famous *kārikās* under reference in different contexts rendering them as part of its formulations but these may be skipped for the present for want of immediate relevance. None-the-less their evaluation in terms of the tantric soteriology definitely merits a reference, all the more so for the reason that the KS monists too have made similar appropriation specially in the Spanda cluster of *kārikās*. Śrīkaṇṭha considers knowledge of the fettered individuals as intertwined with the word and instead of quoting, incorporates *Vāk*. 1.115 wholesale as *kārikā* 84<sup>cd</sup>- 85<sup>cd</sup> in his *Ratnatraya-parīkṣā*.<sup>120</sup> As a logical continuation, echoing the theme of BH’s famous *kārikā*, he holds that *Mahāmāyā* (the principle of *pāśa*, which is also the cause of determinacy), if not properly understood, always obscures the knowledge of *paśu* through intertwining with the word.<sup>121</sup> Properly understood, it becomes pure word-power (*vāk-śakti*)<sup>122</sup> and becomes instrumental, as *mantra*, to the success of individual self’s pursuit of power and liberation.<sup>123</sup>

<sup>117</sup> रूपरसगन्धशब्दाद्यर्था येनावमुश्यतां नीताः ।

सोऽन्तःसंजल्पात्मा नादः सिद्धो न विषयभावेन ॥ – *Nādakārika* ॥

<sup>118</sup> विषयीकुर्वन् सर्वान् शब्दार्थानेष वाचको नान्यः ।

दृष्टं सदप्यसत् तद् यस्मादेतेन सदा परामृष्टम् ॥ – *ibid.* 12

<sup>119</sup> तदुक्तम् – “न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते ।

अनुविद्धमिह ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन जायते ॥” इति । – *Vṛtti on Nādakārikā*, p. 242

<sup>120</sup> न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययोऽणूनां यः शब्दानुगमादृते ॥

अनुविद्धमिह ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन गम्यते । – *Ratnatrayaparīkṣā* of Śrīkaṇṭha, in *Aṣṭaprakaraṇa*, 84<sup>cd</sup>- 85<sup>ab</sup>

<sup>121</sup> सा भोगसाधनोपायप्रत्ययोदयहेतुना ॥

शब्दानुवेधेन सदा मोहयेदविचेचिता । – *ibid.* 169<sup>cd</sup>-170<sup>ab</sup>

<sup>122</sup> शान्त्यतीता पञ्चमी शिवशक्तिरपि शुद्धवाक्स्वरूपा नादाख्यं यत् तत्त्वमित्युक्तम्....तन्मध्ये पुरुषः सूक्ष्मदेहाभिव्यक्तो दृक्क्रियामात्रो....न वाक्छक्तेरपि व्यतिरिक्तमात्मानं मन्यते । यदाहुः –

वाग्रूपा चेदुक्त्वामेदवबोधस्य शाश्वती ।

न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत सा हि प्रत्यवमर्शिनी ॥ इति । – *Vṛtti on Sārdha*. 10.18-19, pp 93-94

<sup>123</sup> शक्तिश्चात्र नादशक्तिरेव विवक्षिता । तत्रैव मन्त्राणां वस्तुतो विनिविष्टत्वात् । सकलपशुगतात् प्रागुक्ताद् बोध्यपरामर्शलक्षणात् कुर्यादितत्सिद्धमित्यर्थः । तदिदमुक्तम् –

“न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादृते ।

अनुविद्धमिव ज्ञानं सर्वं शब्देन जायते ॥”

इति । ....तस्य यथा पुरुषभोगमोक्षकार्याभ्यामन्यथानुपपत्त्या प्रगमो सिद्धः, तथात्रापीत्युक्तमित्यविरोधः । तदिदमाहुः –

“वाग्रूपता चेदुक्त्वामेदवबोधस्य शाश्वती ।

न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत साभिप्रत्यवमर्शिनी ॥” इति । – *Vṛtti on Sārdh.*, on 1.6<sup>cd</sup>- 7<sup>ab</sup>, pp. 14-15

In Kashmir Śaivism, which in the immediate context stands for the monistic strand of philosophical speculation, we discern a paradigm shift from conceiving reality as consisting of *śabda* (subsuming *artha*) to reality as constituted by *prakāśa* and *vimarśa*. This shift, though a direct outcome of BH's impact on KS, also marks the subtle line of departure from Bh's notion of philosophy itself. For BH the philosophy of language exhausts all philosophy, whereas for KS philosophy as such covers all aspects of thought – howsoever seemingly diverse and polarized – severally carrying equal weightage by themselves and yet syncretized into a unified vision emanating from and logically sustained by a complete hermeneutics of the Word and Meaning in terms of *prakāśa* and *vimarśa* which may be concisely summed up as a discovery of reality by its self-referring, self-affirming consciousness. Metaphysically this amounts to “a recognition of reference, i.e. the meaning in experience”.<sup>124</sup> This also brings another paradigm of the Abhinavan thought into bold relief. This is the paradigm of recognition inspired by BH via his theory of the levels of speech and apprehension and conveyance of meaning. In view of the stringent Buddhist denial of the validity of recognition, UTP and AG reconstruct a complete metaphysics of recognition making it essential to the very structure of thought, speech, and reality. It is in this context Iyer's English rendering of *pratyavamarśa* as “recognition-cum-identification” assumes added significance buttressed by Lawrence's forceful reasoning in support. On our part we do not propose to translate these terms because *pratyabhijñā*, *prakāśa* and *vimarśa* all these and also other cognate terms are intended to convey the distinctive connotations at several levels of usage yet so integrated to one another that it would be only fair if we use them as such.

The system of UTP and AG has put up two entirely different – one may even say, contradictory – valuations on BH. From a derogatory epithet of a “poor grammarian” (*vaiyākaraṇasādhūnām*)<sup>125</sup> in Somānanda to the honorific title of *tatrabhavan* in the whole tradition is indeed a journey from negative to the positive revaluation of his contribution. Although Somānanda treats BH primarily as a grammarian who has no *locus standi* for dabbling into the matters philosophical.<sup>126</sup> But on a relook we notice that in his critique Somānanda only aims at limiting the scope of BH as an enunciator of the ultimate nature of things by equating the Supreme Word (*Parāvāk/Śabdabrahman*)<sup>127</sup> with Śiva's power of knowledge<sup>128</sup> and thus underscoring the

<sup>124</sup> *Argument and the Recognition of Śiva: The Philosophical Thought of Utpaladeva and Abhinavagupta*, David Peter Lawrence, Ph. D. Dissertation, Divinity School, Chicago, 1992, n. 13, p. 135

<sup>125</sup> *Śivadṛṣṭi (SD)*, KSS, 2.1

<sup>126</sup> वैयाकरणतां त्यक्त्वा विज्ञानान्वेषणेन किम् । – *SD*.. 2.72<sup>ab</sup>.

<sup>127</sup> इत्याहुस्ते परं ब्रह्म यदनादि तथाक्षयम् ।

तदक्षरं शब्दरूपं सा पश्यन्ती परा हि वाक् ॥ – *ibid.* 2.2

<sup>128</sup> अथास्माकं ज्ञानशक्तिर्या सदाशिवरूपता ।

need for going beyond and as such himself identifying it with the power of will instead, paving the way for the infusion of *Parā*. However, right in the immediate next generation of Somānanda, UTP acknowledges BH's constructive debt, as interpreted by AG, that his formulation of *vimarśa* is in the main drawn from BH. In the AG's exegesis of BH's reference *kārikās*, building upon the central theses developed by his grand teacher UTP, he proceeds with four general formulations:

- (i) Objective reality (*artha*) is constituted by *prakāśa* (light of awareness) implying its ideal character.
- (ii) *Vimarśa* is the essence of *prakāśa*, offering *raison detre* of conceiving reality in terms of *prakāśa*, i.e. pure light of consciousness.
- (iii) *Vimarśa* is posited as the agential functionality or creativity (*kartṛtā*) emanating from and resting within the subjective consciousness which defines consciousness and distinguishes it from un-(or non-)consciousness and sentiency from insentiency at the empirical level.
- (iv) This agential freedom is the word or speech (*vāk*) which has two dimensions – (a) sacred (*māntrī*) and (b) linguistic (*śabdana*) and is marked by fullness expressed as or in terms of "self-affirmation" or "self-repose" (*ahaṃ-pratyavamarśa* or *ahaṃviśrānti*).

In all these formulations, as one instantly finds out, *vimarśa* emerges as AG's 'hermeneutical key' (to use Mark Dyczkowski's phrase). AG grounds in these formulations his ambition of building a meta-philosophy which covers metaphysics, logic, religion, ritual, tantric praxis, yoga, devotion, literary criticism, aesthetics and various art forms integrating them by an underlying unity of thought, purpose, approach and yet nourishing their individual and analytic existence to the highest level of excellence. This all-encompassing vision he spells in terms of recognition leading to his philosophy of the transcendental recognition where one's own identity is 'discovered', 're-cognized' by every instance of acting, becoming, thinking, where one emanates from and returns to oneself in whatever one knows, does or speaks.

This vision, to a great extent, AG inherits from BH. The ideas of word as the creative principle, unity of thought and speech, world of experience constituted by the powers of the word as the ultimate principle, speech as the basis and constitutive of the empirical world of purposeful activities, *vimarśa* and *anusādhāna* (unification) not only participating in apprehending and communicating but also in ordering and coordinating our universe of discourse (*vyavasthā*), language in its transcendental aspect transfiguring into religious language par excellence, soteriology of language leading to self-realization and language being the root of our literary, cultural and aesthetic pursuits all have been taken from BH. Even the major tools and metaphors of crystal, of liquid in a

peahen's yolk, *vāgyoga*, notion of superimposition of the word on meaning (*adhyāsa*), illustration of rapid reading, rapid movement, stillness – all these are drawn by UTP and AG from BH. Here AG's contribution is threefold. First, he continues the basic thrust of BH by meeting criticism from Buddhist logicians specially Dignāga, Dharmakīrti and Dharmottara vis-a-vis their notions of *śabdana* as *abhilāpa* and *apoha* in particular, by defending BH against the attack from the realists and also against the dualistic linguistic formulation of Siddhānta Śaivism; second, he clarifies vague and doubtful areas as for instance the relationship between word and meaning articulated in the word-penetration doctrine (and the use of expressions such as 'as if' – *iva* – as in *anuviddhamiva*), treating meaning as *vivarta* of word (without being sure at to what it stands for: whether transformation or appearance), freedom of the ultimate principle being coloured by nescience, meaning and the process of *pratyavamarśa*, the ontological status of meaning, and the existence of the transcendental level of language as *Parā* – these are, inter alia several areas that demanded a precise formulation. Third, he develops hints and insights which were in incipient stage in BH or were only suggested there in. Here we have a creation of a full-bodied religious language, depicting reality as constituted by the sacred language (*mantraśarīra* or *śabdarāśi*) and its essence as *mantra* or *śabdana*, building up a thoroughly structured aesthetics, integrating speech with resonance within the framework of the basic aesthetical formulations, evolving the notion of enjoyer (*bhoktā*) into that of the aesthete at the level of both metaphysics as well as art-experience rooted in Bh's formulation of the grammatical notion of subject as *bhoktā* and modulating some of foundational linguistic insights – viz., pronouncing the co-eval status of word and meaning and yet synthesizing them into an identity (*śabdārthā-sāmarasya*) instead of treating meaning as *vivarta* and then reducing it to the primal word, understanding thought as having word as its nature (*śabdanātmaka*) and not thought as if pierced by or shot with the word, taking word as the attribute and meaning as the substantive instead of taking word simply as the substantive, going in fact to the extent of making either of them give up their designation as attribute or substantive with in the process of *adhyāsa*,<sup>129</sup> visualizing the word and meaning in harmony instead of the Word-Principle alone as the supreme reality and finally construing the notion of *pratyavamarśa* as *ahaṃ-pratyavamarśa* (self-referring affirmation).

<sup>129</sup> In the empirical realm of linguistic usage this is sought to be achieved by Abhinavan modulation of BH's *śabdavivartavāda* into *śabdādhyāsavāda* in the course of AG's elaboration of the notions of *prakāśa* as *avablāsana* and *vimarśa* as *adhyāsa*: तदयं वाचकस्वरूपाध्यास एव वाच्यत्वं, तदध्यासश्च वाचकत्वमुत्थापयति, इति व्यवहार्यं वस्तु नामरूपलक्षणमनेवरूपतया न कदाचिदास्ते इति, एकान्त एषः।- *IPVV*, II, p. 267. In the light of the above Matilal's observation that UTP and AG supported what is called *śabdādhyāsavāda* as opposed to BH's *Śabdavivartavāda* (vide, On Bhartṛhari's Linguistic Insight, op. cit, p. 6) needs clarification. Though both are adherents of *śabdādvaitavāda*, their *inter se* comparison may be depicted in terms of *śabdādvaita* and *śabdārthā-sāmarasya*.

This issue we propose to examine in a future paper.

AG adopts several strategies to work it out. First of all, as a symbolic gesture, Parama Śiva in masculine gender, is brought in replacing *Śabdabrahman*, in neuter, and is viewed as the Agent par excellence. Deriving from and corresponding to the notions of *prakāśa* and *vimarśa* AG develops two process strategies in the form of *ābhāsana* (manifesting, illuminating) and *vimarśana* (ideating, reflecting). AG then exploits the *vimarśana*-strategy by adopting its several transformations. In the realm of language *vimarśana* emerges as *śabdana*, in analysing art-experience *vimarśana* is transformed into *camatkaraṇa* and *pratibhāna* both as the underlying process and the end-result, in aesthetics and metaphysics *vimarśana* figures as *kalana* to explain the creativity of the artist and by implication that of the supreme artist, i.e. Śiva – the actor, the dancer par excellence, in ritualistic and cosmogonic contexts *vimarśana* serves as *visarjana*, in epistemological analysis it continues to remain as *vimarśana*, and in ritualistic, religious as well as soteriological contexts is reckoned as *mantraṇa*. At a more concrete level by interpreting āgamas, because the word *vimarśa* seldom occurs in the āgamic literature, and at still more immediate level AG and his colleagues exegete BH's *kārikās*, synthesizing them with the insights of their own system in the texts of the system they comment upon. The textual portions where these interpretations appear may be categorized into four groups. It may be noted that *visarjana* and *kalana*, the two modalities of *vimarśa*, have not been considered under these four textual categorizations: (i) Pratyabhijñā-cluster of *kārikās*, viz. *SD* 2.10, *IPK* 1.1.4 and from 1.5.10 to 1.5.20; Āgama-cluster of *kārikās*, represented by *IPK* 4.1.8 to 4.1.10; and Spanda-cluster of *kārikās*, represented by *Sp. K.* 28, 29, 47, 48 and *Śivasutravṛtti* 1.4, 3.19; and others represented by *Ab. Bh.* on *N.S.* 20.26.

For the present we propose to concentrate on the examination of the first four *kārikās* of the Pratyabhijñā-cluster.

Our first encounter with BH's *kārikās* begins with Somāndnda. As part of his presentation of the prima facie standpoint of the Grammarians he quotes *Vāk* 1.115 (123)<sup>ab</sup> without any comment.<sup>130</sup> His illustrious commentator UTP reiterates BH's famous formulation that in all empirical cognitions their expressive verbal element is invariably present.<sup>131</sup> Alluding to a part of the next *kārikā* '*sā hi pratyavamarśinī*' [i.e. *Vāk* 1.116 (124)<sup>d</sup>] he underscores the *vimarśa* character of *vāk* making it imperative to the very notion of the Grammarian's Absolute, designated as *Paśyantī*, interpreting, by implication, the term *prakāśa* as the light of the Brahman, occurring in the first half of BH's *kārikā*<sup>132</sup>,

<sup>130</sup> न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमादुक्ते।...

इत्यादिवाक्यरचनैस्तैरेवं प्रतिपादितम्। – *Śivadṛṣṭi* (*SD*), KSS, 2.10<sup>ab-11<sup>cd</sup></sup>

<sup>131</sup> तथा न स घटादिप्रत्ययो लोकव्यवहारेऽस्ति, यो वाचकशब्दानुगमवर्जितः। वाग्रूपतां विना न ब्रह्मतत्त्वप्रकाशोऽपि प्रकाशेत 'सा हि प्रत्यवमर्शिनी'। इति। तथैवंभूते पश्यन्तीरूपे शब्दाख्ये ब्रह्मणि....। – *Vṛtti* on the above (*SDVṛ*), *ibid.*, p. 44

<sup>132</sup> न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत.....।

which he does not directly quote. Later Somānanda does connect vāk with vimarśa<sup>133</sup> but, as Torella notes, only as a part of the objection that he unfortunately chooses to pass over,<sup>134</sup> out of his self-inflicted compulsion to denigrate the Grammarian. Somānanda remembers *aunmukhya*, “subtle inclination/readiness,” marking the first ever moment of will,<sup>135</sup> which UTP describes as inward looking consciousness what was to emerge later as vimarśa. UTP identifies it with the inward looking free consciousness<sup>136</sup>. Somānanda seems to have been inspired by the idea of “little swelling” (resembling crestless wave) propounded by his senior contemporary Pradyumna Bhaṭṭa with whom Somānanda, otherwise, has fundamental differences.

However, Somānanda’s equation with will’s first moment proved to be the most forceful proof in conclusively establishing the consciousness character of reality. UTP exploited it as a transcendental argument employing *vimarśa* to prove *prakāśa*, to put it in the traditional parlance of the system.<sup>137</sup> It is against this background that we believe UTP’s and AG’s exegesis of BH’s kārikā begins with *IPK* 1.5.10<sup>138</sup> and not 1.5.11 as suggested by the use of “*viduḥ*,”<sup>139</sup> attention to which has already been drawn earlier. UTP conceptualizes will in terms of *vimarśa* mostly in a language that is reminiscent of Somānanda’s not only contentual but even linguistic formulation. The creative will is the subject’s own reflective awareness with regard to the creation of an object shining within.<sup>140</sup> Will is never without an objective reference otherwise it will lead to chaos and confusion. This objective reference has to be internal and has to be so affirmed, since an object will materialize only after the due operation of causal process.

Thus this kārikā conclusively establishes the entire manifested reality being of the nature of pure awareness,<sup>141</sup> which implies internality of the object as continuing even in the manifested state, since essential character never loses its essence.<sup>142</sup> AG in his *Vivṛtivismarśinī* offers several additional insights. According to him, not only the object, but in fact the whole productive process relating to the potential object shines internally in the first volitional pulsation.<sup>143</sup> The argument also

<sup>133</sup> विमर्शानुभवेनैषा यथा वाक् प्रथमं श्रिता । –SD 2.19<sup>ab</sup>.

<sup>134</sup> *The Īśvarapratyabhijñānākārikā of Utpaladeva with the Author’s Vṛtti (IPK vṛ.)* Raffaele Torella, Rome, 1994, “Introduction”, p. XXVI.

<sup>135</sup> भवत्यनुमुखिता चित्ता सेच्छयाः प्रथमा तुटिः । – SD 1.8<sup>cd</sup>.

<sup>136</sup> नैरपेक्ष्येणान्तर्मुखित्वात् चित्ता चैतन्यमेव, तदा सा तुटिः सूक्ष्मकालपरिच्छिन्न इच्छाप्रथमभागः । –SDvṛ., p. 10

<sup>137</sup> तेन अवश्यंभाविनो विमर्शात् तत्प्रकाशोऽनुमीयते । – *Īśvarapratyabhijñānavivṛti-vimarśinī (IPVV)*, Abhinavagupta, KSS, II, p. 167

<sup>138</sup> स्वामिनश्च चात्मसंस्थस्य भावजातस्यम् भासनम् ।

अस्त्येव न विना तस्मादिच्छामर्शः प्रवर्तते ॥

<sup>139</sup> विमर्शं विदुरन्यथा । –*IPK* 1.5.11

<sup>140</sup> प्रतिभासमानार्थैकविषयो निर्मातृतामयो विमर्श इच्छारूपो..... । – *IPKvṛ*, p. 22

<sup>141</sup> तस्मात् स्थितम् अन्तःस्थितं पदार्थजातं तेन विना तद्विषयस्य परामर्शयोगात् इति । –*IPV*, I, pp. 210-211

<sup>142</sup> यदि अन्तःस्थित एव चिदात्मनोऽर्थराशिः, तत्कथमसौ न भासते । कः खलु आह साहसिको न भासते इति । एतदाहसूत्रेण । – *ibid.*, p. 166

<sup>143</sup> सर्वाविभागेन ‘स्थिति’ भाविन उपयोगिरूपस्य । –*IPVV*, II, p. 171

establishes the basic idealistic undertone of the system<sup>144</sup>. Through his analysis of will AG emphasizes the equivalence in the internality of object either at the plane of creative will (*sisṛkṣābhūmi*) or at the plane of residual trace (*saṃskārabhūmi*), i.e. de-creation.<sup>145</sup> AG's major formulation lies in visualizing the kārikā as a precursor to *IPK* 1.5.19 where UTP examines the indeterminate character of thought and its referent both, integrating it with *SD* 1.8-13 and thereby grounding it in the foundational argument that the volitional element, constituting as it does the self-affirming awareness that is *anusādhāna* (a mode of *vimarśa* highlighting its volitional character) accounts for the immediacy or instantaneity in perception.<sup>146</sup> It also points out to the volitional manifestation in generalized form as constituting Paśyantī level of speech.

The *IP* kārikā 1.5.11<sup>147</sup> is as seminal to our understanding Kashmir Śaivism as *Vāk* 1.116<sup>148</sup> to the understanding of BH. What is strikingly remarkable in this context is that AG in his *IPVV* openly acknowledges BH's impact on his formulations.<sup>149</sup> AG pinpoints the centrality of BH's *vāgrūpatā* kārikā and connects UTP's kārikā, under reference, with BH's.<sup>150</sup> AG splits BH's kārikā into two parts and devotes 1.5.11 to the exegesis of 'pratyavamarśinī'–element and 1.5.13 to the 'vagrūpatā'–element. He then, in answer to a self-raised query – 'what did it propound?' – comes out with the central theme of BH's kārikā<sup>151</sup>: That which differentiates light i.e. awareness, from the non-consciousness or insentience, consists in subjective stir and is identical with agentiality, is what we call I-consciousness, i.e. resting on self by definition, due to its absolute non-dependence. The main thrust of the kārikā, then, lies in interpreting pratyavamarśa as I-reflectivity or I-consciousness which serves as the defining component of prakāśa, i.e. reality. AG does not rest at that. Which phrase in the kārikā, he again asks, does he find expressing this idea? From the word *prakāśeta*, is his reply.<sup>152</sup> At this point AG indulges into a dense and protracted hermeneutics of the term 'prakāśeta' employing Mīmāṃsā methodology and comes to the conclusion that it is the verbal element (*ākhyātāṃśa*) in suffix *ta* (in *prakāśeta*) which speaks of the primacy of the agential function:

<sup>144</sup> तदत्र निर्णये विज्ञाननयदूषणप्रस्तावे यदाभासवैचित्र्यकारणत्वेन शङ्कितम् तदपि उपपन्नमेव । – *ibid.*

<sup>145</sup> सर्वमिदं सिसृक्षाभूमौ संस्कारभूमौ च आत्मनि अहमिति प्रकाशमानमवस्थितमेव । – *ibid.*, p. 169

<sup>146</sup> अनुसंधानशब्दं विवृणोति 'तादृगिच्छायोजनेन' इति... विमर्शविशेष एव हि ...ननु दर्शनस्य आत्मभूता इच्छा विमर्शविशेषरूपा इत्येतदेव न सिद्धम् दर्शनानन्तरं हि इच्छा । एतत् परिहरति 'न च' इति । एवं हि सति मन्थरक्रियातस्त्वरिततायाः को विशेषः । – *ibid.*, pp. 233-234.

<sup>147</sup> स्वभावमवभासस्य विमर्शं विदुरन्यथा ।

प्रकाशोऽर्थोपरक्तोऽपि स्फटिकादिजडोपमः ॥

<sup>148</sup> वाग्रूपताचेदुत्क्रामेदवबोधस्य शाश्वती ।

न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत सा हि प्रत्यवमर्शिनी ॥

<sup>149</sup> एतद् संवादयति 'तथा च' इति भर्तृहरिरित्यवोचत् इति संबंधः । – *IPVV*, II, p. 182

<sup>150</sup> केन वाक्येन । आह "वाग्रूपता" इत्यादिना "प्रत्यवमर्शिनी" इत्यन्तेन । – *ibid.*


<sup>151</sup> किमवोचत् । आह

प्रकाशस्य जडवैलक्षण्यं संरम्भः कर्तृतारूपो यः स एव आत्मविश्रान्तिलक्षणो निरपेक्षत्वेन विमर्शोऽहमिति कथ्यते । – *ibid.*

<sup>152</sup> ननु केन शब्देन असौ संरम्भः कारिकायामुक्तः । आह 'प्रकाशेत' । (He refers to "प्रकाशेत" in न प्रकाशः प्रकाशेत सा हि प्रत्यवमर्शिनी.. ) – *ibid.*, p. 182

The, opatative element (in ‘*ta*’ suffix in *prakāśeta*) conveys the idea of *sambhāvanādhikya* (eg. ‘high-ness’ in “high potentiality”: that is, not potentiality but its abundance) alone, whereas verbal element speaks of the rest on/in the primacy of the agential activity (*karoti* in *prakāśaṃ karoti* which is the meaning of *prakāśate*). Then, without opatative element how is this potentiality going to be expressed? If you say that potentiality (of *prakāśeta*) is conveyed by verbal element and hence it does not express “primacy of agential element” (i.e. agential activity, i.e. *karoti*), it is not going to stick. Because what is that with which potentiality is intended to be connected? If it relates to mere absence of a thing (i.e., absence of *prakāśa* vide “*na prakāśaḥ prakāśeta*), then just as non-white cannot be made white, light too cannot be turned into non-light (*aprakāśa*), because it is essentially of the nature of light. Hence potentiality is to be ruled out as the meaning of *liṅ*. Thus externalization (of the internal, that is, the becoming itself being made outward – *bāhyīkṛtameva bhavanam*) alone remains that could be associated with the opatative element. For white does not become white, blue does not become blue, a jar does not become jar, it is only the active or creative element which has entered into their being that alone shines (as the respective objects). This is how the injunction turns out to be accomplished positively, though conveyed negatively: this *prakāśa* “awareness”, alone shines or illuminates, i.e. it is the agent of the activity called shining or illumination. Thus verbal element, i.e. *liṅ* in *prakāśeta*, that is both the opatative element and the verbality (*liṅamśa* and *ākhyātāmśa*) stand for *vimarśa* whose essence is freedom, self-subsistence, and which constitutes the essential, inalienable (*aheya*) body of consciousness. This is what has been called *vāgrūpatā* which is tantamount to *śabdaitṛrūpatā* in *śabdana* (that is, having the nature of one who verbalizes in respect of the activity called verbalization) or metaphorically, which constitutes the eternal law of convention.<sup>153</sup>

AG’s detailed reasoning as above presents before us a conceptual model on the lines of *bhāvanā* exegesis of Mīmāṃsā that may be tentatively tabulated as under:



<sup>153</sup> “लिङ् संभावनाधिक्यमात्रमाह, आख्यातरूपता तु कर्तृव्यापारप्राधान्यविश्रान्तिसतत्त्वेति आशयः। लिङ् अर्थात् संभावनासंस्कारमुच्यते। तत् संभावनाभिधायी अयमन्वयप्रयोगेऽन्तः कर्तृत्वप्राधान्यं निगमयति। ननु यदि वस्त्वभावमात्रं संभावनाविषयत्वेन विवक्षितं, न शुक्लोऽयं, शुक्लः स्यादिति न्यायेन प्रकाशः प्रकाशो (आर्थीभावेदिति प्रकशते वा) कर्तृत्वप्राधान्यं लिङ् शास्त्रेऽप्येत, न श्वेतः श्वेतेत, न नीलं नीलेत, घटो न घटीभावेदिति तु तत्स्वरूपानुप्रविष्ट एव संरम्भार्थो निर्भाति, – इति व्यतिरेकद्वारेण च इत्थं विधिः संपद्यते प्रकाशते च अर्थ प्रकाश इति। तदयं तिङन्तार्थः। एव स्वातन्त्र्यात्मा विमर्शः प्रकाशस्य अहेयं वपुर्वोधस्य या वाग्रूपता शब्दनशब्दयित्तरूपता शाश्वती संकेतादिवत्।” – *IP*, p. 182-183. (प्रकाश) इतिकर्तव्यता (अर्थात्) (प्रत्ययमर्थी) प्रकृति

Though AG’s profound exegesis continues much longer but as the text hereafter is extremely corrupt and full of omissions, further translation has not been attempted. Those interested may refer to the original text, *ibid.*, p. 183. It will be interesting to note that Gajendragadkar translates *śābdī bhāvanā* as verbal creative energy (cf. *Arthasaṅgraha*, Poona, 1934, p. 4). Applying Laugākṣi Bhāskara’s following prescription: “तत्र पुरुषप्रवृत्त्यनुकूलो भावयित्पारविशेषः शाब्दीभावना। सा च लिङ्शेनोच्यते। लिङ्श्रवणेऽयं मां प्रवर्तयति मत्प्रवृत्त्यनुकूलव्यापारवानयमिति नियमेन प्रतीतेः। यद्यस्माच्छब्दान्त्रियमतः प्रतीयेत तत् तस्य वाच्यम्। ... तत्र साध्याकांक्षायां वक्ष्यमाणं शत्रयोपेता आर्थी भावना साध्यत्वेनान्वेति, एकप्रत्ययगम्यत्वेन समानाभिधानश्रुतेः।” (*loc. cit.*). AG would like us to look to the verbal formation *prakāśeta* for a while. Here we find that the word *prakāśeta* conveys, (i) *prakāśa*, the actual illumination-episode, by means of the root (pra+)kās, (ii) *ārthibhāvanā* (“actual creative energy”, *op. cit.*, p. 6) which is here construed to be the superimminence of agential activity by means of verbality (in suffix *ta* in *prakāśe-ta*) and (iii) *śābdī-bhāvanā*, i.e. *sambhāvanādhikya*, by means of opativeness (*liṅtva*), so all the three are understood from one suffix (*ta*) itself having been conveyed by a single common statement (*prakāśeta*) wherein opativeness (in *liṅtva* = *ādhikyamātra*) acts as the denoter and verbality (i.e. primacy of agential activity) as the denoted.

This line of distinction between consciousness and non-consciousness constitutes the main subject matter of *IPK* 1.5.12<sup>154</sup>. Thus all the three *kārikās* are interknitted by a single theme of adding the Kashmir Śaiva perspective to the *kārikā* of BH.

In his exegesis of *IPK* 1.5.11, AG offers some critical insights. UTP openly acknowledges the debt of BH in holding *vimarśa* to be the very nature of *prakāśa*. It simply means if *prakāśa* is light, "*vimarśa* is what makes the object distinguishable and distinct."<sup>155</sup> For a perspectival insight we quote below a passage from Matilal which would be found very germane to the context:

"If Prakash is the flood of light, *vimarśa* is what makes the object distinguishable and distinct..... . The so-called pre-linguistic grasp of the object cannot have any firm grip unless the object is sufficiently distinguished, and if it is sufficiently distinguished, *vimarśa* has already set in, and a *śabdabhāvanā* is implicit. A pure *prakāśa* without *vimarśa* is impossible in this theory... . Perception without conception is blind and conception without perception is mute".<sup>156</sup>

In describing reflective awareness as the very essence of reality AG distances himself from the Advaita Vedāntins whose view of the ultimate reality has no scope for reflective activity or ideation, hence their *Brahman* is supposed to be "without *vimarśa*" (*nirvimarśa*). There is implied criticism of the Sāṃkhya proponents who consider knowledge as reflectional (*pratisaṅkrānti*) but devoid of consciousness. His main target is Buddhists, Dharmakīrti in particular, whose *Nyāyabindu* (1.5 and 2.33) is at the back of his mind. Contradicting him, AG denies *parāmarśa* has anything to do with the association of words, but constitutes the intrinsic nature of knowledge, *jñāna*.<sup>157</sup>

In order to state his position AG evaluates the metaphor of crystal, which his master UTP borrows from BH.<sup>158</sup> The analogy serves BH in two ways – one, to show that we can know the external world through language alone; two, "the crystal analogy illumines its passivity. Language

<sup>154</sup> .... तेन जडात्सहि विलक्षणः ।

<sup>155</sup> "On Bhartṛhari's Linguistic Insight; *op. cit.*, p. 7

<sup>156</sup> *loc cit.*

<sup>157</sup> आर्यधर्मकीर्तेरेवंप्रायाः पृथक्प्रयुक्तीरपरिगणयतः इति उक्तं प्राक् । ...तथा हि न अत्र समयायत्तयोजना उक्ता यतो विकल्पता आपतेत्, अपितु विमर्शरूपता बोधस्य नैसर्गिकी.... इत्याशयेन आह सूत्रम् । – *ibid.*, p. 174

<sup>158</sup> स्फटिकादि यथा द्रव्यं भिन्नरूपैरुपाश्रयैः ।

स्वशक्तियोगात् संबंधं तादृष्येणोपगच्छति । – *Vāk.* III. 3.40

splits up and multiplies what is one, unites what is discrete, but reflects what is in front of it.”<sup>159</sup> However, AG takes recourse to the crystal/mirror analogy to arrive at a different conclusion. In describing *pratyavamarśa* as the essence of knowledge he not only visualizes thought as being dependent upon the word alone, but also on the subject, making word as synonymous with its (subject's) reflectivity and thereby eliminates passivity of language which is now enlivened by the agential participation. In order to drive his point home AG talks of two types of essences – (i) primary and (ii) secondary. According to UTP, light's secondary nature consists in its purity or translucence (*nairmalya* or *svacchatā*) but has nothing to do with non-insentience (*ajādyā*). The primary essence consists in reflection or in being reflectively aware. This is what the term *pratyavamarśa* stands for. Similarly there are three stages of light and their respective lighting sources:

- (i) Simple illumination – as in the case of a lamp, sun or fire. One characteristic of light is that it reveals itself as well as others.
- (ii) Reflection – as in the case of a mirror or crystal. The first characteristic of light is retained here. Besides, these assume or have the capacity to assume the form of the reflected. This latter trait is not found in the former category.
- (iii) Judgement – as in the case of knowledge or cognition. Whereas it shares the former two traits in common with mirror etc., it differs from mirror etc in the sense that it receives reflection and at the same time knows that it is receiving reflection. Now this capacity of being aware, of consciously appreciating, responding and reacting is what is known as *pratyavamarśa*.

It is this *pratyavamarśa* which constitutes the primary essence or the principal nature of knowledge. Since such a conscious apperception is not possible without being grounded in the conscious subject, it is identified with the subjective reflectivity transfiguring consciousness into I-consciousness, distinguishing the sentient from the insentient which is incapable of conscious appropriation.<sup>160</sup> We may go back to the AG's analysis of BH's *kārikā*. It will be evident as to why he insists so much on the verbal element in the suffix part. In an analogous and yet slightly different etymological formulation he notes that the stem part in *prakaśate* or *prakāśeta*, that is the root (*pra*) + *kāś*, is common to all lighting sources in its passivity, whereas the suffix part underlies the agential activity and freedom<sup>161</sup> which is the extraordinary mark of the consciousness of light or *prakāśa*. It is

<sup>159</sup> *Bhartrhari and the Buddhists*, Radhikā Herzberger, Holland, 1986, p. 52

<sup>160</sup> प्रकाशस्य असंसृष्टस्य तत एव अर्कादिप्रकाशविलक्षणस्य परसारूप्यं प्रतिविम्बायमानपरतादात्म्यक्षमत्वमस्ति स्वभावान्तरं यतस्तेन वपुषा घटादेर्बोधो विशिष्यते, तथापि न तत् मुख्यं जडेऽपि मणिमुकुरप्रभृतौ तस्य संभवात्, विमर्शस्तु जडे न संभवति इति अनन्यविषयत्वात् स मुख्य आत्मेति उक्तम्। – *IPVV*, II, P. 177

<sup>161</sup> अत्र नैर्मल्याद् प्रकाशनरूपात् प्रकृतिमात्रविश्रान्तादतिरिक्तः कर्तृतालक्षणः स्वातन्त्र्यस्वभावो यः प्रत्ययस्य अर्थः। – *ibid*.

why in the later *kārikās* we find AG often compare the Buddhists with the Sāṃkhya followers in this particular aspect. On this line of thought we now understand that AG differs from the Buddhists not only in his evaluation of the notion of *vimarśa* alone, but in that of *prakāśa* also. Because in the Buddhist formulation of knowledge, it does not go beyond correspondence or conformity of the knowledge with the object (*sārūpya* or *parasārūpya*) and hence stops at the second or intermediary level, whereas the Abhinavan formulation goes beyond and embraces subject (i.e. agent).

Now once having succeeded in infusing agential participation, AG adds at least two more dimensions to the notion of *pratyavamarśa* emerging from its conceptualization in terms of primacy (*mukhyatā*). The first (in fact he opens his commentary here with the solemn declaration of his intent and then repeats the same in the beginning of 1.5.13 also) happens to be that *pratyavamarśa* is constitutive of the religious language and that it has a soteriological dimension to it. *Pratyavamarśa* is transconventional religiosity innate within us nourished by the fact that those who really know also know that the entire knowledge in its deepest aspect consists in *mantra* which may be understood to consist in transcendental apperception of the ultimate reality as belonging to and enshrined within our innermost self.<sup>162</sup> Thus the tantric formulations of religious and spiritually symbolic languages as *mātrikā* and *mālinī* etc. are resorted only to deepen our awareness.

The second dimension that AG, following UTP, adds to it is aesthetical.<sup>163</sup> In this context AG integrates the notion of joy with *pratyavamarśa*. Joy is the feeling of fulfillment – an experience of perfection, wherever there is even slightest joy it is due to self-reflective awareness (*svātmaparāmarśa*). Thus higher the level of self-fulfillment, deeper the joy. Carrying it to its logical end, *vimarśa* is transformed into the notion of *camatkāra* (“aesthetic relish”). The most compact and dense reflection over one’s own being, where the subjective part subjugates and overwhelms the objective part is *camatkāra*<sup>164</sup> which consists in relishing primarily the subjective aspect. The notion of connoisseur is modelled exactly in the same terms.<sup>165</sup> This formulation of AG comes from an entirely original appreciation and re-interpretation of the BH’s understanding of the experience as *bhoga* which has its roots in the agent (*kartā*) being treated as *bhoktā* in the Grammarian school from the very beginning.

<sup>162</sup> अवभासयति अर्थानिति अवभासः प्रकाशः, तस्य विमर्शमहमिति अकृत्रिममसाङ्केतिकं स्वातन्त्र्यरूपमात्मविश्रान्तिलक्षणं स्वभावं जानन्ति ते तत्त्वविदो ये मन्त्रशरीरं बोधतत्त्वं श्रीमातृकाश्रीमालिन्यादितत्त्वं मन्यन्ते। युक्तं चैतत्। – *ibid.*, p. 174

<sup>163</sup> यस्तु आनन्दांशस्तत्रस्वात्मपरामर्शरूपतैव प्रयोजिका। – *ibid.*, p. 178

<sup>164</sup> तस्मादनुपचरितस्य संवेदनरूपतानन्तरीयकत्वेन अवस्थितस्य स्वतन्त्रस्यैव रसनैकघनतया परामर्शः परमानन्दो निर्वृतिश्चमत्कार उच्यते। – *ibid.*, p. 179

<sup>165</sup> तत एव हृदयेन परामर्शलक्षणेन प्राधान्यात् व्यपदेश्या व्यवस्थितस्यापि प्रकाशभागस्य वेद्यविश्रान्तस्य अनादरणात् सहृदयता उच्यते। – *ibid.*, p. 178-179

The following *kārikā*, i.e. *IPK* 1.5.12,<sup>166</sup> as we had occasion to note, acts as a bridge between *IPK* 1.5.11 and 1.5.13 and has been inspired by *Vāk* 1.118 (126) and *Vṛtti* thereon. At both the places (in *IPVV* on *IPK* 1.1.4 and *IPV* on *IPK* 1.5.14) the way it is cited<sup>167</sup> it appears to have formed part of the *Vākyapadiya kārikās* and not of the *Vṛtti*. However it is a textual problem and may be left at that. UTP in this *kārikā* offers two interpretations of Vasugupta's *Śivasūtra* placing attribute and substantive in apposition (cf. *caitanya* 1.1). According to him this deliberate positioning of the two by Vasugupta is intended to convey the supremacy of the attribute, i.e. consciousness, over the conscious agent. By incorporating Vasugupta in the *IP* *kārikās* and Kallaṭa in the *IPV* and *IPVV*, AG wants to demonstrate that the whole tradition supports this formulation.

By grammatically analyzing the derivation of the word *caitanya*, AG unfolds UTP's new equation between consciousness *qua* activity and consciousness *qua* agency.<sup>168</sup> This formulation seems to have been prompted by the *Vṛtti* where it lays down identity between the Word-Principle and the activity of consciousness. However the main difference lies in their formulation of *citi* "(principle of) consciousness." In BH *caitanya* is understood to constitute the activity of consciousness (*citikriyā*)<sup>169</sup>. But AG goes beyond. He reduces all activity (*citikriyā*) to the agency (*citau kartṛtā*) and this is what that constitutes the consciousness as a potential source of distinction between the sentient and the insentient. AG seems to be saying that even when *caitanya* is spoken of as activity it must be deemed to be none other than the agency ever present in consciousness. In the *IPV*, AG embarks upon a new theorization where *caitanya* is interpreted as both the activity as well as the agency.<sup>170</sup> On this interpretation BH's formulation in the *Vṛtti* as the activity of consciousness may be supported, but AG also notes that it has no support from the tradition. It may be noted that though the term *vimarśa* does not figure in the present *kārikā*, AG in the *IPV* and *IPVV* both, reduces *caitanya* into *vimarśa* and projects the latter as the single most distinctive attribute of the self.<sup>171</sup>

AG arrogates these lines from Bh to support our notion of life at a more practical level in his *IPVV* on *IPK* 1.1.4<sup>172</sup>. The powers (or the faculties, one may say) of knowledge and action constitute

<sup>166</sup> आत्मात एव चैतन्यं चित्क्रियाचितिकर्तृता ।

तात्पर्येणोदितस्तेन जडात्स हि विलक्षणः ॥

<sup>167</sup> सैषा संसारिणां संज्ञा बहिरन्तश्च वर्तते ।

तदुक्त्वात्तौ विसंज्ञोऽयं दृश्यते काष्ठकुड्यवत् ॥

<sup>168</sup> तथाहि संबन्धिविश्रान्तस्य प्रतीतेः द्रव्यरूपस्य च संबन्धिनः प्रकृत्या उक्तत्वात् चित्तक्रियारूपं धर्मं संबद्धमवगमयता ष्यजा निष्कृष्टांशः प्रत्यायितो भवति । – *IPV*, I, p. 247

<sup>169</sup> वाक्त्वरूपमेव चित्तक्रियारूपमित्यन्ये । – *Vṛtti* on *Vāk*. 1.118, p. 193

<sup>170</sup> यदि वा चित्तक्रिया आत्मा उदितः चित्तिकर्तृता च इति पृथगेव । एवं तु न क्वचित् पठितम् । – *ibid.*, p. 249

<sup>171</sup> तदेवं परत्वेन प्रधानतया अभिसंधाय आत्मा चेतन इति वक्तव्ये धर्मान्तराधरीकरणाय विमर्शधर्मोद्धुरीकरणाय च आत्मा चैतन्यम् इत्युक्तम् । – *ibid.*, pp. 248-249

<sup>172</sup> तथा हि जडभूतानां प्रतिष्ठा जीवदाश्रया ।

ज्ञानं क्रिया च भूतानां जीवतां जीवनं मतम् ॥

the very life of the sentient beings and the being of the insentient depends entirely on the sentient. The three terms occurring in BH e.g. – *antaḥsaṃjñā*, *baḥihsaṃjñā* and *visaṃjñā*, it appears, form the central theme of the discussion.<sup>173</sup> It is through the sense of speech and the language spoken that we get access to one’s sentiency in the absence of which one is supposed to be dead or senseless, because it is speech that urges and engages us in our pragmatic pursuits that constitute our practical life.<sup>174</sup> These faculties of knowledge and action are the practical or the more concrete manifestations of our consciousness. Thus AG enlarges the ambit of BH’s *kārikās*, because the life of the sentient is not self-confined, it touches and enlivens the life of even the insentient objects with which we deal and interact making life an ordered whole. Thus AG, like BH, visualizes continuity between the two levels and a clear appreciation of this fact, AG demonstrates, helps one realize one’s inner divinity.<sup>175</sup>

As we said earlier, UTP’s next *kārikā* 1.5.13<sup>176</sup> is perported to be an exegesis of the *vāgrūpatā* element of *Vāk*. 1.116.<sup>177</sup> Going by AG, both in the *IPV* and *IPVV*, this *kārikā* is addressed to UTP’s two main concerns: One, this subjective agency (which was the central theme of the preceding *kārikā*), having *parāmarśa* as its nature, essentially consists in *mantra* and *śabdana*; two, this agency stands for the sovereignty, to use Padoux’ term, of the Supreme Self (*aiśvarya*).<sup>178</sup> The other concern lies in offering additional support to the theme of previous *kārikā* that *pratyavamarśa*’s structural essentiality distinguishes the sentient from the insentient.<sup>179</sup> The additional ground, furnished by this *kārikā*, consists in enlarging the scope of consciousness-activity by equating *vimarśa* with supreme speech and freedom in its primary sense.

As part of his exegetical strategies AG offers two formulations of *pratyavamarśa* in the *IPV*. The first formulation is in terms of *camatkāra* which qualifies the consciousness-activity (*citikriyā*)<sup>180</sup> and the other in terms of *śabdana* which encompasses the consciousness-agency (*citikartṛtā*). The second formulation ipso facto incorporates the first, hence ultimately there remains only one formulation. This is the reason that in the *IPVV*, however, this exegetical distinction has not been maintained.

<sup>173</sup> अत्र अर्थे तत्रभवद्भर्तृहरिपठितमागमं लिखति । तदुल्लान्तौ इति । – *IPVV*, I, p. 100

<sup>174</sup> बहिरपितु यत् विशेषवृत्तिरूपं वचनादानादि.....तेन वागादिद्वारेण तादात्म्यापन्नमान्तरमपि जीवनं प्रत्यक्षत्वेनैव अभिमन्यते । – *ibid.*

<sup>175</sup> तदयं प्रमाता ज्ञानक्रियाशक्तियोगादीश्वरः । – *ibid.*, p. 68

<sup>176</sup> चित्तिः प्रत्यवमर्शात्मा परावाक् स्वरसोदिता ।

स्वातन्त्र्यमेतन्मुख्यं तदैश्वर्यं परमात्मनः ॥

<sup>177</sup> Here we will refer the reader to the brilliant article by Raffaele Torella, “The Word in Abhinavagupta’s *Bṛhad-vimarśinī*”, *The Variegated Plumage*, eds. NB. Patil and M. Kaul, Delhi, 2003, pp. 80-104, which in the main focuses on *IPK* 1.5.13 and 1.5.19. We will concentrate only on those aspects which not have been touched there or need some special focus.

<sup>178</sup> परामर्शमयी विमर्शनलक्षणैव या कर्तृता सैव....मान्त्री शब्दनरूपा । ...परमात्मनश्च एषैव कर्तृता ऐश्वर्यम्... एतदुभयमाह कारिकया । – *IPVV*, p. 187

<sup>179</sup> (a) तस्मात् युक्तमुक्तम्...तेन जडात् स हि विलक्षणः । – *IPV*, I, p. 255

(b) ततो युक्तमवोचाम ..... तेन जडात्स हि विलक्षणः । – *IPVV*, II, p. 198

<sup>180</sup> चेतयति इत्यत्र या चित्तिः चित्तिक्रिया, तस्याः प्रत्यवमर्शः स्वात्मचमत्कारलक्षण आत्मा स्वभावः । – *IPV*, I, p. 251

It is the latter exposition of *pratyavamarśa*<sup>181</sup> by AG in his *IPV* that has attracted world-wide attention.<sup>182</sup> *Pratyavamarśa* is an inner verbalization not dependent upon any convention, a state of uninterrupted self-relishing, and happens to be the source and foundation of all such other thoughts as find expressions in phrases like ‘this is blue’ ‘I am Caitra’ which draw their essence from the use of conventional words. The implicit reference to the ground *pratyavamarśa* and the superstructural one, or the primary and secondary *pratyavamarśas*, leads AG’s commentator Bhāskara to think of the two types of thoughts namely (i) those in the nature of pure reflectiveness (*citirūpapratyavamarśa*) and (ii) those in the nature of determinate or mentally constructed reflectiveness (*vikalparūpapratyavamarśa*).

By reducing *pratyavamarśa* to *śabdana* the way is paved for identifying *pratyavamarśa* with *Parā Vāk*.<sup>183</sup> It is *Parā* because it is full, complete and it is *Vāk* because it expresses everything and this speaking is in the nature of *vimarśana*: it formulates, as explained by Bhāskara<sup>184</sup>, “through conscious identification-cum-recognition.”<sup>185</sup>

AG, elsewhere, explains the logic behind terming *vimarśa* as *vāk* in an extremely complex formulation. He says, in order to appreciate *vimarśa* as *vimarśa* it is necessary that it is called *vāk*, because *vimarśa* is nothing but verbalizing for the simple reason that it is grounded in experience.<sup>186</sup> This method of articulation, not through utterance but through the inner reflective process, is what brings us back to the māntric nature of speech and its phonematic progression. In the *kārikā*, the use of word *parā* does not indicate any reference to the quadripartition of speech, at least so far as the *IPV* is concerned. There *Parā*, being full because of the non-dependence on any external element, expresses itself as “I”, whereas other non-ultimate states, whose fullness varies, find expression as “this”. But in the *IPVV*, AG considers this aspect in detail *vis-a-vis* BH’s tripartition theory. We are not concerned with this issue at the moment. It is however interesting to know that by the time of Abhinava, the new generation of grammarians started subscribing to the fourth level of speech as against the three levels accepted by BH. This is what one gathers from the very conscious reference to the ‘aging grammarians’ (*jaradvaiyākaraṅāḥ*) made by AG himself.<sup>187</sup>

<sup>181</sup> प्रत्यवमर्शश्च आन्तराभिलापात्मकशब्दनस्वभावः, तच्च शब्दनं सङ्केतनिरपेक्षमेव अविच्छिन्नचमत्कारात्मकम् अन्तर्मुखशिरोनिर्देशप्रख्यम् अकारादिमायीयसाङ्केतिकशब्दजीवितभूतनीलमिदं चैत्रोऽहमित्यादिप्रत्यवमर्शांतरभित्तिभूतत्वात् । – *ibid.*, pp 252-253

<sup>182</sup> See, *Vāc, The Concept of the Word*, Andre Padoux, Eng. trans., by Jacques Gontier, New York, 1990, pp. 174-177; *Bhartṛhari*, pp. 107-108

<sup>183</sup> पूर्णत्वात् परा, वक्ति विश्वमभिलपति प्रत्यवमर्शेन इति च वाक् । – *ibid.*, p. 253

<sup>184</sup> प्रत्यवमर्शवृत्त्या न तु उच्चारवृत्त्या । – *Bhāskarī*, *IPV*, I, P. 253

<sup>185</sup> *Bhartṛhari*, p. 107

<sup>186</sup> विमर्शस्य च संवेदनालंबित्वात् शब्दनरूपतास्वीकारेण विमर्शरूपताभिधानाय वाक्पदमुपात्तम् । – *IPVV*, I, p. 105

<sup>187</sup> ननु पश्यन्त्येव परं तत्त्वमिति जरद्वैयाकरणा मन्यन्ते – *ibid.*, II, p. 191

In IPK 1.5.14 UTP does not add anything new in regard to BH's theorization of Vāk, but as the concluding kārikā of the Pratyabhijñā-cluster (of kārikās), he does close his exegesis by referring to Vāk 1.115 and 1.116 in the *IPVV*, and by quoting them in full in the *IPV*. According to AG, UTP is invoking scriptural and āgamic support for his formulation. In enlisting agamic sanction AG places BH in the sacred company of the *Mālinīvijayottara tantra* and the *Sarvavīratāntra*.

Uncovering Āgamic roots, UTP invents a few more equations of pratyavamarśa with the “dynamic vibration” (*sphurattā*) and the “absolute becoming” (*mahāsattā*). AG derives them grammatically in terms of the subjective agency where even becoming becomes an expression of the Supreme Self's agential function in terms of being. Another exegetic addition is viewing these equations in terms of śakti. Thus *sphurattā* is linked to *spandaśakti* when referred to the *Spanda Kārikā* and *vimarśaśakli* when related with the *Śivadṛṣṭi*: As *mantra* it is *parāvākśakti* and as *pratyavamarśa* it is *citiśakti*. Spanda is so interpreted as to account for the notion of unification or holding together (*pratisandhānā*) which is made to play an extremely significant role in the Abhinavan analysis of indeterminate cognition. By an exegesis of the word *sāratāyā* (lit., "by virtue of being the essence") AG reverts to *IPK* 1.1.4 and grounds the insentient in the conscious and the conscious in the pure awareness (*prakāśa*) and the consciousness or thought in the I-consciousness (*ahaṃ-vimarśa*). Thus *mantra*, representing as it does 'I-consciousness', is presented as the heart, which according to AG, is not metaphorical but very much real.<sup>188</sup>

We have to stop here. Though there are many issues that remain to be attended to and also many insights that may be gathered from a perusal of the remaining kārikās of this cluster as well as those of other clusters, it is time to leave the issues here to be taken up at some other point of time in future. Thus we may conclude that it is to the credit of AG and his mentor UTP that the holistic and processive implications of BH's theory of word-impregnation are fully brought into bold relief by visualizing language as a dynamic creative principle firmly rooted in the agential wholeness from which the entire stretch of subjective and objective reality and its phenomenal and transphenomenal manifestations are logically abstracted to be recognized as self-identical emergent referents in I-

<sup>188</sup> नोपचरितं हृदयत्वम्, अपितु मुख्यत्वेन इति भावः। – *IPVV*, II, 203

experience. In sum, *vāk qua* *pratyavamarśa* emerges as becoming (*bhavattā/sphurattā*), as experiencing (*sañvedana*), as verbalizing/expressing (*śabdana*) and as relishing (*bhoga/āsvādana*) marked by a homologous inner reciprocity in the exegesis of AG.